The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
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Robert Francescotti
Abstract
Here I present an analysis of what it is for an x and a y to be the same F. Unlike the Fregean Analysis (FRE), according to which ‘x is the same F as y’ is equivalent to ‘x is an F, y is an F, and x = y’, the analysis presented and defended here allows that there are possible cases in which x and y are the same F 1 but not the same F 2 even though x is an F 2 and y is an F 2 . The analysis offered here, FRE+, retains the conditions that FRE deems are necessary for being the same F while adding a further condition to allow that the same F 1 can be a different F 2 . Although FRE+ is compatible with there being such cases, FRE+ shares with FRE that the identity mentioned in the analysis is nothing other than absolute identity. Thus, FRE+ offers a way to allow that the same F 1 can be a different F 2 while avoiding conflict with the traditionally accepted logic of identity, and I argue without conflict with the Indiscernibility of Identicals in particular.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul
