Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema?
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Frédérique de Vignemont
Abstract
How do you know the posture of your limbs? Do I feel it or do I directly know it? In this paper I will describe Wittgenstein´s and Anscombe’s theory, according to which bodily sensations play no epistemic role. They famously claimed that the sense of position - the ability to report how the limbs are located - does not depend on sensations of position. In this sense, bodily knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge. I know that the sky is blue in virtue of having a visual experience of the blueness of the sky but I know that my legs are crossed independently of the sensation I may have of them being that way. Why is there such a difference? What reasons do Wittgenstein and Anscombe have to deny that bodily sensations play an epistemic role? They claim that the kind of content that bodily sensations are endowed with cannot explain the beliefs that we form about our bodily posture. On their view, it is not fine-grained enough compared to the richness of our bodily knowledge. In addition, it would not be separately describable from the beliefs themselves. I will argue that these objections do not suffice to show that bodily sensations play no epistemic role.
Abstract
How do you know the posture of your limbs? Do I feel it or do I directly know it? In this paper I will describe Wittgenstein´s and Anscombe’s theory, according to which bodily sensations play no epistemic role. They famously claimed that the sense of position - the ability to report how the limbs are located - does not depend on sensations of position. In this sense, bodily knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge. I know that the sky is blue in virtue of having a visual experience of the blueness of the sky but I know that my legs are crossed independently of the sensation I may have of them being that way. Why is there such a difference? What reasons do Wittgenstein and Anscombe have to deny that bodily sensations play an epistemic role? They claim that the kind of content that bodily sensations are endowed with cannot explain the beliefs that we form about our bodily posture. On their view, it is not fine-grained enough compared to the richness of our bodily knowledge. In addition, it would not be separately describable from the beliefs themselves. I will argue that these objections do not suffice to show that bodily sensations play no epistemic role.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
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1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
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2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
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3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
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4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
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5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
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6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
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7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
-
1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
-
2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
-
3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
-
4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
-
5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
-
6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
-
7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
