Startseite Criticism of Gehlen’s Theory of Instinct-Reduction and Phenomenological Clarification of the Concept of Instinct as the Genetic Origin of Embodied Consciousness
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Criticism of Gehlen’s Theory of Instinct-Reduction and Phenomenological Clarification of the Concept of Instinct as the Genetic Origin of Embodied Consciousness

  • Lee Nam-In
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 20. Januar 2018

Abstract

In the past 20 years, the concept of instinct has been discussed in respect to various disciplines such as evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, linguistics, ethics, aesthetics, and phenomenology, etc. However, the meaning of instinct still remains unclarified in many respects. In order to overcome this situation, it is necessary to elucidate the genuine meaning of instinct so that the discussion of instinct in these disciplines can be carried out systematically. The objective of this paper is to establish the genuine concept of instinct on the basis of a phenomenological criticism of A. Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction. Moreover, it seeks to show that this concept is the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. According to Gehlen, instinct is defined as Instinkthandlung. However, this definition of instinct is problematic in the formal logical sense, since the definiendum (the instinct) is already included in the definiens (Instinkthandlung). Moreover, it faces different kinds of serious material problems. Criticizing Gehlen’s theory of instinct systematically, I will show that instinct should be redefined as “the innate living force that urges a species of living being to pursue a certain kind of object,” and I will attempt to clarify this definition of instinct in a more detailed manner by offering 11 points. Thereafter, I will argue that Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction has to be replaced by the theory of instinct-enlargement in human beings. Finally, I will point out that the genuine concept of instinct is nothing other than the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness.

Published Online: 2018-1-20
Published in Print: 2017-12-20

© 2018 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Titelei
  2. Editorial Preface
  3. Contents
  4. Preface
  5. Embodiment
  6. I. Experiencing the Living Body — 体验生命体
  7. The Felt Body and Embodied Communication
  8. Der Leib als Umschlagstelle zwischen Kultur und Natur
  9. Exploring Pregnant Embodiment with Phenomenology and Butoh Dance
  10. What are Senses and Sense Modalities?
  11. Phenomenology of Embodied Personhood and the Challenges of Naturalism in Pain Research
  12. II. Collective Bodies and Bodily Resonance — 共同一体和身体共鸣
  13. “… so etwas wie Leiblichkeit.”
  14. Mass Emotion and Shared Feelings
  15. On Bodily Resonance
  16. III. Embodiment, Mediality and Aesthetics — 具身、媒介与美学
  17. Aesthetic Turn
  18. Felt-Bodily Resonances
  19. Body, Language and Mediality
  20. Bodily Dasein and Chinese Script Components
  21. The Metaphor of the Net
  22. IV. After Heidegger — 后海德格尔
  23. “I” “here” and “you” “there”
  24. Living in the Moment
  25. Heidegger on the Problem of the Embodiment of God
  26. V. Parallels with Phenomenolgy — 与现象学的共性
  27. From the Analysis of the Political Embodiment in Heidegger’s Black Notebooks to a Brief Comparison With Confucianism
  28. Phenomenology of Embodied Intersubjectivity
  29. Toward a Liberative Phenomenology of Zen
  30. VI. Complements to Phenomenology — 对现象学的补充
  31. The Normative Body and the Embodiment of Norms
  32. On the Possibility of a Disembodied Mind
  33. VII. Miscellaneous — 年度文选
  34. Criticism of Gehlen’s Theory of Instinct-Reduction and Phenomenological Clarification of the Concept of Instinct as the Genetic Origin of Embodied Consciousness
  35. Technology, Dao-Technē and Home
  36. Moral Conflicts and the Application of Ethics
  37. Is “Intention” Present or Not?
  38. The First Philosophical Word
  39. Bio-Bibliography
  40. Name Index
Heruntergeladen am 22.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/yewph-2017-0025/html
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