Home Philosophy The Co-Presentational Character of Perception
Chapter
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

The Co-Presentational Character of Perception

  • Philipp Berghofer and Harald A. Wiltsche
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill
Explore this Subject How to publish with us
The Philosophy of Perception
This chapter is in the book The Philosophy of Perception

Abstract

Phenomenologically, perception distinguishes itself from other modes of consciousness by presenting its objects and contents “in the flesh;” it has a presentive character. From the first person perspective, there is a clear difference between thinking about a laptop on the desk, imagining a laptop on the desk, believing or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk, and actually visually perceiving a laptop on the desk. Only perception has a presentive character with respect to physical objects. Epistemologically, perception distinguishes itself by being a source of immediate justification for beliefs about physical states of affairs. Believing, imagining, or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk does not justify a person in believing so. However, if the person sees that there is a laptop on the desk, it is plausible to assume that she is thereby justified in believing that there is a laptop on the desk. Only perception is a source of immediate justification with respect to such states of affairs. In the phenomenological as well as in the recent analytic tradition, there have been attempts to connect the phenomenological and the epistemological distinctiveness of perception: It has been argued that perception is a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of its presentive phenomenal character. In the analytic tradition, however, it has been often overlooked that the phenomenal character of perception is not exhausted by its presentive character. Perception, essentially, also has a co-presenting character; it has a horizontal structure. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the epistemological significance of the horizontal structure of perception.

Abstract

Phenomenologically, perception distinguishes itself from other modes of consciousness by presenting its objects and contents “in the flesh;” it has a presentive character. From the first person perspective, there is a clear difference between thinking about a laptop on the desk, imagining a laptop on the desk, believing or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk, and actually visually perceiving a laptop on the desk. Only perception has a presentive character with respect to physical objects. Epistemologically, perception distinguishes itself by being a source of immediate justification for beliefs about physical states of affairs. Believing, imagining, or hoping that there is a laptop on the desk does not justify a person in believing so. However, if the person sees that there is a laptop on the desk, it is plausible to assume that she is thereby justified in believing that there is a laptop on the desk. Only perception is a source of immediate justification with respect to such states of affairs. In the phenomenological as well as in the recent analytic tradition, there have been attempts to connect the phenomenological and the epistemological distinctiveness of perception: It has been argued that perception is a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of its presentive phenomenal character. In the analytic tradition, however, it has been often overlooked that the phenomenal character of perception is not exhausted by its presentive character. Perception, essentially, also has a co-presenting character; it has a horizontal structure. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the epistemological significance of the horizontal structure of perception.

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Content V
  3. Editorial IX
  4. 1. Objectivity and Realism
  5. Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
  6. Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
  7. Realism’s Kick 39
  8. The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
  9. 2. Content and Intentionality
  10. How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
  11. Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
  12. Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
  13. The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
  14. 3. Perception, Cognition and Images
  15. The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
  16. Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
  17. Sound and Image 189
  18. 4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
  19. Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
  20. Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
  21. Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
  22. 5. Epistemology of Perception
  23. Boundless 251
  24. The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
  25. The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
  26. Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
  27. 6. Perception and the Sciences
  28. Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
  29. Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
  30. 7. Wittgenstein
  31. The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
  32. Wittgensteins Welt 399
  33. Index of Names 417
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657920-017

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Content V
  3. Editorial IX
  4. 1. Objectivity and Realism
  5. Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
  6. Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
  7. Realism’s Kick 39
  8. The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
  9. 2. Content and Intentionality
  10. How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
  11. Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
  12. Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
  13. The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
  14. 3. Perception, Cognition and Images
  15. The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
  16. Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
  17. Sound and Image 189
  18. 4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
  19. Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
  20. Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
  21. Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
  22. 5. Epistemology of Perception
  23. Boundless 251
  24. The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
  25. The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
  26. Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
  27. 6. Perception and the Sciences
  28. Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
  29. Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
  30. 7. Wittgenstein
  31. The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
  32. Wittgensteins Welt 399
  33. Index of Names 417
Sign up now to receive a 20% welcome discount
Institutional Access
How does access work?
Have an idea on how to improve our website?
Please write us.
© 2025 De Gruyter Brill
Downloaded on 17.10.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110657920-017/html
Scroll to top button