Defending Relational Autonomy
-
James Humphries
Abstract
Relational accounts of autonomy such as those advanced by Rebekah Johnston (2017. “Personal Autonomy, Social Identity, and Oppressive Social Contexts.” Hypatia 32 (2): 312–28) and particularly Marina Oshana (1998; “Personal Autonomy and Society.” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1): 81–102. 2006; Personal Autonomy in Society. Aldershot: Ashgate; 2015. “Is Social-Relational Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” In Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives, edited by M. Oshana. New York: Routledge) are often thought to be distinctively vulnerable to paternalist and perfectionist objections, as well as implying in a troublesome and/or implausible way that many of us are much less autonomous than is standardly thought. I argue that although constitutively relational accounts are indeed perfectionist, they are so in such a “thin” way that we should not be concerned by it; that they are not paternalist (and indeed are necessarily hostile to the sorts of power relations necessary for paternalism); and that the charge that relational accounts demand an unattractively high bar for autonomy is misdirected – we really do lack autonomy in perhaps surprising but plausible ways and for the account to imply this is a problem for the world rather than the theory.
Acknowledgements
An early version of this paper was presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions in 2022; I am grateful to the organisers and participants for their constructive comments. Similarly, gratitude is due to members of the Political Theory Reading Group at Glasgow who provided helpful feedback on a more recent draft. Finally, my thanks to the MOPP reviewers for several extremely useful suggestions.
References
Christman, J. 2014. “Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics of Paternalism.” Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 17: 369–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9449-9.Search in Google Scholar
Cohen, G. 1983. “The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1): 3–33.Search in Google Scholar
Dworkin, G. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511625206Search in Google Scholar
Frankfurt, H. 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person.” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024717.Search in Google Scholar
Humphries, J. 2018. “Intimacy, Autonomy and (Non) Domination.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (2): 399–416. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12218.Search in Google Scholar
Johnston, R. 2017. “Personal Autonomy, Social Identity, and Oppressive Social Contexts.” Hypatia 32 (2): 312–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12318.Search in Google Scholar
Khader, S. 2020. “The Feminist Case Against Relational Autonomy.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 17: 499–526. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20203085.Search in Google Scholar
Kropotkin, P. [1913] 2012. The Conquest of Bread. Augusta: Dialectics.Search in Google Scholar
Meyers, D. T. 1989. Self, Society, and Personal Choice. New York: Columbia University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Meyers, D. T. 2008. “Review of Personal Autonomy in Society.” Hypatia 23 (2): 202–6.10.2979/HYP.2008.23.2.202Search in Google Scholar
Mill, J. S. [1859] 1974. On Liberty. London: Penguin.Search in Google Scholar
Noggle, R. 2011. “Review of Personal Autonomy in Society.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (2): 233–8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-011-9267-z.Search in Google Scholar
Oshana, M. 1998 In this issue. “Personal Autonomy and Society.” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1): 81–102, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00098.x.Search in Google Scholar
Oshana, M. 2006. Personal Autonomy in Society. Aldershot: Ashgate.Search in Google Scholar
Oshana, M. 2015. “Is Social-Relational Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” In Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives, edited by M. Oshana. New York: Routledge.10.4324/9780203768778Search in Google Scholar
Pettit, P. 1996. “Freedom as Anti-power.” Ethics 106 (3): 576–604. https://doi.org/10.1086/233648.Search in Google Scholar
Pettit, P. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. New York: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Roberts, A. 2015. “A Republican Account of the Value of Privacy.” European Journal of Political Theory 14 (3): 320–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885114533262.Search in Google Scholar
Schumpeter, J. [1942] 2010. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Abingdon: Routledge Classics.10.4324/9780203857090Search in Google Scholar
Stoljar, N. 2000. “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition” in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, edited by In C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780195123333.003.0005Search in Google Scholar
Stoljar, N. 2017. “Relational Autonomy and Perfectionism.” Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 (1): 27–41. https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2016-0038.Search in Google Scholar
© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
