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On the Economic Value of Signals

  • Adib Bagh EMAIL logo und Yoko Kusunose
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 25. Juni 2019

Abstract

We provide sufficient conditions for the economic value of a signal to be a convex function, either locally or globally, of the input required to produce the signal. We also provide conditions under which this input can be interpreted as a measure of the information contained in this signal. We demonstrate that, under certain conditions, information is a very peculiar good that can—globally—show increasing marginal utility. In contrast to the earlier approach used to obtain the classic results on the local lack of concavity of the value of information, our approach allows permits the investigation of concavity (or lack) of the function representing the value of information, without imposing any conditions of differentiability on this function. Our approach also allows us to show that the marginal value of information can be zero even at an informative signal. Finally, we discuss some of the difficulties that can arise in designing price discrimination schemes for selling signals with various levels of quality.

JEL Classification: D83

Appendix

A Proofs of the claims in Section 1

Proof of Theorem 1.1 For every θ, we have Σi=1Ifij(θ)=1. Therefore, for k=1,,K , we have

(22)Σi=1Ifij,k(θ)=0.

Applying the Envelope Theorem (specifically, applying Corollary 4 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) to the function defined in eq. (3) in Section 1), we get

(23)Vk(α,θ)=maxaM(α,θ)Σj=1Jαj{Σi=1Ifij,k(θ)u(xj,ai)}.

If assumption (a) of Theorem 1.1 holds, then clearly,Vk(α,θ)=0 , for k=1,,K .

Under assumptions (b) of Theorem 1.1, for any k, eq. (23) becomes

Vk(α,θ)=Σj=1Jαj{Σi=1Ifij,k(θ)Cj}

for some constants C1,,CJ . Hence by eq. (22), we get

Vk(α,θ)=Σj=1Jαj{Σi=1Ifij,k(θ)Cj}=Σj=1JαjCj{Σi=1Ifij,k(θ)}=0.

Proof of Corollary 1.1 Let αintΔJ . First, note that Ni(α,θ0)=N(α) . Moreover, the assumptions on u(xi,) imply that l(α, a) is a strictly concave function of A . Therefore, N(α)={a} for some aA . Since M(α,θ0)=[N(α,θ0)]I , this implies that

M(α,θ0)=z=(a,,a).

Therefore, for every j and every zM(α,θ0) , u(xj,ai)=u(xj,a)=andCj . The conclusion of the corollary follows from applying Theorem 1.1.

Proof of Corollary 1.2 Under either assumption (a) or (b), we have θV(α,θ0)=0 by Theorem 1.1 (θV is the gradient of V with respect to θ).[12] Since V(α,θ0)=0 and V(θˆ,α) for some θˆΘ , we have

V(α,θˆ)V(α,θ0)>0=θV(α,θ0)[θˆθ0],

and therefore, V cannot be concave on Θ . Had V been concave on Θ , we would have had V(α,θˆ)V(α,θ0)Vθ(α,θ0)[θˆθ0] for all θΘ .

Proof of Corollary 1.3 Let G(α,θ)=V(α,θ)C(θ) . Then, our assumption on C(θ)—with either assumption (a) or (b) of Theorem 1—imply that θG(α,θ0)<0 on some neighborhood of θ0 . Using the first order Taylor approximation of G at θ0 , and using the facts that G(α,θ0)=0 and Θ=[θ0,θ1]K , we conclude that there exists a neighborhood W(θ0) of θ0 such that G(α, θ') < 0 for all θW(θ0)Θ .

Proof of Theorem 1.2. Fix α. The assumptions of the theorem imply that there is a unique boundary (not in the interior of A ) solution a to the problem maxaAl(α,a) . This, in turn, implies that

M(α,θ0)=(a,,a)AI.

The definition of li(α,θ0,a) implies that

ali(α,θ0,a)intNCA(a).

Assumption (ii) of the theorem and assumption A1 imply that the vector-valued function ali(α,θ,a) is continuous in θ for all i. Hence, there exists a neighborhood Wˆ(θ0) of θ0 such that for all θWˆ(θ0)Θ , we have

ali(α,θ,a)intNCA(a),

for every i. Assumption (i) of the theorem implies that there exists a neighborhood W˜(θ0) of θ0 such that for all θW˜(θ0)Θ , the function li(α,θ,) is strictly concave. Therefore, letting W(θ0)=W˜(θ0)Wˆ(θ0) , a is still the unique solution of maxaAli(α,θ,a) , and hence Ni(α,θ)={a} for all i and for all θW(θ0)Θ . This implies that

M(α,θ)=(a,,a),

on W(θ0)Θ . Part (b) of Theorem 1.1 now implies that Vk(α,θ)=0 on all of W(θ0)Θ .

B Proofs of the claims in Section 2

Proof of Theorem 2.1 Fix αintΔ2 . The non-concavity of f and g imply the existence of θ', θ′′ and θ˜=λθ+(1λ)θ , with λ ∈ (0, 1), such that

(24)f(θ˜)<λf(θ)+(1λ)f(θ),

and

(25)g(θ˜)<λg(θ)+(1λ)g(θ).

If V(α,θ˜)=0 , then by the second half of assumption (c), we must have that either V(α, θ') > 0 or V(α, θ′′) > 0, and in this case it is clear that

V(α,θ˜)<λV(α,θ)+(1λ)V(α,θ).

Now assume V(α,θ˜)/=0 . For every zZ, the expression for h in eq. (2) can be re-expressed as

(26)h(α,z,θ)=C(z)+m1(z)f(θ)+m2(z)g(θ),

where

m1(z)=[U(G,a1)U(B,a1)]f(θ),
m2(z)=[U(B,a2)U(G,a2)]g(θ),

and

C(z)=αU(G,a2)+(1α)U(B,a1),

and the value function is given by

(27)V(α,θ)=maxzZC(z)+m1(z)f(θ)+m2(z)g(θ).

Define Z+={zA2|m1(z)>0andm2(z)>0}{zA2|m2(z)=0andm2(z)>0}{zA2|m1(z)>0andm2(z)=0} .

In other words, Z+ is a subset of Z where m1(z) and m2(z) are both positive with at least one of them being strictly positive.

Define Z={zA2|m1(z)0andm2(z)0} .

Because the payoffs are reciprocal with respect to the states, the subset of Z where mi(z)>0 and mj(z)<0 for i/=j is empty. Hence, we have

Z=ZZ+.

First we note that

(28)supzZh(α,z,θ˜)v.

By our assumptions on the range of f and g, we have

f(θ˜)1/2andg(θ˜)1/2.

Therefore, for every zZ , we have

h(α,z,θ˜)=C(z)+m1(z)f(θ˜)+m2(z)g(θ˜)C(z)+m1(z)12+m2(z)12v,

and eq. (28) holds.

Assumption A4 implies that the supremum of h(,θ˜) will be attained on Z. eq. (28), V(α,θ˜)>0 , and Z=ZZ+ together imply

(29)V(α,θ˜)=MaxzZ+h(α,z,θ˜)v.

Therefore, there exists zˆZ+ such that

V(α,θ˜)=C(zˆ)+m1(zˆ)f(θ˜)+m2(zˆ)g(θ˜).

Assume, without loss of generality, that m1(zˆ)>0 and m2(zˆ)>0 . Then B1 and B2 imply

(30)m1(zˆ)f(θ˜)<λm1(zˆ)f(θ)+(1λ)m1(zˆ)f(θ)

and

(31)m2(zˆ)g(θ˜)<λm2(zˆ)g(θ)+(1λ)m2(zˆ)g(θ).

Adding eqs. (30) and (31), and then adding C(zˆ) to both sides of the resulting inequality gives us

h(α,zˆ,θ˜)<λh(α,zˆ,θ)+(1λ)h(α,zˆ,θ),

and

h(α,zˆ,θ˜)<λsupzZh(α,z,θ)+(1λ)supzZh(α,z,θ),

and therefore

V(α,θ˜)<λV(α,θ)+(1λ)V(α,θ),

and V(α, · ) is not concave on Θ .

Proof of Theorem 2.2 Fix α. When f = g, eq. (26) becomes

(32)h(α,z,θ)=C(z)+m(z)f(θ)

where

(33)m(z)=([U(G,a1)U(B,a1)]+[U(B,a2)U(G,a2)])f(θ),

and

(34)C(z)=αU(G,a2)+(1α)U(B,a1).

Let θ', θ′′ and λθ+(1λ)θ satisfy

(35)f(λθ+(1λ)θ)<λf(θ)+(1λ)f(θ).

The same argument we used in the proof of Theorem 2.1 allows us to limit our attention to the case where V(θ˜)>0 . This last inequality implies that

V(α,θ˜)=C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ˜),

for some zˆZ+ . Equation (35) now implies the existence of zˆZ+ such that

C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θˆ)<λ[C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ)]+(1λ)[C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ)].

Therefore, we have

V(α,θ˜)<λV(α,θ)+(1λ)V(α,θ).

Proof Corollary 2.1 Let θ' and θ′′ be two points in Θˆ . Let θ˜=λθ+(1λ)θ for some λ ∈ (0, 1). The convexity of Θˆ and the convexity of f on Θˆ imply that θ˜Θˆ and

(36)f(θ˜)λf(θ)+(1λ)f(θ).

Furthermore, V(α,θ˜)>0 , which implies that there exists zˆZ with m(zˆ)0 such that

V(α,θ˜)=h(α,zˆ,θ˜)=C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ˜).

From eq. (36), we get

C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ˜)λ[C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)]f(θ)+(1λ)[C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ)],

and hence

V(α,θ˜)λV(α,θ)+(1λ)V(α,θ).

Proof of the claim in Example 2.1 First, since f(θ) is continuous, V(α, · ) is the supremum of continuous functions in θ, and therefore it also is continuous in θ. Define θˆ=inf{θ[0,θ1]|V(θ)>0} . The fact the f is weakly increasing implies that V(α, · ) is weakly increasing on (θˆ,θ1] . To see this, let θ' and θ′′ be two points in (θˆ,θ1] such that θ′′ > θ'. Then, using the same argument we used in the proof of Corollary 2.1, we have V(α,θ)=h(α,zˆ,θ)v for some zˆ with m(zˆ)0 , and hence

h(α,zˆ,θ)=C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ)C(zˆ)+m(zˆ)f(θ)h(α,zˆ,θ),

where C and m are given by eqs. (33) and (34). Therefore,

V(α,θ)V(α,θ).

This, combined with the fact that V is flat at zero on [0,θˆ] and the continuity of V(α, · ), implies that V(α, · ) is weakly increasing on all of [0,θ1] .

C Proofs of the claims in Section 3

Recall that basic assumptions in Section 3 on Θ , f and g are as follows:

Θ is a set with a partial order and corresponding strict partial order >. The functions f and g are increasing in the sense that for any θ′′,θ' in Θ , θ′′ > θ' implies f(θ′′) > f(θ') and g(θ′′) > g(θ'). The range of f and g is contained in the interval [1/2,1] , and therefore, for any θΘ , we have f(θ)>1f(θ) and g(θ)>1g(θ) . A matrix is stochastic if it has non-negative entries and every column adds up to one. We will need the following two useful facts about matrices. First, if the sum of each column in a matrix A is one, then so is the sum of each column in A1 . Note this does not imply that the inverse of a stochastic matrix is a stochastic matrix, since the inverse might have negative entries. Second, if the sum of each column in the matrices A and B is one, then so is the sum of each column in the product AB.

Proof of the claim in Example 3.1.

Given the assigned values of f, g and h at θ' and θ′′, we can compute [S(θ)]1 , the inverse of matrix S(θ′′), and multiply it by the matrix S(θ') to obtain the matrix M=S(θ)[S(θ)]1 . Computing M, we find

M=0.9670.0030.0690.0090.9580.0690.0240.0450.862

Therefore, the only matrix that satisfies the matrix equation S(θ') = MS(θ′′) is not stochastic since it has non-negative entries. Therefore, by Blackwell’s theorem, there must be some DM who strictly prefers S(θ') to S(θ′′).

Proof of Theorem 3.1.

First, we show θθV(α,θ)V(α,θ) for any agent (u,A) and any αintΔJ .

Let θ′′ > θ'. Let M=S(θ)[S(θ]1 (since f(θ)>1/2>1f(θ) and g(θ)>1/2>1g(θ) , S(θ′′) is indeed invertible). Then, we have

f(θ)1g(θ)1f(θ)g(θ)=Mf(θ)1g(θ)1f(θ)g(θ),

and brute force computations give us

M=1f(θ)+g(θ)1(1+f(θ))(1g(θ))+f(θ)g(θ)f(θ)(1g(θ))+f(θ)(1+g(θ))(1+f(θ))g(θ)+(1f(θ))g(θ)f(θ)g(θ)+(1f(θ))(1+g(θ)).

The two facts about matrices that we mentioned in the beginning of Appendix C imply that the sum of each column in M is 1. Hence, to show that M is stochastic, we only need to show that the entries of M are non-negative. Since we have an explicit expression for every mij , this can be done entry-by-entry. For example, note that f(θ)+g(θ)1>0 since f(θ)>f(θ)1/2 and g(θ)>g(θ)1/2 . Moreover, g(θ)>1g(θ) and f(θ)1f(θ) . Therefore,

(1+f(θ))(1g(θ))+f(θ)g(θ).0

Similarly, we can show that the rest of entries are non-negative. In fact, it is also possible to check that m11+m21=m12+m22=1 by brute force, rather than by relying on our previous argument. Hence, M is a stochastic matrix, and by Blackwell’s theorem (See Blackwell 1951, or for a simpler exposition Crémer 1981), we have V(α, θ′′, α) ≥V(α, θ ') for every DM (A,u) and every αintΔJ .

Second, we assume that V(α,θ)V(α,θ) for any agent (A,u) and αintΔJ , and we show that θθ .

Under our current assumption, Blackwell’s theorem implies the existence of a stochastic matrix M such that

(37)S(θ)=MS(θ).

Assume that θ′′ < θ'. By C3, we must have

f(θ)=m11f(θ)+m12(1f(θ))

which implies

(38)m11+m12>1,

(otherwise, we have f(θ') < f(θ′′), which contradicts θ′′ < θ' and the monotonicity of f). Similarly, C3 implies

1g(θ)=m11(1g(θ))+m12g(θ)

which implies

(39)m11+m12<1.

Otherwise, we have g(θ') < g(θ′′) contradicting θ′′ < θ' and the monotonicity of g. Given eqs. (38) and (39), it is clear that assumption θ′′ < θ' cannot be true, and we must have

θθ.

Proof of Theorem 3.2 Assume S(θ) is given by eq. (19) with I = J > 2.

First, assume θ′′ > θ'. Define

M=[S(θ)][S(θ)]1.

As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the sum of each column in M is 1. Straightforward (but tedious) computations give the entries of M:

(40)mij=1+f(θ)+(J1)f(θ)1+Jf(θ)if i=jf(θ)f(θ)1+Jf(θ)if i/=j.

Given that θ′′ > θ' and that f(θ)>f(θ)>1J1 , eq. (40) implies that each mij is non-negative, and hence M is stochastic. Applying Blackwell’s theorem yields the desired conclusion.

Second, note that the range of f is contained in the interval [1/J,1] , and therefore, for any θΘ , we have f(θ)>1f(θ)J1 . Following the same argument in the second part of the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can show that if V(θ)V(θ) for any agent (u,A) , then we must have θθ .

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Published Online: 2019-06-25

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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