Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception
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Pierre Jacob
Abstract
Millikan’s teleosemantic approach constitutes a powerful framework for what evolutionary biologists call an “ultimate” (as opposed to a “proximate”) explanation of the continued reproduction and proliferation of intentional conventional linguistic signs. It thereby aims at explaining the stability of human verbal ostensive communication. This evolutionary approach needs to be complemented by particular proximate psychological mechanisms. Millikan rejects the kind of mentalistic psychological mechanisms posited by the Gricean tradition in pragmatics, according to which the task of the hearer is to recognize the speaker’s intentions. Instead Millikan has persistently argued that verbal understanding is an extended form of perception. My paper is a critical assessment of Millikan’s thesis that verbal understanding of a speaker’s utterance enables the hearer to perceive whatever the speaker’s utterance is about. I argue that Millikan’s thesis rests on two fundamental assumptions. First, Millikan’s notion of extended perception of the world is itself an extension of her semiotic approach according to which the process of ordinary perception (in humans and non-human animals) involves the translation of what she calls locally recurrent natural signs. Secondly, Millikan argues that only humans have the further capacity for flexible extended perception of what she calls detached signs, as opposed to attached signs or location-reflexive signs.
Abstract
Millikan’s teleosemantic approach constitutes a powerful framework for what evolutionary biologists call an “ultimate” (as opposed to a “proximate”) explanation of the continued reproduction and proliferation of intentional conventional linguistic signs. It thereby aims at explaining the stability of human verbal ostensive communication. This evolutionary approach needs to be complemented by particular proximate psychological mechanisms. Millikan rejects the kind of mentalistic psychological mechanisms posited by the Gricean tradition in pragmatics, according to which the task of the hearer is to recognize the speaker’s intentions. Instead Millikan has persistently argued that verbal understanding is an extended form of perception. My paper is a critical assessment of Millikan’s thesis that verbal understanding of a speaker’s utterance enables the hearer to perceive whatever the speaker’s utterance is about. I argue that Millikan’s thesis rests on two fundamental assumptions. First, Millikan’s notion of extended perception of the world is itself an extension of her semiotic approach according to which the process of ordinary perception (in humans and non-human animals) involves the translation of what she calls locally recurrent natural signs. Secondly, Millikan argues that only humans have the further capacity for flexible extended perception of what she calls detached signs, as opposed to attached signs or location-reflexive signs.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
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1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
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2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
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3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
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4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
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5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
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6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
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7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
-
1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
-
2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
-
3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
-
4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
-
5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
-
6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
-
7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
