Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception
-
Ophelia Deroy
Abstract
According to predictive accounts of the mind, our brains do not simply process information upstream- but constantly predict the upcoming signals, to only process the difference between these predictions and the incoming information. But does the role of these top-down processes mean that all perception is influenced by cognition? Or does it rather suggest that the distinction between cognition and perception collapses, as every level of processing now integrates predictions? While the later suggestion is embraced by most interpreters of, and contributors to, predictive accounts, I argue that cognition, or thought, remains distinctive by being the only level that is not predicted by a level above. Using this definition and the example of the «race-lightness» effect, I show that the problem of cognitive influence of perception can be reframed in a graded manner, and make us ask how much perception can be affected by a change in these higher level cognitive predictions.
Abstract
According to predictive accounts of the mind, our brains do not simply process information upstream- but constantly predict the upcoming signals, to only process the difference between these predictions and the incoming information. But does the role of these top-down processes mean that all perception is influenced by cognition? Or does it rather suggest that the distinction between cognition and perception collapses, as every level of processing now integrates predictions? While the later suggestion is embraced by most interpreters of, and contributors to, predictive accounts, I argue that cognition, or thought, remains distinctive by being the only level that is not predicted by a level above. Using this definition and the example of the «race-lightness» effect, I show that the problem of cognitive influence of perception can be reframed in a graded manner, and make us ask how much perception can be affected by a change in these higher level cognitive predictions.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
-
1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
-
2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
-
3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
-
4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
-
5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
-
6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
-
7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
-
1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
-
2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
-
3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
-
4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
-
5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
-
6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
-
7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
