Johanna Seibt’s Process Ontology of Categorical Inference: On Nomological Axiomatics and Category Projection
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Ekin Erkan
Abstract
Drawing from a Sellarsian realist-naturalist epistemology, we trace different levels of cognitive hierarchy procedures through which a representational system learns to update its own states and improve its ‘map-making’ capabilities from pre-conscious operations which modulate base-localization functions, to patterns of epistemic revision and integration at the conceptual and theoretical levels, producing a nomological double of its world. We show how ontological theorization becomes diachronically coordinated with and constrained by empirical science, and how the formal-quantitative kernel of scientific theories corresponds to qualitative-conceptual determinations at the structural level. Following Johanna Seibt’s characterization of ontology as a theory of categorial inference, we trace the preservation of inferential semantic structure across ontological theories in relation to model languages and provide provisional indications to coordinate Seibt’s account with a convergent realist assessment of systematic modeling, defining the epistemological conditions for articulating the preservation of formal structure in theories toward a limit-point of enquiry.
Acknowledgments
Some of these figures have appeared before in Erkan 2021.
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