Structure, Intentionality and the Given
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Marcello Oreste Fiocco
Abstract
The given is the state of a mind in its primary engagement with the world. A satisfactory epistemology-one, it turns out, that is foundationalist and includes a naïve realist view of perception-requires a certain account of the given. Moreover, knowledge based on the given requires both a particular view of the world itself and a heterodox account of judgment. These admittedly controversial claims are supported by basic ontological considerations. I begin, then, with two contradictory views of the world per se and the structure one experiences. I draw out the consequences of these two views for what intentionality is. The two views yield incompatible accounts of the given. The definitive spontaneity of the one account, and passivity of the other, can be understood in terms of the structure (or lack thereof) in the given. In defense of the claim that a structured given is not an apt epistemic basis, I examine an attempt to found an epistemology on such an account in light of the so-called myth of the given. I maintain that the given, if it is to provide some justification for taking the world to be a particular way, must be unstructured. To support this, I first discuss a significant problem with traditional foundationalism. I then argue that a satisfactory (foundationalist) epistemology requires the rejection of the orthodox propositional view of judgment in favor of a non-propositional, reistic view.
Abstract
The given is the state of a mind in its primary engagement with the world. A satisfactory epistemology-one, it turns out, that is foundationalist and includes a naïve realist view of perception-requires a certain account of the given. Moreover, knowledge based on the given requires both a particular view of the world itself and a heterodox account of judgment. These admittedly controversial claims are supported by basic ontological considerations. I begin, then, with two contradictory views of the world per se and the structure one experiences. I draw out the consequences of these two views for what intentionality is. The two views yield incompatible accounts of the given. The definitive spontaneity of the one account, and passivity of the other, can be understood in terms of the structure (or lack thereof) in the given. In defense of the claim that a structured given is not an apt epistemic basis, I examine an attempt to found an epistemology on such an account in light of the so-called myth of the given. I maintain that the given, if it is to provide some justification for taking the world to be a particular way, must be unstructured. To support this, I first discuss a significant problem with traditional foundationalism. I then argue that a satisfactory (foundationalist) epistemology requires the rejection of the orthodox propositional view of judgment in favor of a non-propositional, reistic view.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
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1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
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2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
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3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
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4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
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5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
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6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
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7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Content V
- Editorial IX
-
1. Objectivity and Realism
- Perception: Ground of Empirical Objectivity 3
- Objectivity: How is it Possible? 23
- Realism’s Kick 39
- The Good, The Bad, and The Naïve 57
-
2. Content and Intentionality
- How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience 77
- Structure, Intentionality and the Given 95
- Brentano on Perception and Illusion 119
- The Problem with J. Searle’s Idea That ‘all Seeing is Seeing-as’ (or What Wittgenstein did not Mean With the Duck-Rabbit) 135
-
3. Perception, Cognition and Images
- The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, With Feeling 149
- Why Verbal Understanding is Unlikely to be an Extended Form of Perception 171
- Sound and Image 189
-
4. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
- Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading 199
- Pre-Cueing, Early Vision, and Cognitive Penetrability 217
- Predictions do not Entail Cognitive Penetration: “Racial” Biases in Predictive Models of Perception 235
-
5. Epistemology of Perception
- Boundless 251
- The Manifest and the Philosophical Image of Perceptual Knowledge 275
- The Co-Presentational Character of Perception 303
- Knowledge Without Observation: Body Image or Body Schema? 323
-
6. Perception and the Sciences
- Scheinbewegungen. Wahrnehmung zwischen Wissensgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst 337
- Zur Analogie von Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und der wissenschaftlichen Metapher als Vehikel der Innovation 357
-
7. Wittgenstein
- The Structure of Tractatus and the Tractatus Numbering System 377
- Wittgensteins Welt 399
- Index of Names 417
