Volume 2, Issue 1 - Symposium: Intergenerational Justice and Natural Resources, Guest Editors: Lukas H. Meyer, Pranay Sanklecha, Alexa Zellentin

The purpose of this article is to map the relationships of various moral arguments for action on climate change to each other in a particular case rather than to explore any single argument in depth or to make any abstract claims about the priorities among the arguments themselves. Specifically, it tries to show that “historical responsibility”, that is, responsibility (moral or legal) for past emissions, is very important, although not quite in the way usually argued, but that it is not by itself determinative. Other, independent considerations also greatly matter, although it happens that as a matter of fact all considerations strongly tend to converge towards the same conclusions about which states are responsible to act in order to slow climate change. “Historical responsibility” is shown to involve both contribution to, or causation of, climate change and benefit from climate change. Other factors that play roles in this case are ability to pay, the no-harm principle, and the duty to preserve the physical pre-conditions of human life.

Some key political challenges today, e.g. climate change, are future oriented. The intergenerational setting differs in some notable ways from the intragenerational one, creating obstacles to theorizing about intergenerational justice. One concern is that as the circumstances of justice do not pertain intergenerationally, intergenerational justice is not meaningful. In this paper, I scrutinize this worry by analysing the presentations of the doctrine of the circumstances of justice by David Hume and John Rawls. I argue that we should accept the upshot of their idea, that justice is context sensitive, even if this at first sight seems to invalidate intergenerational justice. On the basis of moral constructivism, I subsequently provide a fresh reading of the doctrine according to which it conveys the idea that justice is the solution to a practical problem. However, as the problem background is evolving, we need to properly characterize the relevant practical problem in order to make ethical theorizing relevant. Contrary to what has been claimed, the circumstances of justice do not then clash with intergenerational justice, but are the necessary presuppositions for its advancement.

While climate change involves spatial, epistemological, social, and temporal remoteness, each type of distance can be bridged with strategies unique to it that can be borrowed from analogous moral problems. Temporal, or intergenerational, distance may actually be a motivational resource if we look at our natural feelings of hope for the future of the world, via Kant’s theory of political history, and for our children. Kant’s theory of hope also provides some basis for including future generations in a theory of justice.

Inhabitants of low-lying islands flooded due to anthropogenic climate change will lose their territory and thereby their ability to exercise their right to political self-determination. This paper addresses the normative questions which arise when climate change threatens territorial rights. It explores whether the loss of statehood supports a claim to territorial compensation, and if so, how it can be satisfied. The paper concludes that such claims are well founded and that they should be met by providing compensatory territories. After introducing a differentiation between land rights and territorial rights, previous theoretical responses to the problem of sinking islands are criticized. It is argued that states may be required to give up parts of their territory as compensation. The paper develops criteria of sufficiency for compensatory territories and proposes to base their selection process on a negative auction. Since it is unlikely that unsettled compensatory territories that meet the specified requirements are available, the rights of their original inhabitants are discussed.

The paper argues that members of future generations have an entitlement to natural resources equal to ours. Therefore, if a currently living individual destroys or degrades natural resources then he must pay compensation to members of future generations. This compensation takes the form of “primary goods” (in roughly Rawls’ sense) which will be valued by members of future generations as equally useful for promoting the good life as the natural resources they have been deprived of. As a result of this policy, each generation inherits a “Commonwealth” of natural resources plus compensation (plus, perhaps, other things donated to the Commonwealth). It is this inherited “Commonwealth” which members of that generation must then pass on to members of the next generation. Once this picture is accepted, the standard bundle of property rights is problematic, for it takes the owner of a constituent of the Commonwealth (e.g. that gallon of oil) to have the right to “waste, destroy or modify” that item at will. This paper therefore presents a revised set of property rights which takes seriously the idea that each generation has an equal claim on the resources that nature has bequeathed us, whilst allowing certain effects on those natural resources by each generation, and a degree of exclusive use of those natural resources owned by an individual.

This paper argues that the best interpretation of Ronald Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scheme is a holistic one that allows the parties to make choices between the policies that are available. This interpretation contrasts with the hypothecated and insurance-focused aspects that are traditionally understood as part of the procedure. The paper argues that the holistic interpretation better fits with the ideal of resource egalitarianism that people should have as much choice as possible from an equal starting point. It does so by allowing people a choice over the policies that will be used to achieve their insurance preferences.

In his classic paper “Equality of What? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Ronald Dworkin argued that we should reject the notion that welfare is the currency of egalitarian justice. One reason is that this notion implies we should compensate individuals for expensive tastes they have deliberately cultivated. However, several egalitarians have objected that Dworkin conflates the resource/welfare and the luck/choice distinction. In particular, welfare luck egalitarianism implies that expensive tastes that are deliberately cultivated may not be compensable. In response to this criticism, Dworkin has more recently argued that welfare luck egalitarianism in fact collapses into ordinary welfare egalitarianism, or relies on an account of luck that is either incoherent or at least cannot provide a basis for egalitarian redistribution. Therefore, according to Dworkin, welfare luck egalitarianism does not solve the problem of expensive tastes. In the current article, I critically assess these recent arguments of Dworkin’s about the inadequacy of welfare luck egalitarianism. I argue that Dworkin has not shown that this notion collapses into ordinary welfare egalitarianism, or that it harbours a problematic account of luck.