Abstract
Some properties come necessarily clustered. Something, a clustering device, must necessarily keep them clustered. Compresence is one candidate, and it is unclear how to understand it. I discern two aspects of it: compresence as simultaneity and compresence as co-location. Then I clarify certain issues over it, particularly regarding whether or not it is transitive and whether or not it figures in the bundle. Contrary to popular belief, I argue that compresence, under the two-aspectual reading, is transitive and constitutive of the bundle.
Acknowledgments
This paper would not have been possible without the insightful discussions with David Yates and Bruno Jacinto.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
- The Dualist Metaphysics of the Incarnation and the Too Many Thinkers Problem
- The Transcendent and Causal Dimensions of Aquinas’s Action Theory: Insights from Metaphysics
- Aspectual Compresence
- Why Trope Metaphysics is Better than the Theory of Universals?
- Free Will: Evidence for the Existence of Soul
- The Same F 1 but a Different F 2 – with Absolute Identity
- The Subtraction Argument in an Infinite World
- Making Sense of Simultaneity: A Reply to Wahlberg
- Events and Facts in the Image of Modes
- Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul