Must Exploiters Objectively Benefit from Exploitation?
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Douglas Ehring
Abstract
Various philosophers have claimed that a necessary condition for A to wrongfully exploit B is for A to benefit from interacting with B. On a subjective understanding of benefits, A benefits from an interaction only if that interaction contributes to the satisfaction of one of A’s actual and current goals or desires. On the other hand, interests may be read as objective or real interests. Proposals for characterizing real interests range from those that restrict real interests to psychological states to those that involve states that are not psychological. On the objective understanding, A benefits from an interaction with B only if that interaction promotes one of A’s real interests. I dispute the claim that a requirement of wrongful exploitation is an objective benefit to the exploiter.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the members of the Philosophy Department of Southern Methodist University for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Conflict of interest: The author has no competing or conflicting interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.
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