The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
Abstract
In the literature on the Incarnation, Christ’s human nature is typically understood through the dualist view of human persons. Some dualists hold that the Son becomes human by acquiring a particular body-soul composite. According to them, the Incarnation involves two souls – one divine and one human. On the other hand, other dualists argue that Christ’s human nature is not a concrete particular but a set of properties necessary for being human. These dualists say that the Son, in becoming incarnate, becomes a compound of body and soul, which means there is only one soul present in the Incarnation. However, I contend that these dualist accounts of the Incarnation lead to the absurd multiplication of thinkers. If Christ is not divided or separated into two thinkers, dualists should deny that the Son takes on a soul as a part or becomes a compound of body and soul.
Acknowledgements
For valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper, I thank Brandon Peterson, Jeremy Skrzypek, and the audiences at the 2023 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association and the 2021 Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society.
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Conflict of interest: The author reports there are no competing interests to declare.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul
