Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration – An underdeveloped diplomatic tool in Yemen

1 Introduction

A widely discussed topic within the field of peacebuilding, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is not a process that stands still for very long. Indeed, at its birth many decades ago, DDR already possessed a wide range of activities within its portfolio and indeed those early characteristics continue to morph as DDR evolves with time.^[1] Through necessity, the earliest generation of DDR later co-opted the related processes of reinsertion, repatriation and resettlement often broadening the acronym to DDRRR.^[2] Second Generation DDR incorporated the elements of Community Violence Reduction (CVR), Pre-DDR activities and DDR Mediation whilst also developing links to the field of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).^[3] Therefore, DDR, through a process of concerted evolution, has now become an extended range of activities all of which have potential relevance to the many complex circumstances that societies in conflict may face.

Adapting to the prevailing operational circumstances of a given conflict, DDR remains an integral part of the UN peace mandate and its portfolio of activities deliver applied strategies for executing successful peacekeeping operations. The disarmament phase of DDR entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents, most commonly small arms and light weapons (SALW), whilst demobilization aims to disband those armed groups. The reintegration phase assimilates former combatants into civilian society to help reduce the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict. At the individual level, DDR therefore seeks to support ex-combatants and those associated with armed groups on their journeys to becoming peaceful members of society. DDR also lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities to which these individuals return, whilst also building capacity for long-term peace, security and development. By designing and delivering context-specific DDR programmes for members of armed groups, United Nations (UN) peace operations are the leading international vector for implementing DDR initiatives.

However, forging peace from out of conflict requires more than DDR operations alone and peacebuilding is thus a coordinated political process that aims to change a violent situation into a peaceful one. With a long and varied history, DDR has had many successes from its past, yet not all DDR programmes have been considered as successful. Therefore, despite its positive intent, context-specific approach, broad scope of activities and continuing evolution towards meeting new conflict challenges, DDR has not been able to successfully resolve every conflict situation.^[4]

From the experience of this author of serving as the UK Regional Stabilisation Adviser for the war in Yemen between 2017 and 2019, there was a perception amongst non-UN practitioners that DDR might have limited relevance to the Yemen. The country continues to suffer from a four-year war that has precipitated the worst humanitarian disaster this century where 24 million Yemenis remain in a situation of humanitarian need. The political peace process continues apace but without a breakthrough in sight and continued insecurity on the ground suggests that the lives of Yemeni citizens will not greatly improve in the near future. More than being a war involving Yemenis, this conflict is further complicated by foreign countries using Yemen as a proxy battleground to play out the politics of their divergent beliefs.

History has shown Yemen to be conflict-prone and indeed the current war is a complex one. Having been applied in many unique conflict contexts, DDR is now a broad, creative and experienced part of a growing UN peacekeeping toolbox. However, when faced with Yemen’s protracted security challenges and a potential caseload of some one million combatants, DDR seemed unready or unable to capitalize upon clear opportunities in the country. DDR has worked well in the past and is delivering positive change in a wide range of ways in several countries at this very minute. Therefore, why has DDR not as yet found a foothold that can help in bringing about of an end to Yemen’s protracted and bloody conflict?

This article outlines the main activities that currently exist within the UN DDR portfolio and offers comments on how these could potentially be relevant to the context of Yemen’s war. Intended neither to be overly analytical nor to offer specific solutions, the article takes a light-touch reflection on this author’s personal experience of co-chairing the UN Special Envoy’s Working Group on DDR in Yemen. The intention is to stimulate further debate on how DDR, as an important area of UN peacebuilding, might help mitigate some of the effects of war in Yemen which continues to blight the country and its people.

2 The concept of DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration is the process of removing weapons from members of armed groups, detaching those ex-combatants from their groups and helping them to safely return to normal society. In complex environments, DDR is often supported by Community Violence reduction (CVR) which, through social cohesion, economic development and conflict resolution helps manage armed groups prior to a DDR programme being commenced.^[5] Similarly, pre-DDR initiatives are a preparatory phase for a fully developed DDR programme, which can stabilize communities by building social cohesion and encouraging reconciliation. DDR processes may also contain a mediation element, which provides services to help resolve a conflict by developing mutually acceptable peace agreements.

As regards the resources used for DDR, in 2017/18 the overall UN peacekeeping budget was $4,071,700,400 US of which 0.8 % ($34, 423,958 US) was dedicated to DDR operations.^[6] During the same time, DDR staff represented some 2 % of the civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions. Currently five peacekeeping missions (MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MINUSTAH/MINUJUSTH, MONUSCO, UNAMID) implement DDR activities, which include CVR projects in MONUSCO and pre-DDR and CVR activities in MINUSCA.

Historically the earliest approaches to DDR utilized a set of sequenced activities in a near linear process, which produced variable results that have been well-documented over time. Based on these experiences and lessons learned, the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR developed the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) in 2006.^[7] The IDDRS laid out a set of preconditions for successful DDR, including an overarching peace agreement, trust in the process, and a minimum degree of security. In contexts like Colombia and Myanmar, those IDDRS preconditions still apply. However, the UN has been increasingly called upon to address security challenges in settings where political settlements are lacking (e. g. Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen) or where armed groups have either not signed or have abandoned a peace agreement (Mali, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Most importantly, security, legal or political challenges may interfere with a combatant’s decision to enter a given DDR process, which is invariably a voluntary decision. Moreover, in the Central African Republic and Mali for example, armed groups link their participation in DDR to their expected integration into the national armed forces as part of their wider political and economic grievances. Hence, as DDR continues to evolve, its programmes have adapted to local needs and contexts thus broadening DDRs core role of improving security.

Rebel from the Central African Republic surrendering his arms

Nonetheless, the challenges facing DDR continue to multiply and, following the development of the IDDRS in 2006, ‘Second Generation DDR’ facilitated more flexible programming which enabled Pre-DDR, CVR and DDR Mediation processes to evolve. Therefore, currently the UNs DDR strategic priorities for 2018–2020 include the tasks of ensuring linkages with political processes, developing Monitoring and Evaluation capacities including the external evaluation of all DDR programmes, tailoring training modules to DDR projects and developing guidance on DDR/CVR operational funding in line with international standards.

Similarly, DDR now faces more complex political terrain and legal constraints in asymmetric contexts where violent extremism poses a further challenge. In response, DDR policy now engages not only programmatically at the community level but also directly with combatants and youth at risk of recruitment whilst also providing technical support to political processes. Hence, as one of the few non-military means in the UN toolbox to directly engage armed groups, the DDR remit now includes beneficiary support through pre-DDR programmes focused on ex-combatants and families, as is the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Similarly, DDR now aims to be more flexible by moving towards adaptive and evidence-based programming within the wider recovery and stability agenda. Hence, the links between DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR), job creation, governance, human rights, infrastructure development, access to justice and rule of law are increasing.

Therefore, DDR in UN peace operations now covers an ever-wider range of activities such as support to mediation efforts in Mali, pre-DDR and transitional weapons and ammunition management (WAM) initiatives in the Central African Republic and finally piloting violent extremists’ disengagement initiatives for Al-Shabaab (AS) elements in Somalia.^[8]

3 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration – challenges and opportunities in Yemen

In questioning the relevance of DDR to the Yemen context, given the global proliferation of small arms and light weapons, one complication with any DDR process is that people can easily re-arm themselves, often at low cost and with minimal legal constraints. The United States has the highest number of guns per citizen (101 guns per 100 people), yet other cultures in less-developed and conflict-prone countries also show a high rate of firearms ownership. Indeed, the Yemen ranks third highest in the world with 54.8 guns per 100 people. Similarly, the open display of firearms now mimics the traditional practice of males displaying a short, curved dagger, the Yemeni Jambiya, in the country. Therefore, given the wide proliferation of firearms in Yemen coupled with the cultural Yemeni norm of displaying weapons for status, wealth and power, the disarmament of individual combatants as a key part of any Yemeni DDR process presents a huge challenge.

Nonetheless, if an enduring ceasefire or peace agreement generates sufficient trust between the belligerent parties, a Yemen disarmament phase should first turn to mitigating the threats from heavy artillery and missiles rather than dealing with concerted small arms and light weapons (SALW) programmes. Therefore, developing good faith agreements covering third party monitoring, tracking, cantonment and eventual decommissioning of heavy weapons will be essential parts of any meaningful disarmament phase in Yemen. Despite laudable efforts towards achieving a Yemen peace accord, both from UN Special Envoy’s side as well as back-channels from within the international community, the Yemeni political track currently remains blocked and the Yemeni war rolls on. Hence, despite the dire humanitarian conditions facing the Yemeni people, the likelihood of any widespread Yemeni disarmament, either informally or within a national DDR programme remains unthinkable in the short term.

Collecting light arms

If the concept of meaningful disarmament would be far from simple in the Yemen, the idea of demobilizing Yemeni combatants is an even more complex challenge. The ultimate objective of demobilization for state and non-state actors should be to improve the security of the nation and welfare of its people. Demobilization, should enable combatants to permanently disengage from conflict activities and free their potential to become productive civilians within a state which upholds the rule of law and human rights. Hence, demobilization, far more than being a change of clothes or a new job with a civilian manager, is a psychological process that, through voluntary changes within the individual aims to build peace through two overall strands. Firstly, by breaking the command chain instilled within regular and irregular armed group members, an individual can detach from their military unit and no longer fall under its influence, orders or culture. Secondly, demobilization addresses the issue of changing the individual’s mindset from roles generally using the influence of force towards achieving an existence, to peaceful processes in non-conflict situations.

Many who have undergone the transition from military service to civilian careers understand that this change is a lengthy process rather than a distinct event. Therefore, with Yemen’s demographics showing a significant ‘youth bulge’ (60 % of Yemenis are aged under 25 years) a large percentage of whom are currently under arms, it would be wise not to expect significant short-term success in any demobilization phase of DDR. Breaking the command chain and changing the mind-set of combatants from fragile and conflict-affected states can be expected to take longer when those involved have spent a larger proportion of their lives within protracted periods of warfare. Indeed, as is too often the case with children in armed conflict, Yemen is likely to have significant numbers who have been forced into actions and situations that will leave them facing a very long process of mind-set change as they move towards functional recovery.

Aside from the social and psychosocial aspects of demobilization, a challenge of large significance for Yemeni ex-combatants will be the economic necessity of finding the means of earning sufficient income from alternative livelihoods to combat. In a country where natural resources are not widely abundant, job opportunities are low and inflation consistently diminishes the Yemeni people’s financial capital. The majority of young Yemenis’ livelihood opportunities, which do not involve informal security, or combat roles are therefore becoming increasingly scarce. Whilst efforts are being made to reform the national economy, the role of tribal defence or alignment with one or other side of the war in Yemen, has become increasingly the main source of income for many in the country. With combatant numbers rumoured to be of the order of one million and few job alternatives, the incentives for a well-armed Yemeni population to demobilize are as difficult to imagine as a credible reason for Yemeni combatants to voluntarily disarm ‘en masse’. Under current circumstances, both are unlikely in the foreseeable future yet, the longer the war continues, the greater the demobilization challenge will undoubtedly become.

Reintegration within DDR processes is a significant undertaking and, in general terms addresses the return of ex-combatants into peaceful society through economic, social and political support. As well as a conducive environment and national buy-in, all reintegration processes therefore require long-term donor commitment and finance. Reintegration also relies heavily upon the empowerment of receiving communities to be able to peacefully assimilate the returning ex-combatants in a sustainable manner. Hence, communities of return also require economic, social and political support as well as concerted sensitization at the national level as part of gaining the wider population’s buy-in regarding a national reconciliation process of which DDR is a part.

The beach of Batticaloa in Sri Lanka – once a place thriving with arms smuggling

In the case of Rwanda, although there was some reluctance in the early years to accept Ex-FDLR fighters back into the national reintegration and Gacaca reconciliation programmes, the country has demonstrated significant progress towards national recovery.^[15] Whilst this has taken much time and flexibility within the international community’s support to reintegration, violence continues across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which most certainly involves Rwandan nationals. Hence, despite international political will, time and money, reintegration efforts in Rwanda have not as yet provided a sufficient ‘pull factor’ to bring those fighters home.^[16]

The reintegration process of the Ex-LTTE in Sri Lanka was focused upon economic support to rank and file members whilst incorporating some senior Ex-LTTE members into political and administrative roles as a reconciliation measure. Since the Sri Lanka war ended with a decisive military outcome rather than a negotiated peace accord, a national DDR programme was not implemented in the country. Hence reintegration efforts in Sri Lanka have potentially left a number of gaps that might one day lead to a less-formal, and non-military, violent struggle within the country.^[17] More recently, in Colombia, some FARC rebels have withdrawn from the national peace agreement due to dissatisfaction with the political and governance roles they were assigned within it. Therefore, such examples highlight the complexity of reintegration processes which require time, trust and commitment both internally and from across the international community in order to achieve positive and sustainable outcomes.

With a key driver in the Yemen war being under-representation of the Houthis within government, reintegration will be the key element of any national DDR programme in the country. Indeed, past rhetoric from some sources has even questioned whether the Houthi people are true Yemenis. Hence reintegration will be a complex undertaking in Yemen and will need to address a full range of needs from ensuring basic economic survival for those individual ex-combatants who may volunteer to pursue alternative livelihoods to armed combat, to successfully incorporating the right actors within the political peace process at all levels. More significantly, the poor state of Yemen’s economy and the low job prospects for youth in areas outside of informal security roles will require concerted and committed donor support over a long period just to give economic hope to Yemen’s large youth population. Similarly, given the country’s long history of internal conflict and widespread grassroots’ influence from armed groups, many ex-combatants may not be able to socially reintegrate into their communities without remaining engaged with those who recruited them in the first place. Hence, as well as requiring huge economic resources, reintegration’s social and political lines of effort will require extensive support to achieve sustainable peace in Yemen.

In outline therefore, successfully delivering any national DDR process in Yemen would be a huge challenge and potentially the largest and most complex undertaking of its kind in UN history. Given the proliferation of SALW across the population as well as the fact that overt displays of gun ownership has now been subsumed into Yemeni culture, traditional disarmament processes are rendered a near impossibility. However, in order to ensure that a Yemeni peace agreement of any type will hold, disarmament of heavy weapons and the decommissioning of missile capabilities, with appropriate monitoring mechanisms, will be necessary. In parallel, it is possible that some community-led initiatives on small arms protocols under the CVR umbrella will ease the proliferation of SALW at least on the surface. The low cost of buying new SALW, as well as the history of secretly storing heavy weapons during earlier Yemeni wars, make disarmament a complex task where local-level negotiations and pragmatic compromise may well be necessary.

Regarding demobilization, any sustainable process as part of wider DDR in Yemen would need to cover many contrasting cultures across the country’s diverse population many of whom have not experienced even rudimentary standards of governance and political engagement throughout their lifetimes. Therefore, holistically addressing mind-set changes and the breaking of irregular command chains for those linked to belligerent forces would be challenge enough. Scaling demobilisation up to the delivery of overall societal changes from conflict to peace will also not be a simple or linear process. Reaching across Yemeni society and sensitizing all as valid stakeholders in the peace process will require significant trust and acceptance and is unlikely to reach all levels and members of society equally or even at all. However, demobilization in Yemen could well have some early success with combatants as DDRs primary stakeholders but is unlikely to holistically address the demobilization challenges within wider Yemeni society, particularly in rural areas. Given the fact that many combatants in Yemen are categorized as youth who will have generally spent a large proportion of their lives under arms, their demobilization will be all the more challenging. Hence, for demobilization to underpin a comprehensive Yemen peace process, it would undoubtedly be a long-term process spanning perhaps a full generation of Yemenis and very possibly beyond.

Collateral war damage in Sana‘a

Whilst disarmament and demobilization could well be key contributors to peace and stability in Yemen, reintegration will best serve those aims in the more immediate term. Indeed, since its lines of effort will include economic, social and political change for the ex-combatant, reintegration in Yemen must first seek to offer alternative livelihoods for combatants and those susceptible to recruitment by armed groups. Lacking social safety nets in the country, economic survival is the key driver of armed recruitment for young Yemenis. With the country economically run down by successive conflicts and limited natural resources, real jobs are scarce and income is comparatively lower than what is on offer from armed groups. Outside of the need to merely survive economically, the opportunities for Yemeni youth to pursue betterment and social mobility via education or entrepreneurship only currently exist in their dreams.

In more urban areas of Yemen, social reintegration could follow past UN practices of sensitizing and preparing receiving communities to accept returning combatants underpinned by CVR activities. Within rural areas, Yemen’s tribal structures include de facto governance, thus many combatants returning to their tribal areas may possibly be more easily assimilated, whether remaining under arms within their tribal groups or not. Indeed, researchers on Yemen’s tribal alliances supporting either the pro-government or pro-Houthi forces will undoubtedly support UN thinking regarding any reintegration processes in the country, if and when that time comes.

Overall, for the individual combatant, it would appear that economic reintegration will be the key pull factor in volunteering for any national DDR programme in Yemen. Social reintegration requires consideration of the individual combatant, their experiences of war and acceptance by others. Hence, this can vary greatly according to the individual as well as the context of where and what they are returning to. A key issue that will feature widely amongst any donors sponsoring DDR in Yemen will undoubtedly be the risk of providing reintegration support to ex-combatants who will be susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups and other spoilers. This will require the international community to trust that processes for CVE and Counter Terrorism (CT) adequately support any DDR in Yemen. Concerning the political arm of reintegration, Yemen’s returning ex-combatants must also feel that they are stakeholders in ending the war and have gained the opportunity of having a voice in the country’s future journey. The peace agreement, when it comes, is unlikely to survive any lack of inclusiveness concerning the political reintegration of belligerent leaders, through whom all elements of Yemeni society can be represented and have an equal opportunity to choose who governs and serves them.

As an aside, from experience with the national Liberian DDR programme, the DDR prospects for Yemen contrast greatly with the traditional DDR operations such as that one from 2004. In Liberia, a highly inclusive disarmament phase was followed by a five-day residential demobilization process for all combatants, armed or otherwise. The Liberian reintegration phase was supported by psychosocial counselling referrals where needed and modest economic, social and political reintegration activities covering the needs of individuals and communities up to the national level. With effective public sensitization underpinning national reconciliation as well as widespread donor commitment, Liberia therefore enjoyed a successful DDR experience that has contributed to relative peace across the sub-region.^[18]

In conclusion, as opposed to Liberia, given Yemen’s current military context, an impasse in the political peace process and the negative impact of external actors using Yemen as a proxy-war battleground, it would seem less likely that traditional DDR has a significant role under such circumstances. Whilst contexts have been seen to change quickly in the country, if there is indeed to be any national-level DDR process in Yemen, it is therefore likely to be a small and strategic-level disarmament phase (‘small first d’), a long-term, societal-changing demobilization phase (‘long-term second d’) lasting for perhaps a full generation across Yemeni society and a very large-scale reintegration phase targeting economic needs (‘large R’): Thus, for Yemen, the DDR acronym might be imagined as ‘dd…R’.

4 The UN DDR record in Yemen

Whilst the prospects for running successful DDR projects in Yemen are limited, it has been disappointing to witness the minimal focus that has been given to DDR as a tool for supporting the Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General (OSESGY) for Yemen. Advice from the UN side has consistently insisted that implementing DDR initiatives prior to the arrival of either a widespread ceasefire agreement or a comprehensive peace accord, could not be considered. Furthermore, although it served as the Special Envoy’s official advisory mechanism, the UN DDR Forum was largely unsupported by other stakeholders from the Yemen UN Country Team and was pointedly resistant to recommending DDR opportunities such as Pre-DDR and CVR to the OSESGY. Most notably, there appeared to be a clear reluctance by UN advisers to consider drafting plans for Pre-DDR activities in preparation for when the security situation might allow DDR interventions on any scale, even where local conditions were favourable.

Numerous international community offers to collectively brainstorm operational workplans did not bear fruit with UN advisers in the DDR Forum and indeed the continuing absence of key UN stakeholders from forum meetings was widely considered as far from ideal. Similarly, there was a notable disapproval from some UN actors within the UN DDR Forum towards non-UN member states delivering their own stabilization pilot projects, even though these were bilateral activities not requiring assent from any UN entity. Nonetheless, in the absence of the UN delivering any pre-DDR or CVR activities in Yemen at the time, member states commenced their own stabilisation activities in 2017 and continue to do so as of today. Focusing upon activities where security would allow stabilization actors to be effective, such bilateral activities targeted community-level service provision, some infrastructure rehabilitation and community peacebuilding activities.

Since the UN DDR Forum in Yemen had not chosen to implement any activities from the UN DDR toolbox, either Pre-DDR, CVR, Mediation (although this had taken place earlier) or Stabilisation through DDR, the forum was transformed late in 2017 by the US, as the principal donor of the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen (OSESGY). The UN DDR Forum was thus realigned into the OSESGY DDR Working Group, co-chaired by the US and UK. This enabled the international community to shift the emphasis towards ascertaining which DDR-related interventions might be possible during the ongoing war in Yemen. By this time, the US were conducting general stabilisation operations through quick impact projects (QIPS) and the UK was delivering one stabilisation pilot project for improving service provision and another on community-based peacebuilding through international implementing partners. Other EU nations, notably Germany, were also supporting grassroots stabilisation in areas where security permitted their local partners to operate effectively.

By demonstrating that DDR-related activities could be delivered prior to an effective ceasefire or peace accord, the Working Group broadened its remit and stakeholder base to include wider involvement from the UN Country Team and observer status for stabilisation implementing partners. Notably however, key bodies from the UN Country Team for Yemen (previously not invited to DDR Forum meetings) were routinely contacted but singularly failed to attend DDR Working Group sessions meaning that stakeholders holding UN remits in areas such as stabilisation and child protection, excluded themselves from the DDR consultation process. For example, although the US/UK-led DDR Working Group had highlighted opportunities to engage Yemeni children in PDR, these were not taken up by UNICEF. Furthermore, late in 2017, having discovered that a Saudi Arabian organisation had commenced the reintegration of Yemeni children formerly associated with the Houthi movement, it still took many months for UNICEF to provide advisory support to that ad hoc Saudi programme. Whilst the intent may have been otherwise, that reintegration programme breached a number of established international standards on child reintegration including the publishing of the children’s photographs exacerbating the potential for their stigmatization. Not being aware of the issue or engaging the Saudi programme on best practice and international standards earlier cannot be seen as being in the best interests of either the programme provider or the children themselves. Hence, in that specific case, the non-participation in DDR discussions by a key UN stakeholder failed the people that the UN Country Team for Yemen are there to protect.

Whilst some community violence reduction (CVR) initiatives were later formulated for Yemen under the UN umbrella, coordination between UN stakeholders remained a significant challenge both in DDR-related matters as well as wider stabilisation, which was later transferred from the DDR Working Group to the UN Resident Coordinator’s office. It is well understood that in conflict environments where there is a political impasse and poor security it is difficult, even with good access and resources, to operate effectively. Nonetheless, such conditions do typically offer opportunities to research, understand and plan ahead for likely scenarios where DDR opportunities may arise. Yet colleagues within the international community continued to perceive that some UN actors related to Yemeni DDR, stabilization and longer-term recovery remained isolated and uncoordinated. Indeed, at a time when this was certainly possible, key UN DDR staff were reluctant to even discuss the drafting of outline operational plans as first response opportunities in areas of reasonable security on the ground. Repeated requests for a DDR small-scale, rapid-response plan remained unanswered and with the UN Resident Coordinator’s office (by then overseeing stabilisation) not effectively engaged with the DDR Working Group, coordination within UN ranks remained at best rudimentary and more often, frustratingly absent.

Later in 2018, an outline strategy for stabilisation in Yemen was produced by the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office. However, lacking in operational detail, it is still struggling to obtain the necessary critical donor funding to render it workable on a wider scale. Considering the paucity of detailed stabilization or DDR planning for Yemen, some member states recognized the need to develop a clearer vision, particularly since the belligerent parties had, by then, showed more openness towards peace negotiations. Recognising the need for a wide-ranging stabilization strategy for Yemen, by mid-2018, the UK began the process of defining a detailed UK Yemen Stabilisation Strategy (YSS). Containing the five pillars of political, economic, governance (rule of law), governance (service provision) and stabilization through community peacebuilding, the YSS now forms the basis for UK stabilisation funding in Yemen and stands as a tool of influence for other international actors in the stabilisation field, including the US and UN.^[19]

Hence, by developing strategies and implementing stabilization activities similar in nature to those within the UN DDR toolbox, the international community continued to provide good counsel in support of the UN-led peace process whist also demonstrating, through bilateral projects inside Yemen, some possible interventions even during the Yemen war. Overall, despite opportunities for the implementation of DDR-related initiatives, the UN Yemen Country Team has largely not seized the moment to produce adequate DDR plans or begin pre-DDR activities such as public sensitization or concerted PDR activities to reduce the impact of war on Yemen’s children. Although some CVR activities do now take place in Yemen, UN DDR and stabilization activities could easily have been better coordinated and underpinned by basic strategies developed jointly by key UN stakeholders. Had there been progress in those key areas, the UN Country Team would now be better placed to support the technical needs of the OSESGY and the Special Envoy in his mandate of driving the UN-led political peace process.

5 Conclusion

In considering how DDR has relevance to the Yemen, this article has outlined the various approaches of traditional and second-generation DDR as well as the related initiatives of CVR, Pre-DDR and DDR Mediation. In addition, it has touched upon DDRs links to stabilisation as well as recent developments inside the stabilisation umbrella of the international community. Building upon that foundation, some thoughts on the potential relevance and opportunities for DDR within the current Yemen context have been presented.

DDR has great potential to deliver significant peace benefits to communities undergoing conflict. As it has evolved, UN DDR has broadened in scope and now has the committed aim of ensuring linkages with political processes as one of its strategic priorities for 2018–2020. This evolutionary process is set to continue with plans for new DDR guidance on children and violent extremism as well as partnerships with other UN entities to develop DDR policy and operational implementation. This positive intent of the UN to broaden DDR and coordinate more widely is seemingly at odds with the United Nation’s ability to bring the benefits of DDR to the people of Yemen. As detailed in this paper, the UN Yemen DDR Forum misunderstood the breadth of UN DDR and indeed advocated for a halt to any DDR initiatives taking place in Yemen prior to the signing of a peace accord. In addition, they did not successfully sensitize other UN agencies or key stakeholders to the possibilities of Pre-DDR or CVR and indeed coordination within the UN Country Team on DDR was at best rudimentary. This has led to the near absent or inadequate planning for both DDR and stabilization which has demonstrated a lack of creativity and commitment in recognizing and implementing opportunities under either UN line of effort.

As well as early DDR theory, this paper touched upon Pre-DDR, PDR and CVR activities within the DDR mandate. These four excellent UN DDR initiatives can reduce community tension, sensitize armed forces and the people they represent, stabilize communities and limit the recruitment of children. However, these activities were largely or totally absent from Yemen during the 2017 to 2019 period.

As UN DDR evolves, it has shown much crossover with the international community’s practices that exist under the stabilisation umbrella. Stabilisation research suggests that local political deals can build confidence between warring parties, increase the participation of under-represented groups and generating positive grass-roots pressure for a wider peace process. This article concludes that in the absence of a binding national-level political process in Yemen, bottom-up approaches focused on reducing violence and improving humanitarian access may offer real opportunities for much-needed progress within the country. UK stabilisation’s elite deals and bargains approach therefore offer a chance to build political momentum and help establish islands of stability from the grass-roots’ upwards. Applying one or more of the array of UN DDR initiatives used in other countries in conflict to the parts of Yemen that are already stable is therefore surely logical. Stabilization overlaps with DDR practice and has similar aims and, despite UN Yemen DDR Forum advisers believing the contrary, neither requires a ceasefire agreement or comprehensive peace accord. Hence, with terrain ripe for Pre-DDR, CVR and PDR in areas where stabilization has begun in Yemen, why is the UN not putting DDR to work in those places yet?

Any national programme in Yemen will potentially be the largest and most complex DDR undertaking in UN history. Traditional DDR with preconditions like adequate security and a political agreement has evolved into DDR that can now directly engage armed groups and use adaptive and evidence-based programming within the wider recovery and stability agenda. Hence DDR now links to security sector reform (SSR), job creation, governance, human rights, infrastructure development, access to justice and rule of law, as does stabilization. Therefore, why is Yemen not benefitting from such developments in UN DDR practice through the brokering of elite deals leading to benefits within suitable communities?

The DDR Working Group for Yemen generally understood that a traditional national DDR programme in Yemen could not commence within the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, this article has outlined that DDR is a flexible tool able to mitigate the effect of conflict at various levels in support of the most vulnerable and affected people. Effective DDR can take many forms and the opportunities for the UN to deliver initiatives to demonstrate ‘the art of the possible’ in Yemen were often present and yet not considered by the UN. Indeed, always in search of confidence building measures (CBMs), the UN Special Envoy’s peace process could have benefitted from DDR interventions as examples of the dividends of peace in less war-torn communities. The UNs stabilization plans could well have benefitted from widespread CVR and Pre-DDR interventions or PDR, as an ongoing child protection activity, should always be a first consideration once a UN foothold is gained in a conflict situation. That the effort to begin such initiatives in Yemen was not there from the UN side is regrettable but the more surprising absence was the lack of DDR planning, either contingency or comprehensive, which was not conducted by the UN at any stage to date.

If DDR ever takes place in Yemen, then a traditional DDR programme is not believed to be the likely best option. Hence, within the Yemeni context, it is suggested that a small and strategic-level disarmament phase should first aim at neutralizing the heavy weapon and missile threat. Thereafter, the proliferation of SALW and cultural aspects of weapons’ ownership is more likely to be addressed by weapons’ management programmes rather than large-scale disarmament. Given a potential caseload of some 1,000,000 combatants together with the large proportion of those being youth under arms, widespread demobilization in Yemen will require long-term societal changes lasting for perhaps a full generation across Yemeni society. The complexities within the D and D phases are indeed significant yet, the success of a national-level DDR programme in Yemen will hinge upon holistic and concerted reintegration. The R phase will need to be inclusive and provide extensive economic support to a large caseload of ex-combatants and build social reconciliation bridges across a highly-diverse country where such efforts have often failed in the past. In addition, sustainable DDR in Yemen would also need to ensure the acceptable political reintegration of representative leaders from all sides at all levels of Yemeni government.