Volume 73, Issue 4

A new theory of paradox is presented and defended. According to this theory, something is a paradox if and only if a subject cannot believe it, or something about it, despite having tried. Three rival theories are criticised and rejected. Section 1 rejects the theory according to which a paradox is an inconsistent set of individually plausible propositions. Section 2 rejects the Quinean account according to which a paradox is an apparently absurd conclusion that is apparently sustained by an argument. Section 3 rejects the theory according to which a paradox is a question or pseudo-question that suspends us between too many good answers. Section 4 introduces the proposed alternative theory and shows how it improves on previous accounts. Section 5 elaborates the account in the direction of philosophical logic. Section 6 addresses the identity and proper individuation of paradoxes. Section 7 gives a concluding reflection on the epistemic value of finding things paradoxical.

In this paper, I examine how Fichte, in his Wissenschaftslehre , presents the concept of freedom through a theory of action. I will investigate the inner connection between the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (1795) and the System of Ethics (1798). The interrelation of these two texts has not been thoroughly thematised in the research. I contend that freedom is not an abstract idea but an active process that operates both on a transcendental level and in empirical practice. Moreover, I address the central significance of the primacy of practical reason, which I argue serves as the foundation for both theoretical knowledge and ethical action. I further maintain that, for Fichte, freedom is not solely an individual matter but a communal responsibility, aimed at creating a future shaped by reason. Through this analysis, I integrate theoretical, practical, and ethical perspectives into a comprehensive philosophical theory of action that offers guidance for the formation of a rational society.

What transformations in “our” collective memory, in “our” conceptualisation of our institutional system, and in “our” moral universalism are necessary today to address the colonial crimes committed by our ancestors in the past? This paper will proceed in three steps: First, it will be shown that our social-theoretical tradition needs not only a postcolonial rereading of all the classical authors of the West, but also an inclusion of studies and literary products that have challenged this tradition from within the colonial experience. Second, a radical decentring of our key political-historical concepts seems necessary in order to be able to describe as belonging to “us” or even to attribute to “ourselves” the institutional conditions that the European states once created in the countries they colonised. And third, a revision of our moral universalism seems necessary because it presupposes a kind of anthropocentrism that seems unacceptable from the perspective of the descendants of the people colonised in the past.

This article discusses the necessity of a performative shift in philosophical practice. The author argues, first, that postcolonial theory cannot be regarded as a homogeneous entity, but rather must be viewed as a diverse field of approaches that address the challenges of colonialism and its aftermath and produce a variety of responses to these challenges. Secondly, she calls for critical reflection on one’s own thematic focus, moral intuitions and reception practices, for an openness to cross-border dialogue and cooperation, as well as a diversification of the philosophical institutional landscape. Only through such a performative turn can philosophy fulfil its role as critical social theory.

This comment on Axel Honneth’s essay 1) challenges Honneth’s over-homogenous notion of “the West” (and of “postcolonialism” too), 2.) argues for a more antagonistic and less therapeutic understanding of the relation between the two collective subjects, and 3) applies this critique to the example of changing street names.

The contribution comments on some self-referential moments in Axel Honneth’s discussion of postcolonialism, which may counteract the author’s self-critical reflections on the subject. It points out that his text does not sufficiently succeed in addressing the perspective of those affected in the context of postcolonialism and also that it lacks an attempt to make postcolonial scepticism toward Western justifications of universalism comprehensible. Furthermore, certain one-sided aspects in Honneth’s rhetorical use of ‘we’ are also addressed.