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Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies

  • Anuj Bhowmik und Maria Gabriella Graziano EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 20. September 2019

Abstract

This paper analyses two properties of the core in a two-period exchange economy under uncertainty: the veto power of arbitrary sized coalitions; and coalitional fairness of core allocations. We study these properties in relation to classical (static) and sequential (dynamic) core notions and apply our results to asset markets and asymmetric information models. We develop a formal setting where consumption sets have no lower bound and impose a series of general restrictions on the first period trades of each agent. All our results are applications of the same lemma about improvements to an allocation that is either non-core or non-coalitionally fair. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that if all the members of a coalition achieve a better allocation in some way (for instance, by blocking the status quo allocation or because they envy the net trade of other coalitions) then an alternative improvement can be obtained through a perturbation of the initial improvement.

Appendix

A Appendix

Suppose that H is a sub-restriction of G , and f and h are two H -allocations such that Vt(h(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on some coalition S. We say that (f,h,S,H) satisfies the property (P) if the following is true:

There exist some 0 < λ < 1 and some 0 < η < 1 such that for all

z{ηHi:i1}B(0,η)Ω,

there is an assignment y z such that yz(t,)e(t,)4Ht , Vt(yz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on S, and

S(yze)dμ+z=(1λ)S(he)dμ.

Analogously, we say that (f,h,S,H) satisfies the property (Q) if the following is true:

There exist some 0 < η < 1 and a sub-coalition R of S such that for all

z{ηHi:i1}B(0,η)Ω,

there is an assignment ξ z such that ξz(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(ξz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on R, and

R(ξze)dμ+z=12S(he)dμ.

Lemma 5.17

Let H be a sub-restriction of G and (A9) be satisfied for H . Suppose also that (A 1)–(A 4), (A 6) and (A 7) hold true. Assume that f and h are two H -allocations such that Vt(h(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on some coalition S. Then (f,h,S,H) satisfies the property (P) if either of the following two conditions is satisfied:

  1. a S  > 0.

  2. a S  = 0, there is an ɛ > 0 such that e(t,ω)+B(0,ε)Xt(ω) for all ( t,ω)T×Ω , and, moreover, there are some i0ΛS and δ > 0 such that

    2μ(Si0)D(he)dμHi0

    for any measurable subset D of S with µ(D) < δ.

Proof

Let {δm:m1}(0,1) be a decreasing sequence converging to 0. For all i ∈ Λ S and r1 , define the set

Sir:=tSi:e(t,ω)+B0,1rXt(ω)for allωΩ.

Consider the function ψ:S×ΩR , defined by ψ(t,ω):=diste(t,ω),R Xt(ω) . Since ψ( · , ω) is T -measurable for all ω ∈ Ω, the set

Sir=tSi:ψ(t,ω)1rfor all ωΩ

is T -measurable. Moreover, {Sir:r1} is increasing and Si{Sir:r1} for all i ∈ Λ S .[12] If Λ S is finite, choose an integer r1 with μ(Sir)>2μ(Si)3 for all i ∈ Λ S . Define κ to be 1r if (i) is satisfied; and ɛ, otherwise. Let

dR++B0,κ3.

Choose some ζ<κ3 such that dB(0,ζ)R++ . In case (ii) holds, pick a finite subset Θ of Λ S such that i 0 ∈ Θ, iΛSΘμ(Si)<δ and

2μ(Si0){Si:iΛSΘ}(he)dμB(0,ζ)Ω.

Define Ψ: = Λ S if (i) is satisfied; and Θ, if (ii) is satisfied. Let E:={Sir:iΨ} if (i) is satisfied; and S, otherwise. For all m1 , define the function hm:S×ΩR by letting  

hm(t,ω):=(1δm)h(t,ω)+δm(e(t,ω)3d),if (t,ω)E×Ω;(1δm)h(t,ω)+δme(t,ω),otherwise.

Put,

Rm:=tS:Vt(hk(t,))>Vt(f(t,))forallkm.

By (A 4) and (A 6), the mapping ξk:SR , defined by

ξk(t):=Vt(hk(t,))Vt(f(t,)),

is T -measurable and so is R m . It is obvious that {Rm:m1} is increasing and S{Rm:m1} . It follows from the absolute continuity of Lebesgue integral that there is some γ > 0 such that

2bD(he)dμB0,ζΩ

for any measurable subset D of S with µ(D) < γ, where b:=min{μ(Si)|iΨ} . For each i ∈ Ψ, define Gi:=Sir if (i) is satisfied; and S i , if (ii) is satisfied. Choose some m' such that μ(SRm)<min{γ,c4} , where c:=min{μ(Gi)|iΨ} . Hence,

μ(GiRm)>3μ(Gi)4>μ(Si)2b2

and

2bSiRm(he)dμB0,ζΩ

for all i ∈ Ψ. Thus, one obtains

1μ(GiRm)SiRm(he)dμB0,ζΩ

for all i ∈ Ψ. Put, λ: = δ m' and

η:=minλζμ(GiRm):iΨ.

Let z{ηHi:iK}B0,ηΩ and define

zˆi:=1λ|Ψ|μ(GiRm)z,

where |Ψ| denotes the number of elements in Ψ. Assuming z = ηz' for some z{Hi:iK} , one obtains

zˆi=αiζz|Ψ|

for some 0<αi1 and for all i ∈ Ψ. Since Hi is convex and 0Hi , one obtains zˆiHi for all i ∈ Ψ. On the other hand, z(ω)B(0,η) implies zˆi(ω)B(0,ζ) for all i ∈ Ψ. By Lemma 5 in Shitovitz (1973), one has

1μ(Si Rm)SiRm(he)dμHi

for all i ∈ Ψ. Since μ(SiRm)<μ(GiRm) , the above together with the fact that Hi is convex and 0Hi further yield

1μ(GiRm)SiRm(he)dμHi0,ζΩ

for all i ∈ Ψ. Define

ciz:=zˆi+1μ(GiRm)SiRm(he)dμ

for all iΨ{i0} ; and

ci0z:=zˆi0+1μ(Gi0Rm)Si0Rm(he)dμ+{Si:iΛSΘ}(he)dμ,

if (ii) is satisfied. Obviously, ciz3HiB0,κΩ for all i ∈ Ψ. Thus, e(t,ω)cizXt(ω) for all ( t,ω)Gi×Ω and i ∈ Ψ. For all i ∈ Ψ, consider an assignment giz:Si×ΩR+ defined by

giz(t,ω):=(1λ)h(t,ω)+λ(e(t,ω)ciz(ω)),if(t,ω)(GiRm)×Ω ;(1λ)h(t,ω)+λe(t,ω),if(t,ω)((SiRm)Gi)×Ω ;h(t,ω),otherwise.

It is easy to verify that giz(t,ω)Xt(ω) for all ( t,ω)Si×Ω . Since ciz3Hi , one must have giz(t,)e(t,)4Hi for all tGiRm . Likewise, it can be shown that giz(t,)e(t,)4Hi for all tS i . Moreover, giz(t,ω)hm(t,ω) for all tGiRm . It follows that

Vt(giz(t,))>Vt(hm(t,))>Vt(f(t,))

for all tGiRm . Hence, Vt(giz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) for all tS i . It can be checked that

Si(gize)dμ+z|Ψ|=(1λ)Si(he)dμ.

for all iΨ{i0} ; and

Si0(gi0ze)dμ+z|Ψ|=(1λ)Si0(he)dμλ{Si:iΛSΘ}(he)dμ,

if (ii) is satisfied. Define the assignment yz:T×ΩR by letting

yz(t,ω):=giz(t,ω),if (t,ω)Si×Ω,iΨ;h(t,ω),otherwise.

It can be simply checked that y z satisfies the required condition.                   □

Proposition 5.18

Suppose that H is a sub-restriction of G that satisfies (A9). Assume further that f and h are two H -allocations such that Vt(h(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on some coalition ST0 . Then (f,h,S,H) satisfies the property (Q) .

Proof

Choose an i0K such that μ(SIi0)>0 . By Lemma 5.17, (f,h,SIi0,H) satisfies the property (P) . Then there exist some 0 < λ < 1 and some 0 < η < 1 such that for all

z{ηHi:i1}B(0,η)Ω,

there is an assignment y z such that yz(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on SIi0 and

SIi0(yze)dμ+z=(1λ)SIi0(he)dμ.

Let η0=η2 and take any z{η0Hi:i1}B(0,η0)Ω . Then zˆ=2z{ηHi:i1}B(0,η)Ω . So, there is an assignment yzˆ such that yzˆ(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yzˆ(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on SIi0 and

SIi0(yzˆe)dμ+zˆ=(1λ)SIi0(he)dμ.

By the Lyapunov convexity theorem, there is a coalition R1SIi0 such that

R1(he)dμ=λSIi0(he)dμ.

Define the correspondence Γf:R1(R)Ω by letting

Γf(t):=zXt:ze(t,)4HtandVt(z)>Vt(f(t,)).

Clearly, R1yzˆdμR1Γfdμ and R1hdμR1Γfdμ . Since R1Γfdμ is convex, one obtains

12R1yzˆdμ+12R1hdμR1Γfdμ.

So, there is an assignment φzˆ such that R1φzˆdμR1Γfdμ and

R1φzˆdμ=12R1yzˆdμ+12R1hdμ.

This implies that

R1(φzˆe)dμ=12R1(yzˆe)dμ+12R1(he)dμ.

Again, by the Lyapunov convexity theorem, there are coalitions R2(SIi0)R1 and R3SIi0 such that

R2(yzˆe)dμ=12(SIi0)R1(yzˆe)dμ

and

R3(he)dμ=12SIi0(he)dμ.

Let R:=R1R2R3 and define an assignment ξz:T×ΩR such that

ξz(t,ω):=φzˆ(t,ω),if (t,ω)R1×Ω;yzˆ(t,ω),if (t,ω)R2×Ω;h(t,ω),otherwise.

Thus, ξz(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(ξz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on R, and

R(ξze)dμ+z=12S(he)dμ.

                                                 □

Proof of Theorem 3.4.

Choose an ɛ ∈ (0, µ(S)). Let α ∈ (0, 1) be such that ɛ = α µ(S). It follows from the Lyapunov convexity theorem that there exists a coalition E such that µ(E) = α µ(S) and E(he)dμ=αS(he)dμ=0 . Thus, there is a coalition E with µ(E) = ɛ and E(he)dμ=0 . If µ(S) = µ(T) then nothing is remaining to prove. So, assume that µ(S) < ɛ < µ(T). By Proposition 5.18, there exist an η > 0 and a sub-coalition R of S such that for all z{ηHi:1in}B0,ηΩ , there is an assignment y z such that yz(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on R, and

(1) R(yze)dμ+z=12S(he)dμ.

Let

β:=1εμ(R)μ(TR).

By the Lyapunov convexity theorem, there is a coalition BTR such that μ(B)=(1β)μ(TR) and

B(fe)dμ=(1β)TR(fe)dμ.

Let

D:={βηHi:1in}B0,βηΩ,

and define g:T×DR by

g(t,z):=Vt(f(t,)+z)Vt(f(t,)).

Since g( · , z) is T -measurable for all zD and g(t,  · ) is continuous with respect to the subspace topology of the usual topology on D for all tT, g is TB(D) -measurable. Define the correspondence Λf:TD by letting

Λf(t):=zD:g(t,z)>0.

By our assumption, Λf(t) for all tT. Moreover, GrΛf is TB(D) -measurable. Consider the correspondence Φf:TD defined by

Φf(t):=zD:f(t,ω)+z(ω)Xt(ω)forallωΩ.

As X t (ω) is closed, Φ f (t) can be equivalently expressed as

Φf(t)=zD:dist(f(t,ω)+z(ω),Xt(ω))=0forallωΩ.

Since 0 ∈ D, Φf(t) for all tT. As before, one can show that GrΦf is TB(D) -measurable. Let Ψf:TD be a correspondence defined by Ψf(t):=Λf(t)Φf(t) for all tT. By our assumptions, Ψf(t) for all tT. Moreover, GrΨf is TB(D) -measurable. By the Aumann-Saint-Beuve measurable selection theorem, there is a T -measurable selection ξ of Ψ f such that g(t, ξ(t)) > 0 for all tT. Define

d:=1μ(B)Bξdμ.

By Lemma 5 in Shitovitz (1973), one has

d{βηHi:1in}B0,βηΩ.

So,

c:=dμ(B){βηHi:1in}B0,βηΩ

and

c0:=cβ{ηHi:1in}B0,ηΩ.

Thus, by eq. (1), there is an assignment yc0 such that yc0(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yc0(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on R, and

R(yc0e)dμ+c0=12S(he)dμ=0.

As in the proof of Proposition 5.18, one can show that there is an assignment φ such that φ(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(φ(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on R, and

R(φe)dμ=βR(yc0e)dμ+(1β)R(fe)dμ.

Let E: = RB. Consider an assignment ψ:T×ΩR defined by[13]

ψ(t,ω):=φ(t,ω),if (t,ω)R×Ω;f(t,ω)+ξ(t,ω),otherwise.

Obviously, ψ is an assignment with ψ(t,)e(t,)4Ht µ-a.e. on T and µ(E) = ɛ. Furthermore, Vt(ψ(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on E. It can be easily verified that E(ψe)dμ=0 . This completes the proof.                                                 □

Proof of Theorem 3.9.

Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem is satisfied. The rest of the proof is decomposed into two cases:

Case 1. μ(S1S2)=μ(T) . It is not difficult to show that there is an assignement φ such that φ(t,)e(t,)Ht and Vt(φ(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on S 1, and

S1(φe)dμ=12S1(he)dμ+12S1(fe)dμ.

This implies that

S1(φe)dμ=12S1S2(fe)dμ=0.

This is a contradiction to that fact that f is in the ex ante core.

Case 2. μ(S1S2)<μ(T) . By the Lyapunov convexity theorem, there is a coalition BTS2 such that μ(B)=12μ(TS2) and

B(fe)dμ=12TS2(fe)dμ.

By Proposition 5.18, there exist an η > 0 and a sub-coalition R of S such that for all z{ηHi:1in}B0,ηΩ , there is an assignment y z such that yz(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on R, and

(2) R(yze)dμ+z=12S1(he)dμ.

Applying an argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 3.4, one can show that there exists an element

cηHi:1inB0,ηΩ

such that c=Bξdμ , where

  1. ξ(t)ηHi:1inB0,ηΩ ;

  2. f(t, · ) + ξ(t) ∈ X t ; and

  3. Vt(f(t,)+ξ(t))>Vt(f(t,))

for all tB. Thus, by eq. (2), there exists an assignment y c such that yc(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yc(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on R, and

R(yce)dμ+c=12S1(he)dμ=12S2(fe)dμ.

Thus,

R(yce)dμ+B(fe)dμ+c=0,

which further implies

R(yce)dμ+B(f+ξe)dμ=0.

Define the assignment ψ:T×ΩR by letting

ψ(t,ω):=yc(t,ω),if (t,ω)R×Ω;f(t,ω)+ξ(t,ω),if (t,ω)(BR)×Ω;f(t,ω),otherwise.

Note that ψ(t,)e(t,)4Ht µ-a.e. on T. If µ(RB) = 0 then f is ex ante blocked by RB via ψ, which is a contradiction. So, assume that µ(RB) > 0 and rewrite the above equality as

12RB(ψe)dμ+RB(ψe)dμ+12BR(ψe)dμ=0.

Thus, there exist R1,R2T such that R1RB and R2BR such that

R1(ψe)dμ+RB(ψe)dμ+R2(ψe)dμ=0.

Thus, the coalition E:=R1(RB)R2 ex ante blocks f via ψ, which is a contradiction.

Proof of Theorem 3.12.

Suppose that the hypothesis of the theorem is true. The rest of the proof is completed by considering the following two cases:

Case 1. μ(S1S2)=μ(T) . This case can be done analogous to Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.9.

Case 2. μ(S1S2)<μ(T) . By Lemma 5.17, there exist a λ ∈ (0, 1) and an η > 0 such that for all z{ηGi:1in}B0,ηΩ , there is an assignment y z such that yz(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yz(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on S 1, and

(3) S1(yze)dμ+z=(1λ)S1(he)dμ.

By the Lyapunov convexity theorem, there are coalitions B1S2 and B2T(S1S2) such that

B1(fe)dμ=λ2S2(fe)dμ

and

B2(fe)dμ=12T(S1S2)(fe)dμ.

Let B:=B1B2 . Applying an argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 3.4, one can show that there exists an element

cη2Hi:1inB0,η2Ω

such that c=Bξdμ , where

  1. ξ(t)η2Hi:1inB0,η2Ω ;

  2. f(t, · ) + ξ(t) ∈ X t ; and

  3. Vt(f(t,)+ξ(t))>Vt(f(t,))

for all tB. Define

c0:=2c{ηHi:1in}B0,ηΩ.

Thus, by eq. (3), there exists an assignment yc0 such that yc0(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(yc0(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on S 1, and

S1(yc0e)dμ+c0=(1λ)S1(he)dμ=(1λ)S2(fe)dμ.

Thus, one has

S1(yc0e)dμ+λS2(fe)dμ+TS2(fe)dμ+c0=0.

Hence, one can find an assignment φ such that φ(t,)e(t,)4Ht and Vt(φ(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on S 1, and

S1(φe)dμ=12S1(yc0e)dμ+12S1(fe)dμ.

As a result, one obtains

S1(φe)dμ+B(fe)dμ+c=0,

which is equivalent to

S1(φe)dμ+B(f+ξe)dμ=0,

Thus, the coalition R: = S 1B ex ante blocks f via ψ, defined by

ψ(t,ω):=φ(t,ω),if (t,ω)S1×Ω;f(t,ω)+ξ(t,),if (t,ω)B×Ω;f(t,ω),otherwise.

Since ψ(t,)e(t,)4Ht µ-a.e. on T, one arrives at a contradiction.   □

Proof of Theorem 4.4.

Suppose that g is a feasible assignment in E(f) not belonging to the ex post core of E(f) . Then there are some state ω 0, coalition S and assignment h in E(f;ω0) such that ut(ω0,h(t))>ut(ω0,g(t,ω0)) µ-a.e. on S, and

Shdμ=Sf(,ω0)dμ.

Since Corollary 3.5 is valid when Ω = {ω 0} and Gt=R for all tT, we can conclude the following: for any 0 < ɛ < µ(T), there must exist some coalition R and assignment y in E(f;ω0) such that ut(ω0,y(t))>ut(ω0,g(t,ω0)) µ-a.e. on R, and

Rydμ=Rf(,ω0)dμ.

This completes the proof.                                    □

Proof of Theorem 4.11.

Suppose that gC(E;f) . Without loss of generality, suppose that g is not ex post C(T0,T1)(E;f) -fair. Thus, there exist a state ω 0, two disjoint elements S1T0 , S2T1 and an assignment h in E(f;ω0) such that ut(ω0,h(t))>ut(ω0,g(t,ω0)) µ-a.e. on S 1, and

S1(hf(,ω0))dμ=S2(g(,ω0)f(,ω0))dμ.

Since Corollary 3.5 is valid when Ω = {ω 0} and Gt=R for all tT, we can conclude that g is not in the core of E(f;ω0) , which is is a contradiction. This completes the proof.                                                          □

B Appendix

The additional material contained in this appendix allows us to apply our main results to asset markets which are not necessarily complete. The proofs reproduce those of previous theorems and are omitted.

Assume that Xt(ω)=R for all ( t,ω)T×Ω . Thus, (A 1) and (A 2) are satisfied trivially. Let π:Ω×RmR be a function such that π(ω,  · ) is linear, π(ω,x)R+{0} for all xR++m , and π(ω, 0) = 0. Define

Ht=Gt={(π(ω,x(ω)):ωΩ):x(ω)Rmfor all ωΩ}

for all tT. It is evident that (A 8) and (A 9) are satisfied. Let a:T×ΩRm and b:T×ΩRm be such that a( · , ω) and b( · , ω) are Lebesgue integrable for all ω ∈ Ω,

f(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,a(t,ω))andh(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,b(t,ω)).

The following fact is a consequence of the construction of the assignment y z in the proof of Lemma 5.17: there are some 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < η < 1 such that for all dR++mS(0,η) [14], there is some cd:T×ΩRm such that c d ( · , ω) is Lebesgue integrable function for all ω ∈ Ω and yz(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,cd(t,ω)) for all ( t,ω)T×Ω , and

(4) Scd(,ω)dμ+d=(1λ)Sb(,ω)dμ

for all ω ∈ Ω. On the other hand, defining in the proof of Proposition 5.18 the correspondence Γf:R1(R)Ω as

Γf(t):=x(Rm)Ω:Vt(π(,x())+e(t,))>Vt(f(t,))

and applying similar arguments, one can find some sub-coalition R of S and 0 < η < 1 such that for all dR++mS(0,η) , there exists a function ξd:T×ΩRm such that ξ d ( · , ω) is Lebesgue integrable function for all ω ∈ Ω and ξz(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,ξd(t,ω)) for all ( t,ω)T×Ω , and

(5) Rξd(,ω)dμ+d(ω)=12Sb(,ω)dμ

for all ω ∈ Ω.

In the light of above remarks and equations, one can obtain the following results.

Theorem 5.19.

Assume that the economy E is atomless (that is, T1= ). Let a:T×ΩRm and b:T×ΩRm be such that a( · , ω) and b( · , ω) are Lebesgue integrable for all ω ∈ Ω,

f(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,a(t,ω))andh(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,b(t,ω)).

Suppose further that there is a coalition S such that Vt(h(t,))>Vt(f(t,)) µ-a.e. on S, Ta(,ω)dμ=0 and Sb(,ω)dμ=0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Suppose that f is not in the ex ante core. Under (A 3)–(A 7), for any given 0 < ɛ < µ(T), there is a coalition R, a function c:T×ΩRm and an assignment y such that µ(R) = ɛ and f is ex ante blocked by R via y; and y(t, · ) – e(t, · ) = π(ω, c(t, ω)) for all ( t,ω)T×Ω . Moreover, if a(t,):ΩRm and b(t,):ΩRm are constant µ-a.e. on T then c(t,):ΩRm can be chosen to be constant µ-a.e. on T, and Rc(,ω)dμ=0 .

Theorem 5.20.

Suppose that a:T×ΩRm is a function such that a(t, · ) is constant µ-a.e. on T, Ta(,ω)dμ=0 for all ω ∈ Ω, and

f(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,a(t,ω)).

Let there be no coalition S and function b:T×ΩRm such that b(t, · ) is constant µ-a.e. on T, Sb(,ω)dμ=0 for all ω ∈ Ω and

Vt(e(t,)+π(ω,b(t,ω)))>Vt(f(t,))

µ-a.e. on S. Under (A 3)–(A 7), there do not exist two disjoint elements S1T0 and S2T1 , and a function c:T×ΩRm such that µ-a.e. on S 1 and for each ω ∈ Ω:

  1. c(t, · ) is constant;

  2. Vt(e(t,)+π(ω,c(t,ω)))>Vt(f(t,)) ;

  3. S1c(,ω)dμ=S2a(,ω)dμ .

Theorem 5.21.

Suppose that a:T×ΩRm is a function such that a(t, · ) is constant µ-a.e. on T, Ta(,ω)dμ=0 for all ω ∈ Ω, and

f(t,ω)e(t,ω)=π(ω,a(t,ω)).

Let there be no coalition S and function b:T×ΩRm such that b(t, · ) is constant µ-a.e. on T, Sb(,ω)dμ=0 for all ω ∈ Ω and

Vt(e(t,)+π(ω,b(t,ω)))>Vt(f(t,))

µ-a.e. on S. Under (A 3)–(A 7), there do not exist two disjoint elements S1T1 and S2T0 , and a function c:T×ΩRm such that µ-a.e. on S 1 and for each ω ∈ Ω:

  1. c(t, · ) is constant;

  2. Vt(e(t,)+π(ω,c(t,ω)))>Vt(f(t,)) ;

  3. S1c(,ω)dμ=S2a(,ω)dμ .

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Published Online: 2019-09-20

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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