Abstract
Bi and branching networks are two classes of minimal networks often found in the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks. Why so? In this paper, we answer this question by establishing a generalized condition that holds together several models in the literature, and then show that this condition is sufficient to guarantee their common result: every non-empty component of minimal Strict Nash network is either a branching or Bi network. This paper, therefore, contributes to the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks by merging together several existing works.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Reviewer 1 for his comments on the intuition of this paper and Reviewer 2 for his meticulous editorial comments, which help improve this paper substantially. At Keimyung Adams College, I thank my assistants - Youngjin Lee, Cho Young Ju, Jang Hyeon Bong, and Son Jae Tong - for their excellent help that substantially saved the time required for this research. In the previous years I also had several other assistants beside these four. While not being mentioned here by name, I nevertheless express my gratitude for their efforts. This research is supported by Keimyung University Bisa Grant for which the author feel thankful."
Appendix
A Proofs of Lemmas

Networks with six agents.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Without loss of generality consider the network ①. There is a chain
Now let us modify the network ② by eliminating the link
Next, let us modify the network ③ by adding the link
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let us consider a chain
Now since it is assumed that
Proof of Lemma 3.
[If a minimally connected network has no inward-pointing chain with more than three agents, then this network is either
The absence of inward-pointing chain with more than three agents results in the fact that there are three types of four-agent chain in a minimally connected network. The first type sequentially consists of links
Let us proceed to the first subsection. First, note that since the absence of the third type of four-agent chain is assumed, the network consists of chains that are of either first type or second type or both. We claim that in any case this network is a branching network. Assuming, without loss of generality, that a chain of the first type exists, recall that the sequence of link in this chain is
Next, we proceed to the second subsection, which is to show that if the third type of chain –
If a minimally connected network is either a branching or
To do so, we prove that if there exists an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents in a minimally connected network, then the network is neither a branching or
Let us prove the first step: if an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents exists, then the network has at least one agent i who receives more than one link. Consider an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents. Let this chain be between i and j. Let i accesses i’ and j accesses j’ in this chain. Next, to prove by contradiction let us suppose that there is no agent who receives more than one link. Then since i accesses i’, we know that i’ also accesses his adjacent agent in this chain. By repeating this analogy we know that j’ access j. A contradiction. It follows that this inward-pointing chain with more than three agents contains at least one agent who receives more than one link. Let this agent be
We now prove the second step:
Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.
By Lemma 3, it suffices to prove that if a two-way flow model satisfies PCPP condition, no SNN has an inward-pointing chain. To prove by contradiction, let us assume that in an SNN an inward-pointing chain exists. By the definition of inward-pointing chain with more than three agents-
Proof of Corollary 1
In the previous section, Lemma 1 and 2 show that the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and the model of Charoensook (2015) satisfy the PCPP. Note that Proposition 1 of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) generalizes Proposition 5.4 of Bala and Goyal (2000). Note further that Proposition 1 of Charoensook (2015) generalizes Proposition 1 of Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011), Proposition 3.1 Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) (Proposition 3.1) and Proposition 4.2 of Bala and Goyal (2000) because all these models have no decay and their cost structures satisfy the UPR condition, which is assumed in Charoensook (2015). Consequently our results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which show that the model of Charoensook (2015) and the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) respectively satisfy PCPP, are general enough to conclude that these models and their propositions satisfy the PCPP condition. In turn, by Proposition 1 above we can conclude that every non-empty component of SNN in these model are either minimal
Additional Examples
This subsection is a continuation and a complement of Discussion 2 (Section 4.2), which includes numerical examples such that minimal SNNs remain
Example 6.
Using precisely the same assumptions as in Example 4, consider the minimally connected network thar is neither
To show that PCPP is violated, consider the chain between 1 and 4. Note that
Finally, it remains to be proven that this network is SNN. This can be done by tediously confirming that each agent plays his unique best response. We leave this task to our readers.

Example 6.
Example 7.
Using precisely the same assumptions as in Example 5 consider the minimally connected network thar is neither
To show that PCPP is violated, consider the chain between 5 and 1. First, note that
Next, to prove that this network is SNN we need to show that σ = 0.999 and c = 0.98 are sufficiently high so that no superfluous link can improve an agent’s payoff. Also we need to show that each agent chooses his unique best response. These can be proven by tediously confirming that a deviation always reduces an agent’s payoff. We leave this tedious task to our readers.

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Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
- Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
- Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
- Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
- Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
- Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
- On the Economic Value of Signals
- The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
- Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
- Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
- Costly Rewards and Punishments
- Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
- Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
- On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
- Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
- Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
- Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
- Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
- Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
- Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
- Notes
- A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
- Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
- Unbundling Production with Decreasing Average Costs
- A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
- Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
- Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
- Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation
Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
- Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
- Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
- Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
- Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
- Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
- On the Economic Value of Signals
- The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
- Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
- Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
- Costly Rewards and Punishments
- Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
- Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
- On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
- Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
- Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
- Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
- Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
- Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
- Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
- Notes
- A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
- Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
- Unbundling Production with Decreasing Average Costs
- A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
- Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
- Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
- Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation