Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
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Sébastien Courtin
und
Bertrand Tchantcho
Abstract
This work focuses on (j, 2) games in which there are several levels of approval in the input, i. e. games with n players, j ordered qualitative alternatives in the input level and 2 possible ordered quantitative alternatives in the output. When considering (j, 2) games, we extend the Public Good index (PGI), the Null Player Free index (NPFI) and the Shift index (SI) and provide full characterizations of these extensions.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank this University for its hospitality. This work has also benefited from comments and encouragemen by a number of conference and seminar participants.The authors thank also ane anonymous reviewers and one associate Editor for their useful comments. This research was developed within the CoCoRICo-CoDEC research program (ANR-14-CE24-0007-02).
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Notes
This project was written while B. Tchantcho was visiting the University of Caen.
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
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- Research Articles
- Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
- Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
- Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
- Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
- Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
- Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
- On the Economic Value of Signals
- The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
- Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
- Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
- Costly Rewards and Punishments
- Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
- Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
- On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
- Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
- Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
- Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
- Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
- Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
- Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
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- A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
- Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
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- A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
- Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
- Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
- Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation
