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Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Edited by: Rafael Hüntelmann , Uwe Meixner and Erwin Tegtmeier
Managing Editor: Georg Koridze
Editorial Board: Brian Davies , Edward Feser , Herbert Hochberg , Ludger Jansen , Ingvar Johansson , Christian Kanzian , Gyula Klima , Robert C Koons , Wolfgang Künne , Winfried Löffler , Kevin Mulligan , Frederic Nef , Nathan Oaklander , David Oderberg , Francesco Orilia , Alvin Plantinga , Matjaz Potrc , Christof Rapp , Maria Elisabeth Reicher-Marek , Thomas Sattig , Richard Schantz , Oliver Scholz , Johanna Seibt , Peter Simons , Barry Smith , Niko Strobach , Käthe Trettin and Daniel Wachter

Language: English

First published: April 30, 2014

Publication Frequency: 2 issues per year

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About this journal

The journal Metaphysica is published semi-annually. The editors aim to create an international forum of ontology and metaphysics for readers all over the world. In the Anglo-Saxon countries (in particular the USA and Australia) the volume of research publications in ontology and metaphysics significantly increased during the last two decades. European philosophers, on the other hand, initially seemed reticent to address ontological and metaphysical topics, undoubtedly due to deeply rooted Kantian ideas about the "end of metaphysics." Since the nineties, however, sentiments have changed in favour of a new "ontological turn" within Central European philosophy. In Austria, Switzerland, and Germany an increasing number of philosophical publications present systematic treatments of ontologi cal and metaphysical issues. At the same time there is a new strong interest in reviewing historical contributions to ontology and metaphysics, from Parmenides to Plato, Aristotle, Occam, Leibniz and further to Brentano, Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann. Since there is no other European journal devoted to the discussion of ontological and metaphysical issues in particular, the editors found it necessary to fill this gap by founding the journal Metaphysica.

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Color May Be the Phenomenal Dual Aspect of Two-State Quantum Systems

June 25, 2025

Tal Hendel

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Panmicropsychism is the hypothesis that the physical ultimates of our universe (i.e., its fundamental physical ingredients) are also its phenomenal ultimates (i.e., its fundamental phenomenal ingredients). In this paper, I argue that, just as the mathematical description of the physical ultimates of our universe displays simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should similarly expect the mathematical description of the phenomenal ultimates to reflect these same qualities. I exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities – color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems (qubits) in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems.
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Retraction of: Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection

March 23, 2022

Ekin Erkan

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Noneism – Neither Meinongianism nor Allism

December 22, 2025

Maciej Sendłak

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The subject of this paper is the relation between three views: noneism, Meinongianism, and allism. The first one has it that ‘some objects do not exist,’ the second that ‘there are objects that do not exist,’ and the last one that ‘every object exists.’ While noneism is commonly considered to be close to Meinongianism and very distant to allism, this arrangement has been lately questioned. Consequently, some claimed that the difference between noneism and allism is based merely on the choice of words. The aim of this paper is to argue that the disagreement between noneism and allism is substantial and not merely verbal, and its subject is the domain of objects.
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How Thick is Now? The Prospects of Thick Presentism

December 24, 2025

Marius Backmann

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In this paper, I will argue against thick presentism, a particular type of presentism according to which the present has a temporal duration. I will first review some of the arguments that have been given for this view. Following this, I will briefly recapitulate two of the most elaborate accounts of thick presentism by H. Scott Hestevold and Sam Baron. The two views agree that temporally extended presents overlap as time progresses, but they disagree on the question of whether the temporally extended present contains a temporal order of irreducible times within them. In total, there are four kinds of possible kinds of views on thick presentism, distinguished by whether the thick presents are overlapping as time progresses, and whether they contain an ordering of irreducible times. We will see that none of the four possible views, neither the two existing ones nor the two possible alternatives, are tenable.
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Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection

October 1, 2021

Ekin Erkan

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Drawing from a Sellarsian realist-naturalist epistemology, we trace different levels of cognitive hierarchy procedures through which a representational system learns to update its own states and improve its ‘map-making’ capabilities from pre-conscious operations which modulate base-localization functions, to patterns of epistemic revision and integration at the conceptual and theoretical levels, producing a nomological double of its world. We show how ontological theorization becomes diachronically coordinated with and constrained by empirical science, and how the formal-quantitative kernel of scientific theories corresponds to qualitative-conceptual determinations at the structural level. Following Johanna Seibt’s characterization of ontology as a theory of categorial inference, we trace the preservation of inferential semantic structure across ontological theories in relation to model languages and provide provisional indications to coordinate Seibt’s account with a convergent realist assessment of systematic modeling, defining the epistemological conditions for articulating the preservation of formal structure in theories toward a limit-point of enquiry.
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Prospectus: How an Instance-Attribute Ontology Can Differentiate Identity from Indiscernibility and Found a Consistent Type-Free Intensional Logic

December 24, 2025

D.W. Mertz

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Offered is a limited prospectus on how a refined ontology of attribution can properly distinguish identity from indiscernibility, and relatedly ground a proposed consistent type-free intensional predicate logic. The ontology recognizes individuated ‘instance’ attributes F i having among themselves shared common intensions F. This instance-intension ontology has embedded in it a Particularized Predicate Logic , PPL, with the unique formal device of ‘extended-binding’. The latter consists of a two-tiered nesting of instance quantifiers and the variables they bind being both bound by, and allowed instantiations under, subsuming intension quantifiers. The logic restricted to monadic predicates, M-PPL, is outlined sufficient to demonstrate its expressive and inferential power to differentiate identity from more general indiscernibility, and to diagnose and prevent contradictions of self-attributions involve in some self-referential paradoxes. Intended is to ground a program fulfilling the desideratum of a consistent intensional predicate logic with unrestricted quantification, while adding warrant for the background instance-intension ontology.
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Real Enough: The Metaphysics of Epistemic Structural Realism

December 22, 2025

Jared Hanson-Park

Article number: 20250010

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Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR), the view that structure is all we can know about the unobservable world, has been criticized for lacking sufficient metaphysical depth to qualify as a genuine form of realism. This paper defends a refined version of ESR – which I call agnostic ESR – that avoids these objections by committing to knowledge of detectable, concrete structures while maintaining agnosticism about the existence of objects with intrinsic properties. I respond to prominent criticisms, including Newman’s objection, concerns about ESR’s metaphysical clarity, and potential collapse into other views, by showing that agnostic ESR can provide a rigorous account of structural knowledge grounded in empirical science that cannot be defended by advocates of other realist positions. I argue that agnostic ESR is metaphysically robust to deserve the realist label.
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Constitution versus Predication: An Essentialist Reply to the Modalist Challenge

April 14, 2025

Márta Ujvári

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Meeting successfully the modalist challenge needs the reconsideration of certain issues. In particular, the purposeful slip of tongue from essence or sortal form to essential properties made by the modalists creates the illusion that essentialism is a sort of de re necessity. To dispel the illusion one has to show why coming about under a kind and also being of that kind is not a property of the instances of that kind. The distinction between constitution under a form and the predication of properties to substances constituted by their form is explored as pertinent to the essentialist reply. Propria as ‘necessary accidents’ are connected to essences. The suggestion is that one can draw, with this connection, on the intensional notion of metaphysical necessity. Lastly, the role of particularized immanent sortal forms is considered by suggesting that they can fill out a gap in the universalist account of sortal essences.
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Could God Make A Rock So Heavy He Himself Could Not Lift it?

October 20, 2025

Derek Anderson

Article number: 20240030

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I argue for the controversial view that God could indeed create a rock so heavy that He Himself could not lift it. This paper is in the tradition of modal metaphysics initiated by Hawthorne and Uzqiano’s (2011. “How Many Angels Can Dance on the Point of a Needle? Transcendental Theology Meets Modal Metaphysics.” Mind 120 (477): 53–81) “How many angels can dance on the point of a needle?” The argument proceeds through an in-depth consideration of the theoretical physics involved in imagining God trying to create and lift a maximally heavy rock using mechanical force. This narrative thought experiment serves as a springboard for investigating modal puzzles about the limits to which the laws of physics can be modified while retaining the conceptual possibility of weight and lifting.
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Fictional Characters as Transworld Individuals

October 13, 2025

Cheng-Chih Tsai

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Speaking of fictional characters, the pretense theorist denies the existence of these entities, while the creationist maintains that they are abstract artefacts created by fiction writers. By interpreting fictional characters as trans-world individuals, we develop an alternative account in which fictional characters and real persons are treated uniformly. In particular, neither fictionalizing discourse nor internal discourse about fictional characters involves pretense, and neither external discourse nor non-existence claim about fictional characters concerns abstract artefacts. A fictional character is, after all, a person; to be fictional, he or she needs to be written about in a fictional work.
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Dispositionalism and the Intrinsic Nature of Pure Powers

June 30, 2025

Vassilis Livanios

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Most recently, a number of philosophers have stressed the need for an intrinsic characterisation of the nature of powerful properties which nonetheless is compatible with the widely shared view that powers are intimately connected to the properties of their manifestations. This paper argues that the adoption of such an intrinsic criterion for the identity of pure powers has important consequences for Dispositionalism, the theory of modality according to which the truth of all alethic modal claims is grounded in the powers of actual entities. To this end, the paper examines the cases of two possibilities regarding pure powers and defends the view that these possible cases undermine the extensional adequacy of Dispositionalism.
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Ontological Category Systems: Notes on the Foundations of their Epistemic Architectures

October 27, 2025

Norman Meisinger

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This paper argues that ontological category systems (OCS) should be assessed against explicit target criteria. To compare the highly diverse OCS, we focus on the epistemic issue of the category problem, not on the ontological one, and examine the system architecture at the bicategorical level. From existing systems we extract mutual exclusiveness , exhaustiveness , and generalness , and add a neglected criterion: recursiveness – the requirement that, at the most general level, the categories also categorize themselves, thereby conceptually closing the system. On this basis we motivate the most defensible number of categories and re-evaluate the traditional divide between universals and particulars in a slightly revised form. The resulting framework clarifies how OCS can remain maximally general while retaining classificatory power and shows why systems that exceed two top-level categories trade generalness for individuation without clear gain.
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Mind, Computation and the Incompleteness of the Formal System

May 7, 2025

Thomas Hauer

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The nature of mind and the relationship of mind to the current form of AI is one of the great and fundamental topics of contemporary philosophy and science. Is the human mind computational or not? Can the brain perform processes that no Turing machine can perform? Can the mind be simulated? Does the incompleteness of the formal system, or the undecidability of all formulas, mean the impossibility of intelligent behaviour? Is it a necessary condition of intelligence to answer all possible questions and tasks, and if so, what answers will be sufficient in the assessment? Only correct answers, or on the contrary, does “only correct” mean too precise and therefore infallible, thus again exclusively “inhuman”? The main aim of this study is to analyse Gödel’s answer to the question about the nature of mind, his metaphysical assumptions and its implications for the current debate on AI.
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The Broad Escape from Narrow Fictionalism

October 20, 2025

Sam Dickson, Jacob O’Sullivan

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Fictionalism is a popular approach to handling possible worlds discourse. It gives one the power of possible world semantics without being committed to undesirable consequences. The standard approach of reparsing possible world statements by attaching a fictional operator suffers from a problem that we argue is structural for all kinds of narrow fictionalism. To show this, we develop a toy theory of temporal fictionalism, showing that it is vulnerable to the same problem. We develop a solution in the form of a broad account of modal fictionalism. Broad modal fictionalism is a contentious view and its usefulness needs to be clarified. Given this, towards the end of the paper we offer some motivations for why broad modal fictionalism is useful and gesture towards how modal talk arises in everyday discourse.
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On Individuating Contingently Non-Concrete Objects

December 29, 2025

Violeta Conde

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Timothy Williamson is known for defending the view that second-order S 5 system axiomatized with Barcan Formulae gives us the most sensible doctrine for metaphysical modality. Barcan Formulae require a constant domain of quantification in which absolutely everything is necessary. Among the objects that constitute this ‘everything’ we find contingently non-concrete objects . These objects do not occupy spatiotemporal coordinates and exist just in the logical sense of ‘exist’ defended by Williamson. In this paper, I try to characterize these sui generis objects arguing that the only properties we can use to individuate them are non-qualitative, including some modal properties. This is so because, as I show in the paper, if we try to individuate contingently non-concrete objects using qualitative properties we incur into the predicative reading of expressions like ‘possible X’ rejected by Williamson.
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Eternalism and Everettian Quantum Mechanics

June 24, 2025

Matias Slavov

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This paper shall explore the conjunction of eternalism and Everettian quantum mechanics. It shall be argued that there is a strong analogy between these two views. In case there is an indefinite number of worlds and observers that are all equally real, there should be an indefinite number of local times which are all also equally real. Whereas Everettianism, specifically the diverging version, treats actuality indexically, relativistic eternalism treats tense indexically. All times exist analogously to all isolated Everettian worlds. There is no unique ‘now’ that cuts throughout all that physically exists. Instead, as eternalism propounds, all times exist. The paper concludes that eternalism and the many-worlds interpretation are not only compatible but complement each other, providing a coherent framework for understanding the nature of temporal reality.
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Jean-Baptiste Gonet (1616ca.–1681): The First Four-Dimensionalist Philosopher

October 20, 2025

Luca Gili, Alessandro Boco

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Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P. (c. 1616–1681), articulated a distinctly eternalist philosophical framework in his Clypeus Theologiae , wherein he maintained that God’s eternity encompasses past, present, and future entities in a mode of real coexistence. According to Gonet, divine eternity serves as the ontological measure of all things, and God apprehends past and future entities in their actual reality rather than merely as intentional objects, a position that diverges from earlier philosophical interpretations. Gonet sought to reconcile this eternalist perspective with the doctrines of creation in time and human free will. He did so by introducing a nuanced distinction in the interpretation of the verb “coexists” within the proposition “past/future entity x coexists with God.” When the verb is understood in relation to temporal reality, x is conceived as non-existent; however, when interpreted in reference to divine eternity, x is understood to possess real existence ( in re ), rather than existing solely as a conceptual entity within the divine intellect. Gonet’s system represents a rare and sophisticated attempt to integrate a Christian metaphysical framework with an eternalist ontology. This paper will examine the core arguments developed by the French Dominican, analyzing their implications within both theological and philosophical discourse.
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Is There Really Any “Merely Verbal” Ontological Dispute?

July 28, 2025

Carlota G. Llorente

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Contemporary debates on metaontology focus on discussions between two main positions: realism and deflationism. Ontological realism claims to deal with an independent objective reality, while deflationism downgrades the seriousness of ontology. From a position close to deflationism, E. Hirsch suggests that certain debates in ontology are not substantive but “merely verbal”. From a proper deflationist position, however, it seems doubtful that any ontological dispute can be merely linguistic without further consequences. The aim of this article is to argue that no ontological debate can remain purely verbal. For this purpose, a brief introduction to Hirsch’s ideas will be presented, followed by three different arguments against “merely verbal” disputes: semantic, epistemic and ontological.
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The Role of Metaphysics in Science: An Extrapolation in Meta-Metaphysics

October 17, 2025

Tridip Patir

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The work carried forward by this paper is simply to spotlight the said prospect of certain Metaphysical presuppositions in Science. This paper takes recourse to the Aristotelian idea of Metaphysics as the first philosophy, redirecting to two conceptions of the ubiquity of Metaphysics in Science, first by Claudia Ribeiro, and the second by Anjan Chakravartty. The paper will then state that in a Metaphysical Spectrum, science and all other types of Empirical Knowledge are simply at their base, Metaphysical theorising. Science is not simply a posteriori content, but it also contains a priori dimensions, which are substantiated in the course of this essay. Finally, the prospect of a naturalisation of metaphysics to save it from scientific underdetermination will be analysed.
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Sortal Counterparts

December 30, 2025

Zeyu Chi

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Kit Fine has put forward a new argument for the coincidence between a statue and a clay, according to which the two differ in numerous sortalish properties that are non-modal. In this paper I offer a one-thinger response to Fine’s argument. The key to my response is the notion of sortal counterparts. Just as in the modal case we can relegate the conflicting modal properties of the statue and the clay to distinct modal counterparts, in the non-modal case we should relegate the conflicting simple sortalish properties to distinct sortal counterparts. Sortal counterparts, I argue, aren’t just the conceptual tool that we need for resolving the puzzle over conflicting sortals, they also help to shed light on the idea of a sortal paradigm and how sortal generalizations can survive recalcitrant exceptions.
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Fiction without Fictional Characters: An Anti-Realist Account

June 30, 2025

Jansan Favazzo

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This paper outlines a semantic analysis of fictional discourse alternative both to fictional realism and fictional fictionalism. The core idea is that competent speakers use fictional proper names in order to talk about certain pluralities of fictional depiction tokens rather than exotic entities such as Anna Karenina and Clarissa Dalloway. In order to corroborate this intuition, I propose an account of fictional proper names based on a Goodmanian notion of secondary extension and a model for the theory built upon negative free logic and plural quantification. Such a model aims to offer an anti-realist translation for three classes of problematic data: paratextual sentences, metatextual sentences, and negative existentials.
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The Problem of God and Abstract Objects: A Reassessment

July 11, 2025

Joshua R. Sijuwade

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This article aims to provide a reassessment of the relationship between God and abstract objects. This reassessment will provide a new conceptualisation of this important relationship and will be formulated, first, within the theoretical framework of ‘Theistic Aspectivalism’, which is grounded on the notion of an aspect, proposed by Donald L.M. Baxter, which provides a means to ward off the ‘Bootstrapping Problem’. Second, within the theoretical framework of ‘Theistic Essentialism’, which is based on the notion of essence and essential dependence, as proposed by Kit Fine, Jonathan Lowe, and Katherin Koslicki, which provides a metaphysical basis for the relationship between God and abstract objects to be further elucidated and for the position of ‘Platonic Theism’ to be free from the primary issues that are often raised against it.

Journal Impact Factor	0.2	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
5-year Journal Impact Factor	0.2	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
Journal Citation Indicator	0.34	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
CiteScore	0.5	2024, Scopus (Elsevier B.V., 2025)
SCImago Journal Rank	0.186	2024, SJR (Scimago Lab, 2025; Data Source: Scopus)
Source Normalized Impact per Paper	0.408	2024, CWTS Journal Indicators (CWTS B.V., 2025; Data Source: Scopus)
European Reference Index for the Humanities	0

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Guidelines for submitting articles
Articles should be written on a computer (compatible with Word 2000 or lower, line spacing 1.5; type-size 12 pt) and submitted via the online submission system ScholarOne https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mp.

The deadline for submitting articles is (for No. 1) January 1st, and (for No. 2) July 1st.

The text should be no longer than 25 pages, including an abstract and keywords. The languages of publication is English.

For more information and a detailed stylesheet, please see the link Instructions for Authors.

For previously published articles, the authors must ensure that no copyright is infringed.
All articles submitted will be refereed on an anonymous basis. We cannot accept any liability for unsolicited manuscripts. They will not be sent back unless the author makes an explicit request and provides return postage.

Books for review should be sent to the editorial office: redaktion@metaphysica.de
Please send reviews to the Review Editor via https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mp.

Managing Editor
Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann
Phone: +49 2247 96 99-320
Fax: +49 2247-96 99-321

Review Editor
Dr. Käthe Trettin

Editors

Rafael Hüntelmann
Theodor-Körner-Straße 7
53819 Neunkirchen-Seelscheid
Germany
Tel. +(49)2247 96 99-320
Fax +(49)2247-96 99-321
Email: huentelmann@metaphysica.de

Uwe Meixner
Universität Augsburg
Institut für Philosophie
Universitätsstr. 10
D-86135 Augsburg
Germany
Email: meixner@metaphysica.de

Erwin Tegtmeier
Philosophisches Seminar der Universität Mannheim
68131 Mannheim
Germany
Email: tegtmeier@metaphysica.de

Editorial Board
Brian Davies, Fordham University, New York, U.S.A.
Herbert Hochberg, University of Texas at Austin, U.S.A.
Ludger Jansen, University of Rostock, Germany
Ingvar Johansson, Umea University, Sweden
Christian Kanzian, Universität Innsbruck, Austria
Gyula Klima, Fordham University, New York, U.S.A.
Robert C Koons, University of Texas at Austin, U.S.A.
Wolfgang Künne, University of Hamburg, Germany
Winfried Löffler, University of Innsbruck, Austria
Kevin Mulligan, University of Genève, Switzerland
Frederic Nef, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France
Nathan Oaklander, University of Michigan at Flint, U.S.A.
David Oderberg, Reading University, UK
Francesco Orilia, University of Macerata, Italy
Alvin Plantinga, Notre Dame University, U.S.A.
Matjaz Potrc, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
Christof Rapp, University of Munich, Germany
Maria Elisabeth Reicher-Marek, Technical University of Aachen, Germany
Thomas Sattig, University of Tübingen, Germany
Richard Schantz, University of Siegen, Germany
Oliver Scholz, University of Münster, Germany
Johanna Seibt, University of Aarhus, Denmark
Peter Simons, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
Barry Smith, University of Buffalo, U.S.A.
Käthe Trettin, Frankfurt/Main, Germany
Daniel von Wachter, International Academy of Philosophy, Liechtenstein

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Philosophy Metaphysics, Ontology

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eISSN:

1874-6373

ISSN:

1437-2053

Language:

English

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De Gruyter

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First published:

April 30, 2014

Publication Frequency:

2 issues per year

eISSN: 1874-6373

ISSN: 1437-2053

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Academics (Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ontology), Libraries, Institutes

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