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Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?

  • Daisy Dutta ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: March 11, 2025

Abstract

Trope metaphysics tries to explain the world and its features in terms of tropes. Tropes as properties are particulars where as properties, universals are multiply-realizable. The theory of tropes has rejected the existence of Universals. The central claim of this paper is that the trope theory offers comparatively a better metaphysical explanation of the world of everyday experiences than the theory of the Universals. This paper argues that trope metaphysics is better in the sense that (a) it is qualitatively more parsimonious, and (b) its account of the world and its properties is more comprehensive than what the theory of universals offers.


Corresponding author: Dr. Daisy Dutta, PhD, Guest Faculty, Department of Philosophy, Cotton University, Assam 781001, India, E-mail:

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Received: 2023-12-27
Accepted: 2024-10-16
Published Online: 2025-03-11
Published in Print: 2025-04-28

© 2025 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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