The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve
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Michael Schmitz
Abstract
A perceptual realism that is naive in a good way must be naively realistic about world and mind. But contemporary self-described naive realists often have trouble acknowledging that both the good cases of successful perception and the bad cases of illusion and hallucination involve internal experiential states with intentional contents that present the world as being a certain way. They prefer to think about experience solely in relational terms because they worry that otherwise we won’t be able to escape from radical skepticism. I argue that experiential relations to objects require that their subjects be in internal experiential states. But this does not mean that these states are our epistemological starting point which can be known independently of any knowledge of the external world. We do escape the epistemological predicament of radical skepticism because the good cases are primary over the bad ones. But this is not because the good cases alone provide reasons for belief, but because we do not need a reason to think we are in a good case, but do need a reason to think we are not, and such a reason must come from a good case. So bad cases can only be thought of as deviations from good cases. And we can only understand experiences as states with contents distinct from their objects and present in good and bad cases once we understand misrepresentation, that is, bad cases, and therefore only as we ascribe knowledge of the external world to ourselves.
Abstract
A perceptual realism that is naive in a good way must be naively realistic about world and mind. But contemporary self-described naive realists often have trouble acknowledging that both the good cases of successful perception and the bad cases of illusion and hallucination involve internal experiential states with intentional contents that present the world as being a certain way. They prefer to think about experience solely in relational terms because they worry that otherwise we won’t be able to escape from radical skepticism. I argue that experiential relations to objects require that their subjects be in internal experiential states. But this does not mean that these states are our epistemological starting point which can be known independently of any knowledge of the external world. We do escape the epistemological predicament of radical skepticism because the good cases are primary over the bad ones. But this is not because the good cases alone provide reasons for belief, but because we do not need a reason to think we are in a good case, but do need a reason to think we are not, and such a reason must come from a good case. So bad cases can only be thought of as deviations from good cases. And we can only understand experiences as states with contents distinct from their objects and present in good and bad cases once we understand misrepresentation, that is, bad cases, and therefore only as we ascribe knowledge of the external world to ourselves.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
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1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
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2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
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3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
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4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
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5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
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6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
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7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
-
1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
-
2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
-
3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
-
4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
-
5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
-
6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
-
7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
