Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
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Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad
Abstract
Free will is an intuitive reality that all humans apprehend in their actions. Moral responsibility also stems from this freedom of will. This article first explains that the strong human intuition about free will cannot be dismissed as an illusion. It then examines the notion that a physical being cannot possess free will because it implies the ability to both perform and abstain from an action. In the physical world, all human actions are determined by preceding causes, leaving no room to avoid an action volitionally. Building on this, the article concludes that free will becomes plausible only when rooted in the existence of the soul. Consequently, free will serves as independent evidence for the existence of an immaterial soul.
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Conflict of interests: The author reports there are no competing interests to declare.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul
