Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
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Jaeok Park
Abstract
In this paper, we study decision making and games with vector outcomes. We provide a general framework where outcomes lie in a real topological vector space and the decision maker’s preferences over outcomes are described by a preference cone, which is defined as a convex cone satisfying a continuity axiom. Further, we define a notion of utility representation and introduce a duality between outcomes and utilities. We provide conditions under which a preference cone is represented by a utility and is the dual of a set of utilities. We formulate a decision-making problem with vector outcomes and study optimal choices. We also consider games with vector outcomes and characterize the set of equilibria. Lastly, we discuss the problem of equilibrium selection based on our characterization.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to two anonymous referees and the participants in the Yonsei–Kyoto–Osaka Economic Theory Workshop for helpful comments. I acknowledge the hospitality of the Institute of Economic Research at Kyoto University, where part of this research was conducted. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A5A2A02925750).
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Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
- Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
- Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
- Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
- Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
- Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
- On the Economic Value of Signals
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- Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
- Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
- Costly Rewards and Punishments
- Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
- Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
- On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
- Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
- Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
- Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
- Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
- Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
- Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
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- A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
- Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
- Unbundling Production with Decreasing Average Costs
- A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
- Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
- Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
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