How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter I
2. Content V
3. Editorial IX
4. 1. Objectivity and Realism
5. Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
6. Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
7. Realism’s Kick 39
8. The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
9. 2. Content and Intentionality
10. How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
11. Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
12. Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
13. The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
14. 3. Perception, Cognition and Images
15. The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
16. Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
17. Sound and Image 189
18. 4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
19. Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
20. Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
21. Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
22. 5. Epistemology of Perception
23. Boundless 251
24. The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
25. The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
26. Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
27. 6. Perception and the Sciences
28. Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
29. Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
30. 7. Wittgenstein
31. The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
32. Wittgensteins Welt 399
33. Index of Names 417