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A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution

  • Makoto Hagiwara ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 12. September 2019
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Aus der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Band 20 Heft 1

Abstract

We consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Nash implementation; no-envy solution; procedural fairness; simple game form
JEL Classification: C72; D71; D78

Acknowledgements

This study was carried out during the stay at University of Rochester. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this journal and William Thomson for their invaluable advice and suggestions. I also thank Shunsuke Hanato, Takehiko Yamato, and the participants at a study group (University of Rochester, 2018) for helpful comments. This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP17J01520 and JSPS Overseas Challenge Program for Young Researchers Grant Number 201780041 (Funder Id: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001691). I thank Editage (www.editage.jp) for English language editing.

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Published Online: 2019-09-12

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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  21. Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
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  23. A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
  24. Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
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https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0051
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
Nash implementation; no-envy solution; procedural fairness; simple game form

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Research Articles
  2. Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
  3. Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
  4. Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
  5. Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
  6. Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
  7. Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
  8. On the Economic Value of Signals
  9. The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
  10. Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
  11. Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
  12. Costly Rewards and Punishments
  13. Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
  14. Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
  15. On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
  16. Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
  17. Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
  18. Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
  19. Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
  20. Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
  21. Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
  22. Notes
  23. A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
  24. Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
  25. Unbundling Production with Decreasing Average Costs
  26. A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
  27. Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
  28. Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
  29. Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation
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