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Moral Philosophy and Politics

Editor-in-Chief: Lukas Heinrich Meyer
Edited by: Jennifer Page , Mark Peacock , Michael Schefczyk and Tongdong Bai
Managing Editor: Harald Stelzer

Language: English

First published: May 30, 2014

Publication Frequency: 2 issues per year

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About this journal

Moral Philosophy and Politics (MOPP) is an international, peer-reviewed journal that publishes original philosophical articles addressing matters of public relevance. The notion ‘public relevance’ is construed broadly to encompass various domains and aspects. The journal has a special focus on the philosophical assessment of policies and their normative foundations, analyses of the philosophical underpinnings or implications of political discourse, and discussions of the justice or injustice inherent in social and political structures that govern human conduct.

MOPP is committed to the ideals of clarity, evidence-based reasoning, and intellectual openness. interdisciplinary work and historical approaches are encouraged when they are relevant to contemporary issues. MOPP considers both theoretical and meta-ethical works, as well as those tackling conceptual problems, provided they offer insights into political, moral, economic or social issues that characterize contemporary societies. Contributors are expected to make clear how their work relates to these issues.

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Current Calls for Papers

‘Philosophizing the Indefensible by Shmuel Nili’, ed. by Ben Jones (for more information, click here)

Call for Special Issues and Symposia

Moral Philosophy and Politics welcomes guest editors who are interested in organizing special issues for our journal. If you have a topic in mind that aligns with the scope and focus of MOPP and would like to collaborate with us, please get in touch with our editorial team. Interested guest editors are kindly requested to include a one-page proposal outlining their envisioned special issue. For more information about the process of publishing a special issue with MOPP, please click here.

Open Access
Constitutional Demoicracy: An International Republican Regime of Human Rights

August 18, 2025

Davide Pala

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Nowadays, many new agents, structures and dynamics make human rights insecure – think of TNCs or climate change. Yet states as they currently are seem unable to tackle these threats effectively. So what should an appropriate human-rights regime, that is, one that protects them securely and legitimately , look like, today? This article argues that republicanism provides the regime we need: a constitutional demoi -cracy. This new, mixed human-rights regime is a demoicracy for, even if states remain the primary locus where human rights are realised, they bind themselves to a union that governs together the new agents, structures and dynamics that threaten them, without their demoi merging into one global demos. It is constitutional, for this governing together gives rise to a thin but binding supranational apparatus, whose point is, similar to domestic constitutions, to constrain state power over human rights and at the same time to empower states to protect them.
Open Access
Ecological Sustainability: What We the People Owe Ourselves as a Duty of Self-Determination

August 1, 2025

Jonathan Kwan

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I argue that a people as an intergenerational group has a self-directed duty of ecological sustainability that is a precondition, and even a correlate, of its own right to self-determination. Conceptualizing ecological sustainability as a self-directed duty of self-determination offers several advantages. First, it avoids the nonidentity problem, since the identity conditions of intergenerational peoples do not depend on which specific individuals will become members. Second, it better captures the normatively valuable relationships knitting different generations into a single political community than theories that ascribe rights to self-determination or sovereignty to discrete generations. Third, grounding a duty of ecological sustainability in self-determination not only responds to a distinct demand of legitimacy but also sidesteps problems that arise when appealing instead to justice, especially egalitarian distributive principles. Lastly, I reply to the worry that a duty grounded in the right to self-determination cannot be a genuinely binding duty insofar as a people can simply waive its right to self-determination. I contend that a people cannot permanently waive its right to self-determination while continuing to exist, and even when a people chooses to dissolve, it is still bound by its self-directed duty of ecological sustainability until it ceases to exist.
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Styles of Social Kinds

July 17, 2025

Tris Hedges

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In this paper I initiate an important dialogue between the phenomenology of social perception and analytic social ontological discussions of how our perception of others (and concurrent conferrals of social kinds) can be sites of ‘ontic injustice’. Katharine Jenkins develops the concept of ontic injustice to theorise how your being of a social kind can consist, at least in part, of wrongful constraints and enablements. Taking Jenkins’s discussion of interpersonal kinds as the focus, I argue that the phenomenological concept of style enables a more experientially accurate account of how such (oftentimes unjust) interpersonal kinds come into being. My central claim is that Jenkins’s indicator/base property distinction performs a theoretical abstraction from actual embodied lived experience and that these properties are experientially subordinate to how other subjects are first and foremost given stylistically in experience, that is, as unified meaningful wholes. To support this claim, I engage with Jenkins’s example of gender presentation and show how its misalignment with base properties is better made sense of through the tripartite distinction of style, indicator properties, and base property. Introducing this phenomenological perspective enriches the experientially descriptive aspects of Jenkins’s social ontology.
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Rousseau’s “General Will” and AI: A Framework for Democratic Governance in the Era of Big Tech

July 11, 2025

Adrien Tallent

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This paper critically analyzes the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the general will (GW), proposing a practical, three-dimensional approach to address the challenges posed by these technologies to democratic governance. The current dominance of automated systems controlled by a few digital giants (“Big Tech”) threatens to undermine collective and democratic decision-making. Building on Rousseau’s notion of the general will as a collective and sovereign expression of the common good, I identify four ways AI erodes the GW: (1) the privatization of the public debate; (2) the individualization of practices; (3) the erosion of personal and collective will; (4) the risk of technological despotism. I then discuss possible pathways to address these challenges and recover the sense of the GW. First, education and mediatization of AI issues would enable the (re)formation of the GW. Then, public participation platforms could allow its expression. Finally, coming back to Rousseau, I call for a renewal of the terms of the social contract through public participation in AI choices. By linking Rousseau’s democratic ideals with modern challenges, the paper presents actionable pathways to align AI technologies with democratic principles and collective representation.
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Relational Egalitarianism and Migration: An Introduction

June 27, 2025

Daniel Sharp

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In this introductory essay to the special issue on relational equality and migration, I first introduce a familiar way of conceiving of the connection between equality and migration, one that focuses on distributive inequality. I then provide an overview of the state of the debate concerning relational equality and migration. I conclude by summarizing the contributions to this special issue.
Open Access
‘Not a Guest in My Country’: Immigration Background, Social Hierarchies, and the Fundamental Interest in ‘Being at Home’

June 2, 2025

Hong Do, Cristina Astier

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The prevailing belief, both within the immigration literature and in current political debate, is that the cornerstone of resolving immigration issues is the attainment of citizenship. In contrast, this article delves deeper into the plight of citizens with a perceived immigration background. We argue that formal equal citizenship does not alleviate the morally objectionable patterns of social inequality experienced by these citizens. To elaborate further, we insist that citizens with a perceived immigration background are often not treated equally by social institutions or by their fellow citizens. To address this concern, we argue that these citizens have a claim against being treated as strangers, aliens, and nonmembers of society, which is grounded in the public and equal advancement of the fundamental interest in ‘being at home’.
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Political Liberalism, Exclusion and Metapluralism: A Critical Analysis of John Tomasi’s Account of the Moral Powers of Citizenship

May 23, 2025

Joshua Clarke

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Upon reading Free Market Fairness , it is apparent that John Tomasi’s defence of market democracy relies on a certain conception of political personality qua citizenship in which the idea of self-authorship is afforded a primary role. With the goal of both clarifying and assessing the merits of said conception, this article begins with a delimitation of Rawls’s and John Tomasi’s account of political personhood qua citizenship. It then moves on to provide several interpretations of the central causality clause associated with Tomasi’s first moral power, favouring a so-called ontological interpretation. Building upon this, the article goes on to argue that Tomasi’s account brings to light problems of exclusivity and metapluralism which afflict, and cast doubt upon, the broader project of political liberalism.
Open Access
The Moral Magic Problem in Theories of Rights

April 24, 2025

Giulio Fornaroli

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According to a widely accepted thesis, all rights violations wrong the right-holder. According to another widely accepted thesis, rights protect interests. But many conventional rights protect morally trivial interests. Hence, the two theses taken together lead to the puzzling conclusion that one can wrong another by frustrating a trivial interest. In this essay, I first introduce this “moral magic” problem and show why the interest theory of rights has no resources to address it.
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Art in Service of the State: New Sketch of a State Arts Program

April 18, 2025

Lukas James Myers

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In the 80s and 90s political liberals debated whether it is legitimate for a state to fund the arts on the grounds that art is a public good. The public goods model is only one way in which the state might justify funding for the arts. Indeed, throughout history, liberal societies have employed artists on behalf of the state and for the benefit of the state. In this paper, I argue that it is, in principle, permissible for the state to fund the arts for the good such funding can provide the state. I sketch a state arts program which has the purpose of producing pro-state art, art which helps to legitimize the state. The state is permitted to do this in order to execute its duty of stability. I defend the permissibility of such a program against the claim that it would be objectionably propagandistic or that it would be too easy to abuse such a program for nefarious means.
Open Access
The Egalitarian Case for Open Borders: Moral Arbitrariness

March 3, 2025

Bradley Hillier-Smith

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This paper argues that recent debates on egalitarian objections to immigration restrictions overlook a crucial, powerful normative principle that underpins objections to inequalities: any inequalities between morally equal persons – whether in goods, resources, welfare but also in powers, statuses, rights, and freedoms – that arise from morally arbitrary factors are pro tanto unjust. This principle of moral arbitrariness is fundamental to both luck and relational egalitarianism yet is often missing from debates that apply such theories to migration ethics. The result of this omission is that certain arguments that purportedly reject luck egalitarian cases for open borders in fact fail since they fail to recognise the normative force of the principle of moral arbitrariness; yet, simultaneously, relational egalitarian cases for open borders are not fully successful since they fail to recognise that the principle of moral arbitrariness is required to distinguish immigration restrictions as unjust where other (relational) inequalities may not be. Hence, the overall argument of this paper is that the recognition of the principle of moral arbitrariness is essential for the success of both the luck and relational egalitarian cases, and thus a proper recognition of the full normative force and implications of this principle entails the egalitarian case for open borders indeed succeeds.
Open Access
Postcolonial Migration and Relational Inequality: The Complexities of Positive Contact as a Relational Equality Promoting Tool

March 3, 2025

Zara Goldstone

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Recently, some political philosophers have started to argue that the history and continuation of colonial injustices means that former colonising states have no right to exclude members of former colonies or colonially inflected societies. However, less attention has been paid to the issue of how postcolonial migrants ought to be treated once admitted into former metropoles. In this paper I assess whether postcolonial migrants ought to be required to socially integrate once admitted. On the one hand, there seems to be a compelling argument in favour of this requirement, because of the relational equality promoting benefits of social integration. I show how postcolonial migrants are subject to relational inequality within former metropoles and draw attention to compelling empirical evidence that shows that facilitating close and frequent interactions between members of ‘outgroups’ and ‘ingroups’ is an effective means of promoting relational equality. However, I then argue that postcolonial migrants ought not to be required to socially integrate for two reasons. Firstly, such policies in fact risk reinforcing relational inequality, and secondly, they risk subjecting postcolonial migrants to unreasonable burdens. This does not mean that former colonising states ought to dispense with social integration policies altogether, but they ought to be more attuned to the preferences of postcolonial migrants. In contexts in which they oppose social integration policies, a more appropriately relational egalitarian act would be for former colonising states to keep open the possibility of future social integration, rather than to impose it.
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Must Exploiters Objectively Benefit from Exploitation?

February 20, 2025

Douglas Ehring

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Various philosophers have claimed that a necessary condition for A to wrongfully exploit B is for A to benefit from interacting with B. On a subjective understanding of benefits, A benefits from an interaction only if that interaction contributes to the satisfaction of one of A’s actual and current goals or desires. On the other hand, interests may be read as objective or real interests. Proposals for characterizing real interests range from those that restrict real interests to psychological states to those that involve states that are not psychological. On the objective understanding, A benefits from an interaction with B only if that interaction promotes one of A’s real interests. I dispute the claim that a requirement of wrongful exploitation is an objective benefit to the exploiter.
Open Access
Luck Egalitarianism, Exploitation, and the Normative Foundations of Socialism

February 18, 2025

Callum Zavos MacRae

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According to a prominent account, the central normative commitments of socialism are a luck egalitarian principle of equality and a principle of community or solidarity. The model has a number of attractions. However, it appears to be vulnerable to a series of objections that have been pressed against luck egalitarian accounts of the concept of exploitation. In this paper I argue that, despite some overlooked flexibility, the exploitation objection represents a serious challenge to this model and provides a good reason to explore alternative accounts of socialism’s normative grounds.
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Border Control, Migration Pathways, and Social Inequality

February 14, 2025

Michael Ball-Blakely

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Relational egalitarians have increasingly argued that immigration control facilitates social inequality. This ranges from Amy Reed-Sandoval’s account of the socially undocumented, to Désirée Lim’s criticisms of skill selection’s expressive disrespect, to Daniel Sharp’s claim that immigration control exercises power over would-be immigrants. I develop a novel extension of relational egalitarianism principles. Unlike other accounts, I argue that immigration control contributes to inegalitarian relationships that are not: (1) within the receiving state, (2) the result of discrimination, (3) simply the exercise of power-over, and (4) between the receiving state and would-be immigrants. I argue that immigration restrictions can, in the context of cultures of migration, create inegalitarian relationships in sending countries, harming both would-be immigrants and nonimmigrant populations. Cultures of migration respond to and help create changes in values. They lead to a dissatisfaction with local opportunities – including employment, consumption, and cultural practices. When borders are relaxed, these changes promote immigration. But when they are hardened, the changes persist while the dissatisfied are increasingly trapped in a society that they no longer find desirable. And nonimmigrants – who might still endorse local values and desire local opportunities – are left living amidst (often) more privileged compatriots who increasingly denigrate the lifestyles they endorse.
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Defending Relational Autonomy

January 14, 2025

James Humphries

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Relational accounts of autonomy such as those advanced by Rebekah Johnston (2017. “Personal Autonomy, Social Identity, and Oppressive Social Contexts.” Hypatia 32 (2): 312–28) and particularly Marina Oshana (1998; “Personal Autonomy and Society.” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1): 81–102. 2006; Personal Autonomy in Society . Aldershot: Ashgate; 2015. “Is Social-Relational Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” In Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives , edited by M. Oshana. New York: Routledge) are often thought to be distinctively vulnerable to paternalist and perfectionist objections, as well as implying in a troublesome and/or implausible way that many of us are much less autonomous than is standardly thought. I argue that although constitutively relational accounts are indeed perfectionist, they are so in such a “thin” way that we should not be concerned by it; that they are not paternalist (and indeed are necessarily hostile to the sorts of power relations necessary for paternalism); and that the charge that relational accounts demand an unattractively high bar for autonomy is misdirected – we really do lack autonomy in perhaps surprising but plausible ways and for the account to imply this is a problem for the world rather than the theory.
Open Access
Justice for Thwarted Fathers? Problems for Retrospective Parental Rights Claims

December 23, 2024

Teresa Baron

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This paper examines the legitimacy of retrospective parental rights-claims through the lens of so-called ‘thwarted father’ cases: men who are unaware of their progeny’s existence until the window for establishing legal parentage (and associated rights) has passed. In some famous cases of thwarted fathers, courts have found that an injustice has been done which must be rectified by awarding retrospective parental rights and custody to those men, even when their genetic child has already lived for some extended period with their adoptive parents. In this paper, I critically examine Norvin Richards’ liberty-based defence of the parental rights of these fathers. He argues that the decision to overturn an adoption in a thwarted father case is justified if we agree that a man’s contribution of sperm was indeed the first act of a parenthood project that he should have had the liberty right to continue. Although Richards’ account might allow us to say that a thwarted father has been wronged, justice cannot demand that the situation be rectified through specific performance (as in cases when property is stolen and justice requires that it be returned).
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Herod Strategy and a Social Insurance Scheme Against a Short Life: Three Challenges

December 11, 2024

Gregory Ponthiere

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A social insurance scheme against a short life seems impossible: ex ante (before lengths of life are known), it is hard to identify the persons who will be short-lived, and ex post (once lengths of life are known), it is often too late to compensate the short-lived. However, it is possible to insure persons against a short life by means of age-based statistical discrimination that favours the young in line with the Herod strategy: allocating the good things of life to all young adults improves the situation of the unidentified persons who will die prematurely and reduces the deprivation due to an early death. This article examines three challenges questioning the capacity of the Herod strategy to reduce wellbeing deprivation due to a premature death. First, the limited substitutability between the quantity and the quality of life years makes an efficient insurance scheme against a short life incomplete. Second, the state cannot know ex ante the conception of the good life of the short-lived and must offer baskets of universal means that would improve all kinds of short lives. Such baskets will, under endowment effects, affect the adopted views about the good life, against the ideal of a neutral state. Third, the bias towards the future makes persons spontaneously reallocate the good things of life to later ages, which would defeat insurance against a short life.
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Domestic Mobility and Relational Equality

November 4, 2024

Patti Tamara Lenard

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My focus is on how democratic states restrict, constrain and shape the movement of citizens and residents across their territory. My central claim is that a focus on equal relations between them, as relational egalitarians emphasize, can show where restrictions on movement are permissible or problematic. Over the course of the discussion, I offer many examples, as well as four cases in which I assess specific movement-related policies for whether they are violations of relational equality: exclusionary zoning, eminent domain, resettlement of isolated communities and no-fly lists. These analyses are neither extensive nor exhaustive, but I hope they are sufficient to demonstrate that relational egalitarians should be concerned with whether citizens and residents can move freely and to indicate how a relational egalitarian can evaluate movement-related policies as to whether they support or undermine the ability of citizens and residents to interact as social equals.
Open Access
What is Wrong with Methodological Nationalism? An Argument About Discrimination

November 4, 2024

Anna Milioni

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Methodological nationalism is a cognitive bias that construes states as the natural and necessary form of contemporary social organisation. This gives rise to a state-centred view which naturalises national communities, exaggerates the differences between citizens and migrants, and exceptionalises international migration. In this paper, I argue that methodological nationalism is not only empirically inaccurate, but also normatively problematic, because its assumptions prevent migration ethicists from properly theorising about discrimination. I begin by briefly presenting methodological nationalism and clarifying some misconceptions. I also identify some features that would make a policy discriminatory and show that many contemporary migration policies are discriminatory. Looking at three variants of methodological nationalism (naturalisation, territorialisation, and ignorance), I argue that methodological nationalism marginalises concerns about discrimination in migration ethics and prevents migration ethicists from developing accounts that would be able to counter xenophobic arguments. Last, I consider the implications of my argument for migration ethics.
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Irregular Migrants and the Demands of Relational Equality

November 4, 2024

Diego Tapia-Riquelme

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Should states naturalize long-term irregular migrants residing in their territory? Scholars such as Carens and Rubio-Marín have defended their naturalization by drawing on a theory of social membership. However, some have argued that the social membership account falls short of requiring the granting of citizenship to irregular migrants. Others, such as Brock, Ochoa Espejo, and Hosein, have attempted to defend a right not to be deported. I argue that relational equality can provide a defense for granting irregular migrants citizenship rights – their complete naturalization – which avoids the limitations of both approaches: it provides a more solid grounding for granting citizenship to irregular migrants, and shows why a right to stay still leaves irregular migrants in a morally troubling position. Irregular migrants are subjected for long periods of time to the laws of the state they reside in without having any power or influence over them and face significant difficulties in leaving the country, which results in objectionable social inequality. I argue that such concerns about inequality of status override the right of the demos to determine its membership and concerns about irregular migrants’ original breaking of the law.
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Cultured Meat as a Transitional Step Towards Interspecies Justice?

September 19, 2024

Steve Cooke

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For some, cultured animal products ought to be celebrated for the potential they offer to replace factory farming. Others argue that, for the same reason, there is a duty to support their production and consumption. This paper argues that the ethical status of cultured animal products ought to be assessed not just in comparison with factory farming, but also in terms of its potential to bring about interspecies justice. The claim is made that the attitudes embodied within cultured animal products show a lack of proper respect for nonhuman animals and are at odds with those required by justice. Although cultured animal products have the potential to greatly reduce harms done to nonhuman animals, this paper argues that their adoption ought to nevertheless be regarded with some regret. Using a Rawlsian framework for assessing transitional steps towards justice, the paper shows that, whilst the adoption of cultured animal products may be permissible, the case for regarding it as a duty is much weaker. For cultured meats to be permissible, it must first be shown that alternatives that respect the value of nonhuman animals as ends-in-themselves do not exist.

Special Issue: Mathias Risse and Gabriel Wollner’s On Trade Justice; Guest Editors: Peter Dietsch and Frank J. Garcia

Issue 2

Issue 1

Special Issue: Towards Foolproof Democracy: Improving Public Debate and Political Decision-Making (Part II); Guest Editors: David Lanius and Ioannis Votsis

Issue 2

Special Issue: Children’s and Adolescents’ Rights; Guest Editors: Anca Gheaus und Sabine Hohl

Issue 1

Special Issue: The Ethics of State Mass Surveillance, Guest Editor: Peter Königs

Issue 2

Special Issue: Towards Foolproof Democracy: Improving Public Debate and Political Decision-Making, Guest Editors: David Lanius and Ioannis Votsis

Issue 1

Special Issue: Demandingness in Practice Guest Editors: Marcel van Ackeren and Simon Derpmann

Issue 2

Special Issue: Normative Aspects of International Trade Institutions, Guest Editor: Valentin Beck

Issue 1

Special Issue: Philip Pettit’s The Robust Demands of the Good, Guest Editors: N. P. Adams and Susanne Burri

Issue 2

Special Issue: Legitimate Expectations

Issue 1

Symposium: Autonomy and The Morality of Freedom

Issue 2

Special Issue: The Ethics of Immigration in a Non-Ideal World, Guest Editors: Jan Brezger, Andreas Cassee and Anna Goppel

Issue 1

Symposium: Brain Drain and Emigration, Guest Editor: Eszter Kollar

Issue 2

Symposium on Discrimination, Guest Editor: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen; Symposium on Limits of Markets

Issue 1

Symposium: Intergenerational Justice and Natural Resources, Guest Editors: Lukas H. Meyer, Pranay Sanklecha, Alexa Zellentin

Issue 2

Special Issue: Fair Trade

Issue 1

Special Issue: Global Tax Justice

Moral Philosophy and Politics publishes special and thematic issues focussed on important and emerging topics in the field of study. The journal has established a rigorous process to ensure that any special issue manuscripts follow the same high-quality standards and peer review processes as regular manuscripts. For further information on the journal’s peer review policy please see the "Instructions for Authors".

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Journal Impact Factor	0.6	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
5-year Journal Impact Factor	0.9	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
Journal Citation Indicator	0.74	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
CiteScore	2.4	2024, Scopus (Elsevier B.V., 2025)
SCImago Journal Rank	0.403	2024, SJR (Scimago Lab, 2025; Data Source: Scopus)
Source Normalized Impact per Paper	0.777	2024, CWTS Journal Indicators (CWTS B.V., 2025; Data Source: Scopus)

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Moral Philosophy and Politics (MOPP) invites submissions on any topic falling within the scope of the journal. It welcomes both submissions for special issues as well as submissions unrelated to any current call for papers. Submissions should be between 3.000 and 12.000 words in length.

MOPP uses a double-blind refereeing process. The identity of the author(s) of a submission is not known to the referees, nor vice versa. The editor in charge of the submission knows the identity of both. Submissions must be anonymized to allow for blind reviewing. Each submission is typically reviewed by two referees within six to twelve weeks.　

Submissions need not conform to any particular formatting style upon submission, but must be adjusted to the MOPP house style upon acceptance.

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De Gruyter allows authors the use of the final published version of an article (publisher pdf) for self-archiving (author's personal website) and/or archiving in an institutional repository (on a non-profit server) after an embargo period of 12 months after publication. The published source must be acknowledged and a link to the journal home page or articles' DOI must be set. Authors may not self-archive their articles in public and/or commercial subject based repositories. Click here for more information on De Gruyter’s self-archiving policy.

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For information on De Gruyter’s Open Access policy, please click here.

Editor-in-Chief

Lukas Meyer (Graz University, Austria)

Editors

Jennifer Page (Zürich University, Switzerland)
Mark Peacock (York University, Canada)
Michael Schefczyk (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany)
Tongdong Bai (Fudang University, China)

Managing Editor

Harald Stelzer (Graz University, Austria)

Editorial Board

Elizabeth Anderson (University of Michigan, MI, USA)
Arthur Applbaum (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA)
Dieter Birnbacher (Düsseldorf University, Germany)
Rüdiger Bittner (Bielefeld University, Germany)
Idil Boran (York University, Canada)
John Broome (Oxford University, UK)
Simon Caney (Oxford University, UK)
Paula Casal (ICREA/Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain)
Stephen Darwall (Yale University, New Haven, CN, USA)
Andreas Føllesdal (Oslo University, Norway)
Rainer Forst (Frankfurt University, Germany)
Stephen Gardiner (University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA)
Stefan Gosepath (Free University Berlin, Germany)
David Heyd (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)
Wilfried Hinsch (Cologne University, Germany)
Duncan Ivison (Sydney University, Australia)
Rahel Jaeggi (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
Matt Matravers (University of York, UK)
Kirsten Meyer (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
David Miller (Oxford University, UK)
Nenad Miscevic (Maribor University, Slovenia)
Susan Neiman (Einstein Forum, Potsdam, Germany)
Elif Özmen (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Germany)
Nigel Pleasants (University of Exeter, UK)
Thomas Pogge (Yale University, CT, USA)
Mathias Risse (Harvard University, MA, USA)
Sam Scheffler (New York University, USA)
Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
Ralf Stoecker (Potsdam University, Germany)
Adam Swift (University of Warwick, UK)
John Tasioulas (University College London, UK)
Leif Wenar (King’s College London, UK)
Andrew Williams (ICREA/Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain)
Lea Ypi (London School of Economics, UK)

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2194-5624

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2194-5616

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English

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First published:

May 30, 2014

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2 issues per year

eISSN: 2194-5624

ISSN: 2194-5616

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