Band 2017, Heft 2

In the 4th and 5th centuries B.C. the most significant paradigm change in Western intellectual culture occurred, later affecting Christianity and subsequently science. In the interest of personal empowerment over spontaneous stirrings, a private inner sphere, a so-called soul (psyche) was ascribed to every conscious subject which was taken to contain their whole experience, like a house, conceived of as an inner world in which reason was to be the master of spontaneous impulses; the empirical external world between these inner spheres was cleansed of all gripping forces and, for this purpose, ground down to a few elegantly selected types of features and their carriers (atoms, substances): the remainder of this grindingdown was deposited in the souls or overlooked to nonetheless be found in the souls in changed form. Man was dissected into body and soul. In the transposition into the soul’s huge amounts of life experience were forgotten. Among them can be counted the felt body which disappeared between body and soul as in a crevasse, even though it is the closest thing to human experience.

Zusammenfassung Leibliches Verhalten, sei es Gehen, Wahrnehmen, Sprechen, Hantieren, Essen oder raumzeitliche Orientierung, entspringt diesseits von Natur und Kultur einer Lebenswelt, in der alles mehr oder weniger natürlich vorgeprägt wie künstlich geformt ist. Es vollzieht sich in zwischenleiblichem Verkehr mit Anderen. Es verkörpert sich in einer Zwischensphäre von Werkzeugen, Apparaturen, Medien und Symbolen. Es zehrt von einer natürlichen Vorgeschichte. In seiner Doppelrolle als Leibkörper bildet der Leib eine „Umschlagstelle” (Husserl) zwischen Natur und Kultur, zwischen Eigenem und Fremdem. So fungiert die Natur innerhalb der Lebenswelt, bevor sie sich in Form alltäglicher Störungen, methodisch und technisch herbeigeführter Eingriffe oder pathologischer Spaltungen absondert. Unser Leib ist nicht aus einem Guss. Reine Natur und reine Kultur sind Konstrukte der Moderne, die aus einer naturalistischen oder kulturalistischen Leibvergessenheit resultieren.

How does pregnancy transform our embodiment? This question will be explored with the help of phenomenology and Butoh dance. Although Butoh has not yet been able to fulfil its true potential for disclosing female embodiment and particularly pregnant embodiment, it will provide us with helpful clues. In pregnancy, objects are less ready-to-hand, more out of reach - world as we know it becomes removed. The habit body vanishes away. But pregnancy is not just a loss of the ordinary: it also opens up new dimensions. One such dimension is that of being touched from within. A phenomenology of the pregnant body thus leads to a removal of world, but also reveals new dimensions of world, and it even comes to disclose the other as a new world within. It means to carry something alien, like the stone in Butoh play Child’s Breath , which can only be carried slowly, awkwardly.

Perceptual experiences not only have cognitive aspects, through which we acquire information about some objects, but sensory aspects, through which we experience how the object appears. In the traditional view, the sensory aspects have been reduced to sensations or senses, which have the function of supplying materials for cognition. Against this view, E. Strauss characterized sensing as a kind of “communication” with the world in a pathetic dimension and each sense modality as a way of embodied “Being in the world” in its own way. My paper tries to combine this phenomenological view of senses with the ecological approach of J.J. Gibson, according to which senses are considered as perceptual systems. With this attempt at an ecological phenomenology, the paper focuses on the embodiment dimension of perceptual experiences and clarifies the multi-dimensional and multi-sensory character of various perceptual experiences.

Here I distinguish three fundamental ways in which the naturalistically oriented science of pain has critically engaged phenomenology. The science of pain has either denied any role phenomenology could play in scientific pain research, or it has aimed to correlate phenomenological findings with neurological processes, or it has pursued a genuine dialogue with phenomenology, yet only insofar as phenomenology is conceived in line with the principles of static methodology. I argue that genetic phenomenology of embodied personhood offers a fourth and most promising way to pursue a dialogue between phenomenology and the science of pain. By drawing a distinction between the naturalistic and the personalistic attitudes, genetic phenomenology invites one to reinterpret the neurological conceptions of pain as modifications derived from a more basic understanding of pain experience.

In manuscripts from the 1920s Husserl elaborates on what in the Cartesian Meditations he calls “personalities of a higher order.” We might expect the founder of phenomenology to be suspicious of this idea, considering it a mere façon de parler. In fact, Husserl strongly endorses this notion, borrowing the term Gemeingeist from the German Idealists, and defending it against attempts by empirical psychologists to reduce everything to individuals. He attributes to certain forms of community not only personality but also subjectivity, consciousness, unity of consciousness, convictions, memory, and even “so etwas wie Leiblichkeit” - something like corporality. It is this last notion that I want to explore in this paper: what would such communal corporality be like? “We-intentionality” is much discussed these days among phenomenologists. Can we attribute corporality to it, and if so, how? I will consider possible answers to this question, not limiting myself to what Husserl says.

Are mass emotions and shared feelings two different phenomena? In this paper, I investigate two different forms of corporeal interaction; one bipolar and one unipolar. In the bipolar type, two individuals give different impulses, which are aligned with each other. In the unipolar type, the impulse derives from a thing, a task or a person. This impulse creates an identical corporeal dynamic in those involved. This synchronization of the corporeal directions leads to corporeal resonance and a reciprocal intensification. The shared experience of feelings is a part of unipolar corporeal interaction since the impulse for the corporeal dynamic of the individuals departs from one and the same feeling. According to Max Scheler’s analysis of emotional contagion, contagion comes about through imitation; it is merely a fallacy to believe the other person’s feeling is one’s own. In this paper, I argue that emotional contagion and shared feelings cannot be distinguished by virtue of this criterion of genuineness and instead belong to the same type of corporeal interaction. On the whole, I question the assumption that feelings are solely personal states. Individual and collective feelings can only be distinguished unambiguously through concepts, whereas affective phenomena are always tied to others, to norms and discourse.

This paper is intended to outline both a special field of somatic inquiry concerning bodily communication and resonance and a theoretical approach combining concepts from the philosophical discourse of “Leibphänomenologie” (“phenomenology of the sensing body”) with empirical participant research on bodily practices in somatics and modern dance. Since both the field of inquiry and the theoretical approach are not yet well established, but rather a work in progress, the paper will focus on the delineation of some theoretical conjectures and conceptual propositions, a few empirical observations, and open questions.

That which I always already am, without having to do it - the transcendental status of corporeality - is prefigured in Nietzsche’s theory, according to which every authentic philosophy is first of all to be thought “under the guidance of the body.” Nietzsche criticized philosophy’s forgetting of the living body long before a phenomenological difference was made between the living body and the dimensional body; he proposed that thinking be based on differences and not on oppositions. This turn toward the living body in philosophy can be described as a turn of aesthetics. As a discipline, aesthetics had originated as a theory of sensual perception. Through Nietzsche, it discovered the space of the living and feeling body as the foundational basis for philosophical knowledge.

Moving from a (new) phenomenological theory of the lived body (Leib), the text outlines its constitutive (pre-reflective) role in human experience but especially in aesthetic perception. Against every reductionist and introjectionist objectification of the lived experience, every explanatory hypothesis of associationist and projectivist type, a pathic aesthetics ‒ that emphasizes the affective involvement that the perceiver feels unable to critically react to or mitigate the intrusiveness of ‒ is an adequate investigation of the felt body as sounding board of outside atmospheres and Stimmungen. By means of its specific dynamics and lived “isles”, in fact the felt body feels what happens in the surrounding area without drawing on the five senses and the perceptual body schema. Felt-bodily isles turn out exactly to be both a tool for sensing the affective radiation provoked by atmospheres and quasi-things, and “places” that, communicating with each other and with our consciousness, are themselves quasi-things.

Husserl attempted to found logics and language on intuition, and particularly perception. The relationship between logical language and intuition is therefore one of the fundamental themes of his phenomenology. Husserl regarded the two as sharing an isomorphic structure, and this article shows that this structure can be characterized as “mediality.” That is, the “meaning” of language appears by mediation of sound or script, while the “I” as person appears by mediation of the body. I will show furthermore that intuitions themselves appear through the mediation of language, and interpret this idea of mediality in terms of the Japanese language. Guided by Husserl’s notion of Sprachleib (linguistic living body), I will also attempt an analysis of the “bodily” function of Chinese script and onomatopeia as aspects of Sprachleib and show how the Sprachleib functions as a “cultural living body” that makes community possible.

In the Shuowen, one of the earliest comprehensive character dictionaries of ancient China, when discussing where the Chinese characters derive their structural components, Xu Shen proposed the dual constitutive principle of “adopting proximally from the human body, and distally from things around.” This dual emphasis of “body” and “things around” corresponds largely to the phenomenological issues of body or corporeality on the one hand, and lifeworld on the other. If we borrow Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as Being-in-the world, we can easily arrive at a reformulation of Xu Shen’s constitutive principle of the Chinese script as one that concerns “bodily Dasein.” By looking into various examples of script tokens we can further elaborate on how the Chinese make use not only of the body in general but various body parts, and how they differentiate their life world into material nature, living things, and a multifaceted world of equipment in forming a core basis of Chinese characters/components, upon which further symbolic manipulation such as “indication”, “phonetic borrowing”, semantic combination, and “annotative derivation”, etc. can be based. Finally, examples will be cited to show how in the Chinese scripts the human body (and its parts) might interact with other’s bodies (and their parts) or with “things around” (whether nature, living creatures, or artifacts) in various ways to cover the social, environmental, ritual, technical, economical, and even intellectual aspects of human experience. Bodily Dasein, so to speak, provides us with a new perspective of understanding and appreciating the entire scope of the Chinese script.

My aim in this paper is to sketch a picture of how we currently visualize human vs. artificial intelligence. I am going to analyze images depicting the transcendence of the human in recent movies, which I take to be significant for the contemporary conditio humana. I will examine how movies like Her (USA 2013, Spike Jonze) or Transcendence (USA 2014, Wally Pfister) invent and use images of human and artificial life. I will then analyze the images themselves, how they are connected and what underlying ontological assumptions can be found. My main focus will be on the concept of the body and figures of disembodied intelligence. I will argue that disembodied intelligence has become a central topos in contemporary cinema. I will show how these ideas relate to the presentation of technology as a highly complex and dynamic net-structure, comparable to the characteristics of the human brain.

It was not only in his infamous speeches as NSDAP-approved Führer- Rektor of Freiburg University that Heidegger advocated what can be seen as an ‘activist’ understanding of human existence. To exist, according to this approach, means to be called upon to take charge of one’s life - actively, responsibly, authentically - whether mandated by Volk and Führer or not. Heideggerian resoluteness amounts to being active in a deep sense, a view articulated during the Rektoratszeit in the form of an outright equation of dasein and work. I will revisit Heidegger’s phenomenology of boredom in Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, and contrast it with passages from Fernando Pessoa’s Book of Disquiet. Pessoa presents a radical counterpoint to Heidegger, utterly at odds with his intellectual and political persona. Insofar as the early Heidegger still represents the sinister forces ruling on the death star of western metaphysics, Pessoa carries the light that can set us on a path toward very different horizons for thinking being.

“Embodiment of God” is understood by me as “the appearance of God,” and in terms of “divinity (Gottheit),” “holy (Heilig),” and “Being (Sein).” Heidegger states in “Letter on Humanism”: “Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of the divinity to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word ‘God’ is to signify.”1 This statement basically shows how the latter stage, namely “God” appears or is embodied in the world. It also manifests how Heidegger understands onto-theology. “Letter on Humanism” was written in 1946. Is such a relation between ontology and theology to be found in Heidegger’s early works? What of Heidegger’s position after 1946? How can we understand Heidegger’s position on God according to his works in general with regard to my formulation of it as the “embodiment of God”?

In Heidegger’s Black Notebooks some ideas about political embodiment can be found, which have come under suspicion to justify the Third Reich’s race law. In the following article, the analysis and discussion of Heidegger’s political embodiment will firstly be traced back to the traditional understanding of the human as a “rational animal”, and will then look at how the “racial being” is subsequently developed and eventually transformed into political absolute subjectivism. Moreover, Heidegger’s in-depth explanation and critique on Nietzsche’s metaphysics, which he views as having transformed human experiences to a metaphysical representation and thus misunderstanding human nature, will also be clarified. Through Heidegger’s critic on biologism, a profound disclosure which potentially imply an attack of the racism at his time (Nazism) can be shown. Furthermore, Heidegger’s thinking of Being as a kind of emancipation of European political embodiment will also be analyzed. Lastly, although Heidegger and Confucianism have different ideas of lived-body, both schools basically show the same fundamental understanding of human nature. In regard to this, their understanding of political embodiment, their similarities and divergences, will be elucidated.

Hermann Schmitz has developed a “New Phenomenology.” It emphasizes fundamental conceptions that undercut traditional subject-object distinctions. In the Chinese classic The Zhuangzi we find stories that describe involvements and dialogue that can be seen as doing something similar. I will bring out some of these parallels. In particular I will focus on freedom and mutual understanding.

The questions pursued in this essay are: What can philosophers today learn from a tradition of psychosomatic practice such as Zen Buddhism? How does such a tradition challenge the very methodology of our cerebral practice of philosophy? And finally: What would it mean to bring Western philosophy and the psychosomatic practice of Zen together, not necessarily to merge them into one, but at least to commute between them so that they may speak to and inform one another? In pursuing these questions, it is demonstrated, we have much to learn from the Kyoto School of modern Japanese philosophy. The middle two sections of this essay explain how Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) and Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) challenged the disembodied methodology of Western philosophy by drawing on their psychosomatic practice of Zen. The final section of this essay critically compares and contrasts the psychosomatic practice of Zen with the pragmatist “somaesthetics” of Richard Shusterman. Shusterman himself pursued connections between his project and Zen practice, yet it will be argued that the guiding aims of his pragmatically and aesthetically orientated somaesthetics need to be distinguished from the primarily enlightening and liberative aims of the psychosomatic practice of Zen.

Phenomenologically speaking, one can consider the experiencing body as normative insofar as it generates norms through repeated actions and interactions, crystallizing into habits. On the other hand according to Foucauldian approaches, the subjective body does not generate norms but is itself produced by norms: Dominant social norms are incorporated via repeated practices of discipline. How is the individual level of habit formation in phenomenology related to this embodiment of supra-individual norms? In what sense can we differentiate between a habit formation that results in a skill and one that disciplines a body? To address these questions the paper will analyze examples of the embodiment of norms in Foucault and feminist philosophy and show how they rely on the phenomenological concept of the actual and habitual body.

Even though the Cartesian mind-body dualism has largely been dismissed in contemporary philosophy, the idea that the conscious mind can be a bodiless and non-spatial entity is still held to be possible. This paper examines a series of arguments by Jaegwon Kim, Peter Strawson, and Immanuel Kant against the possibility of a disembodied mind. It is argued that although the concept of a disembodied mind is coherent, it derives from a more fundamental concept in which the mind and the body are originally unified. The unity of mind and body, which can be called a person, is logically prior to the concept of the mind as a disembodied person, and thus the possibility of a disembodied mind turns out to depend on the existence of the physical and spatial world.

In the past 20 years, the concept of instinct has been discussed in respect to various disciplines such as evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, linguistics, ethics, aesthetics, and phenomenology, etc. However, the meaning of instinct still remains unclarified in many respects. In order to overcome this situation, it is necessary to elucidate the genuine meaning of instinct so that the discussion of instinct in these disciplines can be carried out systematically. The objective of this paper is to establish the genuine concept of instinct on the basis of a phenomenological criticism of A. Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction. Moreover, it seeks to show that this concept is the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. According to Gehlen, instinct is defined as Instinkthandlung. However, this definition of instinct is problematic in the formal logical sense, since the definiendum (the instinct) is already included in the definiens (Instinkthandlung). Moreover, it faces different kinds of serious material problems. Criticizing Gehlen’s theory of instinct systematically, I will show that instinct should be redefined as “the innate living force that urges a species of living being to pursue a certain kind of object,” and I will attempt to clarify this definition of instinct in a more detailed manner by offering 11 points. Thereafter, I will argue that Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction has to be replaced by the theory of instinct-enlargement in human beings. Finally, I will point out that the genuine concept of instinct is nothing other than the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness.

Heidegger maintains that the root of modern technology, like that of all other technologies, lies in technē. However, because the art dimension of technē is suppressed in modern technology, the essence of this technology becomes a Gestell (fixed frame) that enforces product-making, and thus drives technology beyond the control of human beings. The more fundamental reason underlying this “frame-becoming” nature is “the mathematical” that emerges in ancient Greece, which, through the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy, turns the world into the images represented by the subject, and things into definite objects. To escape the dictatorship of the Gestell, it is necessary to re-realize the art-dimension of technē in modern technology, i. e. to let the gentle granting nature of the enowning (Ereignis, event) re-master technology. In this respect, both Heidegger and Heisenberg were inspired by or at least resonated with Lao Zi or Zhuang Zi’s Dao. Confucians will greatly appreciate the critique of modern technology by Heidegger, and especially his view of returning “home” to overcome the possible dangers brought about by technology. However, from the perspective of Confucianism, Heidegger’s critique contains some shortcomings: for example, his ignorance of the individualistic impact in the Gestell and his unidirectional “ontological difference,” which leads him to a view of “home” that lacks “family” and therefore renders his solution loose and rootless. Only an organic community originated in the family, be it Confucian or Amish, can effectively reduce the control of modern technology over the human being.

All questions of thought lead back to philosophy. However, there remains a lack of clarity with regard to the preconditions of philosophy, especially the genesis of philosophy, that is, what is the first philosophical topic is not much clearer. It is often thought that philosophizing stems from being, or a state of existence, a legend from Greek philosophy. This paper attempts to reanalyze the precondition or the critical point of “how thinking is possible” by an archaeology of thought, so as to pinpoint the first word that initiated human thought. The first thinking word must be a philosophical word. In examining historical conditions, oracle bone scripts and basic connectives in mathematical logic, this paper argues that human thought stemmed from negative words that are the first philosophical words. The trajectory is that negatives, upon entering the human lexicon, inspired the concept of possibility; only with various possibilities, consciousness begins to think freely, put forward issues worth being reflected and deliberated and provide different alternative answers. In short, the advent of the negative “no” marked the existence of the critical condition of thinking, i. e., thinking and philosophy started when the human being could say no, which is therefore the first term and the primary topic of philosophy.