The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
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Aymeric Lardon
Abstract
In this article we study Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies under the α and β-approaches. We first prove that the core of any game can be partially characterized by associating a Bertrand oligopoly TU-game derived from the most efficient technology. Such a game turns to be an efficient convex cover of the original one. This result implies that the core is non-empty and contains a subset of payoff vectors with a symmetric geometric structure easy to compute. We also deduce from this result that the equal division solution is a core selector satisfying the coalitional monotonicity property on this set of games. Moreover, although the convexity property does not always hold even for standard Bertrand oligopolies, we show that it is satisfied when the difference between the marginal cost of the most efficient firm and the one of the least efficient firm is not too large.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Research Articles
- Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
- Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
- Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
- Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
- Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
- Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
- On the Economic Value of Signals
- The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
- Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
- Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
- Costly Rewards and Punishments
- Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
- Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
- On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
- Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
- Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
- Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
- Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
- Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
- Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
- Notes
- A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
- Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
- Unbundling Production with Decreasing Average Costs
- A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
- Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
- Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
- Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation
