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Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition

  • Banchongsan Charoensook EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: June 8, 2019

Abstract

Bi and branching networks are two classes of minimal networks often found in the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks. Why so? In this paper, we answer this question by establishing a generalized condition that holds together several models in the literature, and then show that this condition is sufficient to guarantee their common result: every non-empty component of minimal Strict Nash network is either a branching or Bi network. This paper, therefore, contributes to the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks by merging together several existing works.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Reviewer 1 for his comments on the intuition of this paper and Reviewer 2 for his meticulous editorial comments, which help improve this paper substantially. At Keimyung Adams College, I thank my assistants - Youngjin Lee, Cho Young Ju, Jang Hyeon Bong, and Son Jae Tong - for their excellent help that substantially saved the time required for this research. In the previous years I also had several other assistants beside these four. While not being mentioned here by name, I nevertheless express my gratitude for their efforts. This research is supported by Keimyung University Bisa Grant for which the author feel thankful."

Appendix

A Proofs of Lemmas

Figure 6: 
Networks with six agents.
Figure 6:

Networks with six agents.

Proof of Lemma 1.

Without loss of generality consider the network ①. There is a chain i1,i2,i3,i4 . We will show that if i2i1i3 then i2i4i3 . To do so, let us assume that i2i1i3 .[11] This assumption necessitates that in the network ②, which is the viewpoint of i1 that contains both agents i2 and i3 , i2 is better informed than i3 , where the term ‘better informed’ refers to the fact that i2 has more total ex-post information than i3 does.

Now let us modify the network ② by eliminating the link gˉi3i4=1 , which results in the network ③. Observe that by removing gˉi3i4=1 from the network ②, both i2 and i3 lose information from i4 . However, i3 loses more information from i4 than i2 does because i3 is closer to i4 than i2 . This fact and the fact that i2 is better informed than i3 in ② imply that i2 is also better informed than i3 in ③.

Next, let us modify the network ③ by adding the link gi2i1=1 so that the network ③ becomes the network ④. Observe that in ④ the agent i2 is closer to i1 than i3 is. This observation together with the fact that in ③ i2 is better informed than i3 and that the network ④ is simply ④ = ③ + i1i2 lead to the conclusion that in ④ i2 is better informed than i3 . Finally, observe that ④ is nothing else but the viewpoint of i3 that contains i2 and i1 . This fact and the aforementioned fact that in ④ i2 is better informed than i3 allow us to conclude that i2i4i3 .   □

Proof of Lemma 2.

Let us consider a chain i1,i2,...,in1,in . Without loss of generality let us assume that i2i1in1 . Consequently our goal is to show that i2inin1 . Before so doing, we remark that in the model of Charoensook (2015) and any model that assumes no information decay any agent i prefers agent x to y if and only if ci,xci,y . Onwards, we use this fact to complete this proof.

Now since it is assumed that i2i1in1 we know that ci1,i2ci1,in1 . Due to the fact that C={ci,j:i,jN,ij} satisfies UPR, ci1,i2ci1,in1 necessitates that cin,i2cin,in1 , which in turn necessitates that i2i1in1 .   □

Proof of Lemma 3.

[If a minimally connected network has no inward-pointing chain with more than three agents, then this network is either Bi or branching]

The absence of inward-pointing chain with more than three agents results in the fact that there are three types of four-agent chain in a minimally connected network. The first type sequentially consists of links {i1i2,i2i3,i3i4} . The second type sequentially consists of links {i2i1,i2i3,i3i4} . The third type sequentially consists of links {i1i2,i3i2,i3i4} . Note that the first and the second types are such that there is no agent who receives more than one link, while the third case is such that there is exactly one agent who receives more than one link. Onwards we split our proof into two subsections. In the first subsection, we show that the absence of the third type leads to a network that is branching. On the contrary, in the second subsection we show that the presence of the third type leads to a Bi network.

Let us proceed to the first subsection. First, note that since the absence of the third type of four-agent chain is assumed, the network consists of chains that are of either first type or second type or both. We claim that in any case this network is a branching network. Assuming, without loss of generality, that a chain of the first type exists, recall that the sequence of link in this chain is {i1i2,i2i3,i3i4} .[12] We first show that there is at least one agent who receives no link. Suppose not. Then it is the case that i1 receives a link from another agent j1 , who receives a link from another agent j2 . This analogy repeats infinitely, causing the network to consist of an infinite number of agents. A contradiction. Hence, there is at least one agent who receives no link. Next, we show that there is exactly one such agent. Let this agent be i . The fact that i receives no link necessitates that i establishes a link with all his adjacent agents. Hence, each of his adjacent agents receives exactly one link. The fact that each of these neighbors receives exactly one link from i further necessitates that he establishes links with all his adjacent agents who are not i . Thus, beside i every other agent receives exactly one link and establishes at least one link unless he is a terminal agent. We conclude, therefore, that this network is a branching network.

Next, we proceed to the second subsection, which is to show that if the third type of chain – {i1i2,i3i2,i3i4} – is present then this network is a Bi network. Indeed, we can show that this network is Bi2 network. To do so we let j be an agent who is a adjacent agent of one of these four agents – i1,i2,i3 and i4 . Clearly j receives a link from one of these four agents. Otherwise, it is straightforward to show that an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents exist. For example if j is a adjacent agent of i1 and j establishes a link with i1 , then the chain ji1,i1i2,i3i2 is inward pointing. Similarly, any adjacent agent of j that is not one of these four agents also receives a link from j. By repeating this analogy, we have a path from any adjacent agent of i2 to a terminal agent in this network. Put differently, any agent in this network can be reached through a path from an agent that is an adjacent agent of i2 . It follows that a subset of the set of all adjacent agents of i2 forms a contrabasis of this network. Finally, observe that since there is a path from any adjacent agent of i2 to a terminal agent in this network, i2 is the only agents who receives more than one link and every other agent receives exactly one link. We conclude, therefore, that this network is Bi2 network.

If a minimally connected network is either a branching or Bi network, there exists no inward-pointing chain in this component.

To do so, we prove that if there exists an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents in a minimally connected network, then the network is neither a branching or Bi network. We divide our proof into two steps: (i) if an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents exists, then the network has at least one agent i who receives more than one link, which necessitates that the network is not a branching and (ii) this agent i is not an i point contrabasis of this network, which necessitates that the network is not a Bi network.

Let us prove the first step: if an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents exists, then the network has at least one agent i who receives more than one link. Consider an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents. Let this chain be between i and j. Let i accesses i’ and j accesses j’ in this chain. Next, to prove by contradiction let us suppose that there is no agent who receives more than one link. Then since i accesses i’, we know that i’ also accesses his adjacent agent in this chain. By repeating this analogy we know that j’ access j. A contradiction. It follows that this inward-pointing chain with more than three agents contains at least one agent who receives more than one link. Let this agent be i .

We now prove the second step: i is not an i -point contrabasis of this network. First recall from the previous paragraph that i resides in an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents, and this chain is between i and j where ii,j . Next, consider a chain between i and j. To prove by contradiction let us suppose that i is a point contrabasis and the network is Bi . The assumption that i is a point contrabasis necessitates that there is a path from a adjacent agent of i to j. Let this adjacent agent of i be k. Since a path from k to j exists, we know that k accesses one of his adjacent agents, and this agent access another agent. By repeating this analogy we know that j’ accesses j. A contradiction to the assumption that j accesses j’ in this inward-pointing chain.   □

Proof of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1.

By Lemma 3, it suffices to prove that if a two-way flow model satisfies PCPP condition, no SNN has an inward-pointing chain. To prove by contradiction, let us assume that in an SNN an inward-pointing chain exists. By the definition of inward-pointing chain with more than three agents- i1,i2,....,in1,in – we know that i1 accesses i2 and in accesses in1 . Since in a SNN every agent chooses his best response, this further necessitates that i2i1in1 and in1ini1 , which is a contradiction to the presupposition that the two-way flow model satisfies PCPP condition.   □

Proof of Corollary 1

In the previous section, Lemma 1 and 2 show that the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and the model of Charoensook (2015) satisfy the PCPP. Note that Proposition 1 of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) generalizes Proposition 5.4 of Bala and Goyal (2000). Note further that Proposition 1 of Charoensook (2015) generalizes Proposition 1 of Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011), Proposition 3.1 Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) (Proposition 3.1) and Proposition 4.2 of Bala and Goyal (2000) because all these models have no decay and their cost structures satisfy the UPR condition, which is assumed in Charoensook (2015). Consequently our results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which show that the model of Charoensook (2015) and the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) respectively satisfy PCPP, are general enough to conclude that these models and their propositions satisfy the PCPP condition. In turn, by Proposition 1 above we can conclude that every non-empty component of SNN in these model are either minimal Bi or branching.   □

Additional Examples

This subsection is a continuation and a complement of Discussion 2 (Section 4.2), which includes numerical examples such that minimal SNNs remain Bi or branching although PCPP is violated. Interestingly enough, in this subsection we show that precisely the same sets of numbers and assumptions also give rise to minimal SNNs that are neither Bi or branching. Therefore, a conclusion from this subsection and Section 4.2 is that once PCPP is violated we cannot guarantee that every non-empty component of a minimal SNN is either Bi or branching.

Example 6.

Using precisely the same assumptions as in Example 4, consider the minimally connected network thar is neither Bi nor branching in Figure 7. We claim that this network, which is neither Bi nor branching, is SNN. In addition this minimal network violates PCPP.

To show that PCPP is violated, consider the chain between 1 and 4. Note that σ12σ13 but σ43σ42 . Therefore 213 but 342 respectively. Hence, PCPP is violated.

Finally, it remains to be proven that this network is SNN. This can be done by tediously confirming that each agent plays his unique best response. We leave this task to our readers.

Figure 7: 
Example 6.
Figure 7:

Example 6.

Example 7.

Using precisely the same assumptions as in Example 5 consider the minimally connected network thar is neither Bi nor branching in Figure 8. We claim that this network, which is neither Bi nor branching, is SNN. In addition this minimal network violates PCPP.

To show that PCPP is violated, consider the chain between 5 and 1. First, note that V54>V52 but V12>V14 . Second, note that σ = 0.999 and c = 0.98 which are very close to 1, imply that a superfluous link is not worth establishing by an agent. Therefore, V54>V52 and V12>V14 leads to 452 and V14>V12 respectively. Hence, PCPP is violated.

Next, to prove that this network is SNN we need to show that σ = 0.999 and c = 0.98 are sufficiently high so that no superfluous link can improve an agent’s payoff. Also we need to show that each agent chooses his unique best response. These can be proven by tediously confirming that a deviation always reduces an agent’s payoff. We leave this tedious task to our readers.

Figure 8: 
Example 7.
Figure 8:

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Published Online: 2019-06-08

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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