Abstract
We provide sufficient conditions for the economic value of a signal to be a convex function, either locally or globally, of the input required to produce the signal. We also provide conditions under which this input can be interpreted as a measure of the information contained in this signal. We demonstrate that, under certain conditions, information is a very peculiar good that can—globally—show increasing marginal utility. In contrast to the earlier approach used to obtain the classic results on the local lack of concavity of the value of information, our approach allows permits the investigation of concavity (or lack) of the function representing the value of information, without imposing any conditions of differentiability on this function. Our approach also allows us to show that the marginal value of information can be zero even at an informative signal. Finally, we discuss some of the difficulties that can arise in designing price discrimination schemes for selling signals with various levels of quality.
Appendix
A Proofs of the claims in Section 1
Proof of Theorem 1.1 For every θ, we have
Applying the Envelope Theorem (specifically, applying Corollary 4 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) to the function defined in eq. (3) in Section 1), we get
If assumption (a) of Theorem 1.1 holds, then clearly,
Under assumptions (b) of Theorem 1.1, for any k, eq. (23) becomes
for some constants
Proof of Corollary 1.1 Let
Therefore, for every j and every
Proof of Corollary 1.2 Under either assumption (a) or (b), we have
and therefore, V cannot be concave on
Proof of Corollary 1.3 Let
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Fix α. The assumptions of the theorem imply that there is a unique boundary (not in the interior of
The definition of
Assumption (ii) of the theorem and assumption A1 imply that the vector-valued function
for every i. Assumption (i) of the theorem implies that there exists a neighborhood
on
B Proofs of the claims in Section 2
Proof of Theorem 2.1 Fix
and
If
Now assume
where
and
and the value function is given by
Define
In other words,
Define
Because the payoffs are reciprocal with respect to the states, the subset of Z where
First we note that
By our assumptions on the range of f and g, we have
Therefore, for every
and eq. (28) holds.
Assumption A4 implies that the supremum of
Therefore, there exists
Assume, without loss of generality, that
and
Adding eqs. (30) and (31), and then adding
and
and therefore
and V(α, · ) is not concave on
Proof of Theorem 2.2 Fix α. When f = g, eq. (26) becomes
where
and
Let θ', θ′′ and
The same argument we used in the proof of Theorem 2.1 allows us to limit our attention to the case where
for some
Therefore, we have
Proof Corollary 2.1 Let θ' and θ′′ be two points in
Furthermore,
From eq. (36), we get
and hence
Proof of the claim in Example 2.1 First, since f(θ) is continuous, V(α, · ) is the supremum of continuous functions in θ, and therefore it also is continuous in θ. Define
where C and m are given by eqs. (33) and (34). Therefore,
This, combined with the fact that V is flat at zero on
C Proofs of the claims in Section 3
Recall that basic assumptions in Section 3 on
Proof of the claim in Example 3.1.
Given the assigned values of f, g and h at θ' and θ′′, we can compute
Therefore, the only matrix that satisfies the matrix equation S(θ') = MS(θ′′) is not stochastic since it has non-negative entries. Therefore, by Blackwell’s theorem, there must be some DM who strictly prefers S(θ') to S(θ′′).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
First, we show
Let θ′′ > θ'. Let
and brute force computations give us
The two facts about matrices that we mentioned in the beginning of Appendix C imply that the sum of each column in M is 1. Hence, to show that M is stochastic, we only need to show that the entries of M are non-negative. Since we have an explicit expression for every
Similarly, we can show that the rest of entries are non-negative. In fact, it is also possible to check that
Second, we assume that
Under our current assumption, Blackwell’s theorem implies the existence of a stochastic matrix M such that
Assume that θ′′ < θ'. By C3, we must have
which implies
(otherwise, we have f(θ') < f(θ′′), which contradicts θ′′ < θ' and the monotonicity of f). Similarly, C3 implies
which implies
Otherwise, we have g(θ') < g(θ′′) contradicting θ′′ < θ' and the monotonicity of g. Given eqs. (38) and (39), it is clear that assumption θ′′ < θ' cannot be true, and we must have
Proof of Theorem 3.2 Assume S(θ) is given by eq. (19) with I = J > 2.
First, assume θ′′ > θ'. Define
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the sum of each column in M is 1. Straightforward (but tedious) computations give the entries of M:
Given that θ′′ > θ' and that
Second, note that the range of f is contained in the interval
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Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
- Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
- Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
- Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
- Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
- Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
- On the Economic Value of Signals
- The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
- Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
- Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
- Costly Rewards and Punishments
- Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
- Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
- On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
- Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
- Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
- Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
- Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
- Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
- Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
- Notes
- A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
- Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
- Unbundling Production with Decreasing Average Costs
- A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
- Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
- Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
- Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation
Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs
- Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: A Generalized Sufficient Condition
- Pay-What-You-Want in Competition
- Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry
- Students’ Social Origins and Targeted Grading
- Pricing, Signalling, and Sorting with Frictions
- On the Economic Value of Signals
- The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies
- Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly
- Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims
- Costly Rewards and Punishments
- Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies
- Strategic Activism in an Uncertain World
- On Equilibrium Existence in a Finite-Agent, Multi-Asset Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
- Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange
- Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval
- Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty
- Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis
- Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy
- Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model
- Notes
- A Note on Reference-Dependent Choice with Threshold Representation
- Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games
- Unbundling Production with Decreasing Average Costs
- A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
- Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes
- Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality
- Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation