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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editors-in-Chief: Sandra Ludwig and Hendrik Schmitz
Edited by: Francesca Barigozzi , Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll , Robert Fleck , Daniel Kamhöfer , Matthew McGinty , Mariapia Mendola , Till Requate , Frans de Vries and Tobias Wenzel

Language: English

First published: November 1, 2001

Publication Frequency: 4 issues per year

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Objective
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (BEJEAP) welcomes submissions that employ microeconomics to analyze issues in organizational economics, consumer behavior, and public policy. Articles submitted to BEJEAP can come in two formats: research papers and letters. Authors should bring to their analysis whatever microeconomic theoretical, experimental or econometric tools are helpful. We publish both empirical work and applied theory (though not more abstract forms of applied theory), and our aim is to disseminate papers that have practical implications for public policy, organizational or individual decision making.

Topics

Design of organizations and institutions
Industrial organization
Health economics
Public finance
Labour Economics
Economics of education, family, development, law, or the environment
Effects of domestic and international policy

Article formats
Research Papers, Letters

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Quick publication of cutting-edge research
Practical implications for public policies
Empirical work and applied theory
High quality peer-review

History

Content available since 2001 (Volume 1, Issue 1)

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Gender Gaps in Different Assessment Systems: The Role of Teacher Gender

August 29, 2025

Catarina Angelo, Ana Balcão Reis

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Previous research that investigates the gender gap in student achievement has identified a gender gap in the difference between teacher grading and scores on national exams at the end of secondary school. In this paper we go a step further and look at how teacher characteristics may influence this gender gap. Our identification strategy takes advantage of a rich dataset that allows us to match each student with the respective teacher and contains information regarding scores obtained by each student from teacher grading, and in curriculum based national exams. Using fixed effects at the student level we find that exams are relatively more favorable for boys, regardless of the teacher gender or the gender matching. Results suggest that having a male teacher tends to increase the assessment gap for all students through a greater decrease from teacher to exam scores, the impact being less for boys.
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The Impact of Medical Cannabis Laws on Commercial Health Insurer Individual Market Premiums, Claims, and Profitability

August 12, 2025

Amanda C. Cook, Joshua D. Frederick, E. Tice Sirmans, Rhet A. Smith

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Higher administrative costs, adverse selection, and restrictive rating schemes all threaten the profitability of commercial insurers in the individual health insurance market. The uncertainty surrounding cannabis liberalization potentially exacerbates this risk. Individual insurance markets and medical cannabis laws (MCLs) rapidly expanded across the United States over the past decade. Using commercial insurerlevel data compiled by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners from 2010 to 2018, we use a difference-in-differences approach to examine the impact of medical cannabis laws on medical claims, premiums, and insurer profitability in the individual insurance market. We find that claims increase during the first year of legalization before declining and becoming negative after two years. We also find weak evidence of post-MCL reductions in premiums. These dynamic effects on insurer costs and revenues are reflected in insurer underwriting profits as the initially negative effects become positive and marginally significant as the legal medical cannabis market develops.
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Complement or Substitute? Punishment and Self-Interested Enforcement

August 11, 2025

Ken Yahagi

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This study examines the problems that law enforcement agencies face with self-interested agents who (1) prefer to punish wrongdoers and reduce crime rates and (2) would suffer a loss of reputation resulting from law enforcement investigations that do not lead to convictions. Next, we examine how agents’ enforcement responses change with sanction size. This is fundamental to how higher-ranking authorities (e.g., the judiciary) can implement sanction policies to mitigate law enforcement agency problems. Our analysis shows that enforcement and sanctions can function as either complements or substitutes. When agents have strong preferences for reducing crime, stricter sanctions complement enforcement and increase deterrence. Conversely, when concerns about reputation loss dominate, stricter sanctions substitute for enforcement and may decrease deterrence. Consequently, a non-maximal sanction may be optimal when sanctions substitute for enforcement. This yields a novel justification for imposing non-maximal sanctions based on the behavior of the enforcer.
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Environmental Taxes Versus Subsidies with Unionized Labor Markets. A Note on the Role of Wage Setting Structure

August 7, 2025

Cecilia Vergari, Nicola Meccheri

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In the context of a unionized labor market and green consumerism, this paper analyzes, within a vertically differentiated duopoly, which environmental policy – taxes or subsidies – is more efficient in reducing polluting emissions and enhancing social welfare. The structure of wage setting proves to be crucial in determining final outcomes. Specifically, under firm-specific unions with decentralized wage setting, a subsidy policy is more efficient than a tax policy. Conversely, when an industry-wide union sets wages centrally, the tax policy outperforms the subsidy policy.
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Addictive Treatment

August 6, 2025

Artyom Jelnov

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A treatment prescribed by an incompetent expert can cause long-term damage. However, this damage may not be recognized in the short term. I propose a theoretical model in which an incompetent expert can act dishonestly. Specifically, she can prescribe an improper treatment, which seems to be effective in the short-term but has long-term negative side effects. I show that, surprisingly, the possibility of dishonest behavior may encourage consumers to approach experts and enhance social welfare.
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Hiring Subsidies for Low-Educated Unemployed Youths are Ineffective in a Tight Labor Market

August 5, 2025

Muriel Dejemeppe, Matthieu Delpierre, Mathilde Pourtois

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We evaluate the impact of hiring subsidies for unemployed jobseekers in Wallonia, the French-speaking region in Belgium, focusing on low-educated youths who gain earlier access to subsidies. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that prioritizing subsidies for them leads to deadweight losses during the pre-pandemic economic boom. Positive job-finding effects are observed for high school graduates in areas with lower labor market tightness, supporting the hypothesis that this factor drives inefficiency. For high school dropouts, no effects are detected. This may reflect loose targeting – such as lack of a minimum unemployment duration – but other group differences could also play a role.
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Payment for Environmental Services and Environmental Tax Under Imperfect Competition

July 16, 2025

Anneliese Krautkraemer, Sonia Schwartz

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This paper designs the second-best Payment for Environmental Services (PES) when it interacts with a Pigouvian tax under market imperfections. Following Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003. “Agri-Environmental Externalities: A Framework for Designing Targeted Policies.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 30 (1): 51–75), we study the optimal allocation of land between two crops with different environmental impacts and fallow land. The regulator sets a Pigouvian tax on the agricultural production generating environmental damage and a PES on uncultivated land, as fallow buffer strips promote biodiversity. We assume an economy with market power and distortionary taxation. We show that the second-best level of the Pigouvian tax is higher than the marginal damage, contrary to Barnett (1980. “The Pigouvian Tax Rule Under Monopoly.” The American Economic Review 70 (5): 1037–41) whereas the PES is lower than the marginal benefit. The Pigouvian tax increases with the marginal social cost of public funds while the PES decreases with the marginal social cost of public funds provided that demand for the environmentally damaging agricultural good is inelastic. We thus highlight a contributory component of the environmental incentive tax. This paper also identifies specific cases where the PES is ineffective in promoting biodiversity.
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What Happens When We Become Age 18? SNAP Work Requirement and SNAP Participation

July 7, 2025

Sungjin Lee

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This study investigates whether the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) work requirement affects SNAP participation of able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs). Since 1996, ABAWDs have been required to work or participate in work programs at least 20 h per week for SNAP eligibility. Using the sample of SNAP household heads and their youngest child from administrative data for Missouri from 2004 to 2010, we compare the hazard of SNAP exit, exploiting the fact that the work requirement exemption depends on the age of the youngest child and the county of residence. Results indicate a modest reduction in SNAP participation due to the SNAP work requirement. The cumulative survival estimation indicates that the youngest child and household heads are less likely to continue to participate in SNAP for the next 24 months by 4.6 and 7.4 % points when they are expected to be subject to the work requirement.
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Disclosure of R&D Knowledge with Cross-Ownership in a Mixed Duopoly

July 7, 2025

Ting Zhang, Zhaoxin Qi, Dongdong Li

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This paper investigates the disclosure of R&D knowledge with cross-ownership in a mixed duopoly, where a semi-public ownership firm competes with a private firm. The results show that regardless of the degree of cross-ownership, both semi-public and private firms fully disclose their information. Furthermore, we find that privatization maintains the same disclosure level but reduces social welfare. Finally, we extend the model to unilateral ownership, the presence of foreign-owned firms and strategic R&D investment. We find that under unilateral shareholding, when the semi-public firm holds shares of the private firm, the semi-public firm fully discloses its R&D knowledge, while the private firm does not disclose its R&D knowledge. However, when the private firm holds shares of the semi-public firm, both semi-public and private firms fully disclose their information. The previous result still holds if the private firm is foreign-owned and strategic R&D investment is incorporated.
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Optimal Tariffs with Endogenous Entry Mode: Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs

July 7, 2025

Tsaur-Chin Wu, Chin-Ho Lin, Chia-Jen Chang

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This paper is the first to examine the welfare impact of two tariff regimes when firms’ entry mode is endogenously determined via export or foreign direct investment (FDI) under a three-country, two-firm model. First, both uniform and discriminatory tariffs reveal an asymmetrical entry mode, where the high (low)-cost firm prefers export (FDI) and vice versa. Second, if both high and low-cost firms choose export under uniform tariffs but the high (low)-cost firm chooses export (FDI) under discriminatory tariffs, the importing country prefers uniform tariffs, and global welfare is higher with uniform tariffs. Third, if the high (low)-cost firm chooses FDI (export) under uniform tariffs but export (FDI) under discriminatory tariffs, the importing country prefers uniform tariffs, and global welfare is greater with discriminatory tariffs.
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Microfinance and Vulnerability to Seasonal Famine in a Rural Economy: Evidence from Monga in Bangladesh

February 1, 2020

Claudia Berg, M. Shahe Emran

Article number: 20180359

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This paper uses a unique data set on 143,000 poor households from Northern Bangladesh to analyze the effects of microfinance membership on a household’s ability to cope with seasonal famine known as Monga. We develop an identification and estimation strategy that exploits a jump and a kink at the 10-decimal land ownership-threshold driven by the Microfinance Institution screening process to ensure repayment by excluding the ultra-poor. Evidence shows that microfinance membership improves food security during Monga, especially for the poorest households who survive at the margin of one and two meals a day. The positive effects on food security are, however, not driven by higher income, as microcredit does not improve the ability to migrate for work, nor does it reduce dependence on distress sale of labor. The evidence is consistent with consumption smoothing being the primary mechanism behind the gains in food security of MFI households during the season of starvation.

Special Issue: The economics of long-term care, Guest editor: Helmuth Cremer

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“Socioeconomic Status and Health Across Generations and Over the Life Course” edited by Thomas C Buchmueller

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“Distributional Aspects of Energy and Climate Policy” edited by Don Fullerton

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“The Mortgage Meltdown, the Economy, and Public Policy” edited by Guest Editors Stuart Gabriel and John Quigley

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Journal Impact Factor	0.8	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
5-year Journal Impact Factor	0.8	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
Journal Citation Indicator	0.24	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
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You can easily submit your manuscript online. Simply go to http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/dgbejeap and you will be guided through the whole peer-reviewing and publishing process.

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In the interest of a fast track from submission to publication, there will be no major revision rounds for letters. BEJEAP will either accept manuscripts (subject to editorial revisions), invite minor revisions, or reject manuscripts without a detailed referee report. Submitted letters should hence be ready for publication if accepted for publication by the editors.

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Editors-in-Chief
Sandra Ludwig, Ulm University, Germany
Hendrik Schmitz, Paderborn University, Germany

Editors
Francesca Barigozzi, University of Bologna, Italy
Robert Fleck, Clemson University, USA
Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll, University of Turin, Italy
Daniel Kamhöfer, University of Kaiserslautern-Landau, Germany
Matthew McGinty, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA
Mariapia Mendola, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
Till Requate, Kiel University, Germany
Frans de Vries, University of Aberdeen Business School, UK
Tobias Wenzel, University of Sheffield, UK

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Journal information

Additional information

eISSN:

1935-1682

Language:

English

Publisher:

De Gruyter

Additional information

First published:

November 1, 2001

Publication Frequency:

4 issues per year

eISSN: 1935-1682

Audience(s) for this journal

researchers in the field of economic analysis and policy

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

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