Volume 7, Issue 1

Regional integration makes relocation a more attractive option for Multinational Corporations (MNC), influencing in turn the provision of investment incentives by member countries. We examine in this context the effects of subsidy competition. To do so, we model the strategic interaction between two governments offering subsidies to a MNC facing different location alternatives, which involve relocation and plant closure. Our welfare analysis shows that the combination of regional integration and subsidy competition may lead to suboptimally high levels of subsidization. We also discuss how the desirability of harmonizing subsidies (by banning them), and the net gains from integration crucially depend on technological differences, ownership, and on corporate tax rates. For instance, a simple agreement on avoiding subsidies generally raises welfare if the MNC belongs to an extra-regional country. This is not the case for a regional MNC. Lastly, we find that the gain from regional subsidy coordination increases with integration.

Digital-age technologies promise to revolutionize the market for academic journals as they have other media. We model journals as intermediaries linking authors with readers in a two-sided market. We use the model to study the division of fees between authors and readers under various market structures, ranging from monopoly to free entry. The results help explain why print journals traditionally obtained most of their revenue from subscription fees. The results raise the possibility that digitization may lead to a proliferation of online journals targeting various author types. The paper contributes to the literature on two-sided markets in its analysis of free-entry equilibrium and modeling of product-quality certification.

We model economic decisions as stemming from urges. The magnitude of the urge is a function of previous consumption. Welfare gains from satisfying an urge vary with the nature of the urge. An urge is "dysfuntional" if people are willing to incur costs to stop themselves from gratifying that urge. The simple framework we develop captures the essential features of other, more complex models of addiction and problems of self control. We apply the model to analyze cigarette smoking. Our main results are that, under not implausible conditions, making cigarettes more addictive can reduce smoking and making cigarettes more harmful can improve the average health of the population.

Retail and wholesale gasoline prices vary over time and across geographic locations due to differences in government policies and other factors that affect demand, costs, and market power. We use a two-equation, reduced-form model to determine the relative importance of these various factors using panel data for 48 states over nine years. We find that the variation in the price of crude oil has been virtually the only major factor contributing to gasoline price variations during the 1990s. Tax variations and mergers contribute substantially more to geographic price differentials than do price discrimination, cost factors, or pollution controls.

We study the design of retirement and disability policies and illustrate the often observed exit from the labor force of healthy workers through disability insurance schemes. In our model, two types of individuals, disabled and leisure-prone ones, have the same disutility for labor and cannot be distinguished. However, they are not counted in the same way in social welfare. We determine first- and second-best optimal benefit levels and retirement ages. Then we introduce the possibility of testing that can sort out disabled workers from healthy but retirement-prone workers. We show that such testing can increase both social welfare and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled workers are better taken care of. It is not optimal to test all applicants. Surprisingly, the (second-best) solution may imply later retirement for the disabled than for the leisure-prone. In that case, the disabled are compensated by higher benefits.

Prior literature suggests that Daylight Saving Time (DST) can both increase the risk of automobile crashes in the short run and decrease the risk of automobile crashes in the long run. We use 28 years (1976-2003) of automobile crash data from the United States, and exploit a natural experiment arising from a 1986 federal law that changed the time when states switched to DST to identify the short run and long run effects of DST on automobile crashes. Our findings suggest that (1) DST has no significant detrimental effect on automobile crashes in the short run; (2) DST significantly reduces automobile crashes in the long run with a 8-11% fall in crashes involving pedestrians, and a 6-10% fall in crashes for vehicular occupants in the weeks after the spring shift to DST.

Many communities and several states prohibit smoking in bars or restaurants. Using county-level data on employment from across the US, we find that communities where smoking is banned experience reductions in bar employment compared with counties that allow smoking. Smoking bans have a larger detrimental impact on bars in geographic areas with a high prevalence of smokers. The relative effect on restaurant employment is neutral or mildly positive. The positive effects are concentrated in areas with fewer smokers. We also find that bans have a positive effect on restaurant employment in warmer regions of the country, especially during the cooler winter months, and in the summer in colder regions. This suggests the prevalence of outdoor seating might influence the policy's effect.

This paper discusses market power effects in ambient permit markets. We consider a dominant firm in a position to exert market power in several markets. A first conclusion is that the distortion observed on manipulated markets spreads to other markets. We find that the manipulated prices could be lower than their competitive level if the dominant firm acts as a monopolist, and higher if it acts as a monopsonist. We show that the efficient outcome is not reached, except if the number of firms is the same as the number of markets whatever the initial endowment of permits. If not, the efficient outcome can be reached by means of initial endowments.

In this paper we study a model of rational consumption and quitting in the context of harmful addictive goods. We assume that a person has imperfect information about his ability to resist and terminate the addiction. We first characterize the optimal consumption path of a non-addicted person, along which his stock of the addictive substance is either always increasing (and thus addiction occurs stochastically), always decreasing, or always unchanged. We then characterize the optimal consumption path of an addicted person, along which he may attempt to quit the addiction for a period of time, and then resume his consumption if the attempt is unsuccessful. Finally, we remark on the issues of regret, multiple attempts to quit, and quitting programs.

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

Time-consuming and costly religious rituals pose a puzzle for economists committed to rational choice theories of human behavior. We propose that either through selection or a causal relationship, the performance of religious rituals is associated with higher levels of cooperation. To test this hypothesis we design field experiments to measure the in-group cooperative behavior of members of religious and secular Israeli kibbutzim, communal societies for which mutual cooperation is a matter of survival. Our results show that religious males (the primary practitioners of collective religious ritual in Orthodox Judaism) are more cooperative than religious females, secular males and secular females. Moreover, the frequency with which religious males engage in collective religious rituals predicts well their degree of cooperative behavior.

Vaccination provides indirect benefits to the unvaccinated. Despite its important policy implications, there is little analytical or empirical work to quantify this externality, nor is it incorporated in a number of cost-benefit studies of vaccine programs. We use a standard epidemiological model to analyze how the magnitude of this externality varies with the number of vaccinations, vaccine efficacy, and disease infectiousness. We also provide empirical estimates using parameters for influenza and mumps epidemics. The pattern of the externality is complex and striking, unlike that suggested in standard treatments. The size of the externality is not necessarily monotonic in the number vaccinated, vaccine efficacy, nor disease infectiousness. Moreover, its magnitude can be remarkably large. In particular, the marginal externality of a vaccination can be greater than one case of illness prevented among the nonvaccinated, so its omission from policy analyses implies serious biases.

We develop a model of the household that includes pets. We use over twenty years of data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to consider pet ownership and expenditures for single and married households. Households with very young children are less likely to own pets and have lower pet expenditures, showing a substitute relationship. Households with older children are more likely to own pets, suggesting a complementary relationship. However, households with more children show reduced pet spending, evidence of a substitute relationship. Surprisingly, when the effect of income on pet ownership and pet spending are jointly considered in computing the income elasticities, women in married households have smaller income elasticities for pet expenditures than do men. This finding is the opposite of what has been found for women and men with regard to expenditures on children.

This article develops a theoretical model of college admissions to investigate the effects of banning affirmative action admissions policies on the efficiency of the admissions process. Previous work in this area has shown that prohibiting affirmative action causes inefficiency when college quality is an increasing function of diversity. This article identifies an additional reason why colleges and universities use racial preferences in admissions, setting aside explicit demands for diversity. In the theoretical model, the racial identity of the applicants is relevant information for making inferences about an applicant's true academic ability. Preventing admissions officers from using this information results in inefficient selection of applicants, even if diversity does not explicitly enter the objective of the university. Thus, affirmative action is justified solely on informational grounds.

This study presents a model of optimal contracting for health services in the presence of excess demand and waiting times. We assume that: i) hospitals differ in their demand for treatment; ii) potential demand is private information of the provider; iii) specialists can dump patients; iv) activity and waiting times are contractible. A separating equilibrium exists when it is optimal for the purchaser to contract more activity and longer waiting times to those hospitals with higher demand. Hospitals with low demand gain informational rents. A pooling equilibrium may also occur.

The large empirical literature on the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic growth has produced mixed results. Despite the ambiguous evidence on the benefits of FDI, investment promotion has become an active area of policy and a growing number of nations are offering services and incentives to attract investment by multinational firms. Rather than assessing whether the costs of investment promotion are justified by the potential benefits of FDI, this paper asks a prior question which is relevant to the policy debate. We investigate whether national investment promotion activities succeed in increasing the volume of inward investment or whether this expenditure merely subsidises investments which would have occurred in its absence. We use a widespread but under acknowledged feature of investment promotion practice to test the effectiveness of investment promotion at the industry level. We find that a positive effect of investment promotion on FDI inflows is robust across various empirical specifications.

Individuals often respond with strong emotions to being penalised. Such responses suggest that informal penalties are important and play a role in creating deterrence. In this paper informal penalties are analysed in the context of medical errors. The introduction of informal penalties, if dependent upon formal ones, implies that: (i) the optimal enforcement regime becomes more lenient, and in some cases the lack of formal punishment is preferred, (ii) the first-best solution becomes unattainable, (iii) liability rates and formal penalty level are no longer perfect deterrence substitutes. In addition, powers of informal penalties provide a rationale for administrative sanctions (informal criticism, reprimands and warnings).

Recently, researchers have started to re-examine the so-called Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on optimal commodity taxation. The essence of such research is to examine whether or not it is optimal to distort markets other than the labor market for achieving the second-best resource allocation. I examine this theorem by introducing the comparative advantage of human capital accumulation. More specifically, I assume that people with high ability obtain a higher return from skilled human capital accumulation than people with low ability. I explore the implication of this comparative advantage of human capital accumulation for the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on optimal commodity taxation.

By not allowing wages to clear the labor market, the minimum wage could cause workers with low reservation wages to be rationed out while equally skilled workers with higher reservation wages are employed. This paper exploits overlapping CPS panels to more precisely identify those most affected by the minimum wage, a group I refer to as the "unskilled." I test for inefficient rationing by examining whether the reservation wages of employed unskilled workers in states where the 1990-1991 federal minimum wage increase had the largest impact rose relative to reservation wages of unskilled workers in other states. I find that proxies for reservation wages of unskilled workers in high-impact states did not rise relative to reservation wages in other states, suggesting that the increase in the minimum wage did not cause jobs to be allocated less efficiently. However, even if rationing is efficient, the minimum wage can still entail other efficiency costs (e.g., from employment reductions).

In some European countries, the liberalization of the motor insurance market in the 1990s led to substantial increases in fares and claims throughout the whole decade. In this paper we argue that these phenomena are due to the impact of liberalization on companies' optimal incentives to fight fraud. By developing a circular city competition model with a cost-reducing stage prior to the price game and a settlement stage following it, we show that price deregulation entails decreasing monitoring investments and increasing claims both in the short and long run. Even equilibrium premiums may steadily increase if the ``competition effect" connected to new entries is outweighed by a ``monitoring effect" that raises marginal costs.

Childhood lead exposure can lead to psychological traits that are strongly associated with aggressive and criminal behavior. In the late 1970s in the United States, lead was removed from gasoline under the Clean Air Act. I use the state-specific reductions in lead exposure that resulted from this removal to identify the effect of childhood lead exposure on crime rates. The elasticity of violent crime with respect to childhood lead exposure is estimated to be 0.8, and this result is robust to numerous sensitivity tests. Mixed evidence supports an effect of lead exposure on murder rates, and little evidence indicates an effect of lead on property crime. Overall, I find that the reduction in childhood lead exposure in the late 1970s and early 1980s was responsible for significant declines in violent crime in the 1990s and may cause further declines in the future. Moreover, the social value of the reductions in violent crime far exceeds the cost of the removal of lead from gasoline.

A static game-theoretic model is developed to examine the post-9/11 interaction between the higher-education sector and the visa authority. We analyze the determination of the sponsorship of foreign scholars by the former and of visa scrutiny level by the latter, when some of the applicants, unknown to either party, are potential terrorists. When some genuine scholars are denied visa mistakenly, the intensity of visa screening is higher than its efficient level, but the number of students sponsored by the universities may or may not be higher. When delays associated with visa scrutiny cause some genuine scholars to be unable to enter, both the number of foreign scholars sponsored and the intensity of visa scrutiny are higher than their efficient levels. Under the same case, as the proportion of bad applicants (who are potential terrorists) for visas increases, the number of foreign scholars sponsored and the intensity of visa scrutiny increases, while there is a decline in the proportion of visa applicants granted visas. The basic analysis is extended to the case where the pool of applicants is endogenous.

This paper re-examines the labor supply responses in the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME). Specifically, the original experimental results show a significantly larger labor supply response for men and women from dual-headed households in the five-year Negative Income Tax (NIT) treatment relative to those in the three-year NIT treatment. Although typically thought of only as an NIT experiment, the SIME/DIME also included a job training experiment that enrolled roughly 60 percent of households, including both NIT treatment and control households. The original empirical specification imposed strong assumptions on the treatment response to the job training experiment in order to increase the precision of the estimated parameters. Once these assumptions are relaxed, the labor supply differences between men in the three- and five-year NIT treatments fall by over 50 percent in magnitude and become statistically insignificant. The analogous differences for women are almost entirely explained by these specification changes. Whereas the original findings of the SIME/DIME were inconsistent with the standard life-cycle labor supply model, the results of the re-analysis are mostly consistent with the model.

This paper investigates whether the pursuit of redistributional objectives may provide a rationale for origin-based taxation in small open economies. The analysis is developed in a simple two-class economy where consumers are classified according to the type of labour they supply. As world prices are given for a small open economy, the full burden of origin-based commodity taxes falls on the two types of labour. When a non-linear tax is levied on labour income, origin-based taxes cannot directly improve income distribution as the two types of labour face different marginal tax rates. However, the government can exploit the differential incidence of these origin-based taxes and increase social welfare by relaxing the self-selection constraints that bind the non-linear tax. Rather surprisingly, the value judgements embedded in the social welfare functional do not affect the structure of optimal origin-based commodity taxation.The paper also shows that the optimal structure of origin-based commodity taxation does not change when the labour income tax schedule is constrained to be linear, and that a positive source-based tax on capital income may be optimal if it results in a differential burden on the two types of labour.

Beef food safety events have contributed to considerable market volatility, produced varied consumer reactions, created policy debates, sparked heated trade disputes, and generally contributed to beef industry frustrations. Utilizing data from a total of 4,005 consumers in the United States, Canada, Mexico and Japan in a Double-Hurdle modeling framework, we examine whether consumers altered their beef consumption behavior because of their risk aversion and risk perceptions stemming from information about beef food safety in recent years. Results reveal stark differences in risk perceptions and risk aversion regarding beef food safety across consumers in the four countries and that these differences are revealed through different beef consumption behavior. An improved understanding of food safety perceptions and attitudes will enable policy makers and agricultural industries to better anticipate consumers changing consumption behavior, if a food safety event occurs. Food safety management strategies vary across countries because of identified differences in food safety risk attitudes and risk perceptions.

I examine the changing patterns of enrollment of females and males in mathematics and science courses in high school between roughly the classes of 1982 and 1992. Course taking has increased in both subjects and, notably, the gender gap has closed. I also examine the impact of state graduation requirements on course taking patterns for males and females. Higher graduation requirements in mathematics and science are associated with increased course taking and the magnitude is similar for both females and males. Finally, I investigate the relationship between high school math and science course taking and college major choice for the latter cohort. Ability and taste are likely to affect both high school course selection and college major and students planning on choosing a technical major are more likely to choose to take additional math and science courses in high school. To address this issue of selection bias, I first include direct measures of ability and taste and then use variation in state graduation requirements to instrument for increased course taking. I find that the number of high school mathematics courses taken has a positive effect on the probability that a student chooses a technical major in college and that this result appears robust to correction for selection bias.

We use mortality rates and age specific estimates of the response of transfers and wealth to lifetime resources to estimate how much of an extra dollar of parental lifetime resources will ultimately be passed on to adult children in the form of inter vivos transfers and bequests. We find that parents pass on between 2 and 3 cents of an extra dollar of expected lifetime resources in bequests and about 3 cents in transfers, which together amount to about one fifth of our rough estimate of the marginal propensity to spend on children under 18 and on college. The value of .4 relating earnings of the child to earnings of the parent rises to about .46 when the effect of parental earnings on bequests and transfers is added on, although the estimate is lower for nonwhites and varies with assumptions about the intergenerational earnings correlation and the number of children.

In a homogeneous good, Cournot duopoly model, entry may occur even when the potential entrant has no cost advantage and no independent access to distribution. By sinking its costs of production before negotiating with the incumbents, the entrant creates an externality that induces the incumbents to bid more aggressively for the distribution rights to its output. Each incumbent is willing to pay up to the incremental profit earned from the additional output plus the incremental loss avoided by keeping the output away from its rival. This implies that the incumbents are willing to pay up to the market price for each unit of available output. A sequential game in which the incumbents produce first is analyzed, and the conditions under which entry is deterred by incumbents' preemptive capacity expansions are derived.

What accounts for the existence of positive energy taxes in the US, given that such taxes are regressive and that the income distribution is skewed to the right? The traditional majority-voting equilibrium approach suggests a subsidy; thus we also look at two alternatives. These are the probabilistic-voting model and Roemer's (2001) model of political competition with the "Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium" (PUNE) as the equilibrium solution concept. Our economic model is calibrated on the basis of the US data. The paper shows that while the majority-voting approach calls for a massive subsidy, the PUNE approach leads to huge environmental taxes. Our tentative results suggest that the probabilistic model, wherein parties assume that the proportion of unbiased voters is the same in all categories of income, comes closest to explaining the observed US energy taxes.

This paper examines the complementarity between international trade and investment policies, and argues that preferential trade agreements may be a particularly effective means for harnessing the tariff liberalizing potential of foreign direct investment. A simple two country model demonstrates that export-platform foreign investment induces unilateral tariff liberalization by the investment-source country, suggesting that international capital mobility may substitute partially for multilateral forums such as the WTO in achieving efficient tariffs. A multi-country extension of the model in which countries can compete for foreign investors via subsidies then develops an efficiency argument in favor of discriminatory tariff allowances such as Article XXIV of the GATT or the Generalized System of Preferences. When small countries can earn preferential tariff treatment from a large trading counterpart by encouraging local export-platform investment (or by discouraging import competing investment), the equilibrium tariff level will be lower when discriminatory tariffs are possible rather than when they are not.

Forecast improvements can be expected if the two partners involved in a brokerage merger pool information and expertise. We examine four large mergers of brokerage firms in the last decade to study the incidence of and explanations for forecast improvements after the mergers. At the brokerage-level, we find that for two of the four mergers, forecast improvements appear more pronounced in subsamples of stocks for which both of the pre-merger analysts were retained in the merged brokerage. At the analyst-level, we find only weak evidence of forecast improvements after the merger. However, we find evidence that after a merger, a stock is more likely to be assigned to an analyst with overall better forecasting performance before the merger. This suggests that analyst selection can be a mechanism generating the post-merger forecasting improvements.

This paper presents a model that can account for the gender specialization of skill acquisition in the presence of competitive matching. In particular we show that when the comparative advantage in nonmarket domestic activities belongs to women, an incentive arises for them to intentionally degrade the market value of acquired skills in order to secure gains from the marriage market. We then show that this incentive can be excessively strong and gives rise to the emergence of an inefficient asymmetric equilibrium where women concentrate excessively on acquiring skills that do not lead to higher wages in the labor market. The analysis reveals why policy interventions such as affirmative action programs or equal employment opportunity laws that directly subsidize the acquisition of skills for women would not be effective in closing the gender earnings gap in the long run, and instead suggests that extensive family policies are generally more effective in this regard.

In this paper we distinguish between three channels that determine attitudes to further immigration: labour market concerns, welfare concerns, and racial or cultural concerns. Our analysis is based on the British Social Attitudes Survey. A unique feature of the survey is that it includes questions on attitudes towards immigration from different origin countries, with populations differing in ethnic similarity to the resident population. It also contains sets of questions relating directly to the labour market, benefit expenditure and welfare concerns, and racial and cultural prejudice. Based on this unique data source, we specify and estimate a multiple factor model that allows comparison of the relative magnitude of association of attitudes to further immigration with the three channels, as well as comparison in responses across potential immigrant groups of different origin. Our results suggest that, overall, welfare concerns play a more important role in determination of attitudes to further immigration than labour market concerns, with their relative magnitude differing across potential emigration regions and characteristics of the respondent. In addition, we find strong evidence that racial or cultural prejudice is an important component to attitudes towards immigration; however, this is restricted to immigration from countries with ethnically different populations.

This paper uses longitudinal data from Current Population Surveys conducted between 2004 and 2006 to estimate the net impact of Hurricane Katrina-related evacuation on various indicators of well-being. While evacuees who have returned to the affected region show evidence of returning to normalcy in terms of labor supply and earnings, those who persisted in other locations exhibit large and persistent gaps, even relative to the poor outcomes of individuals destined to become evacuees observed prior to Katrina. Evacuee outcomes are not demonstrably better in destination communities with lower initial unemployment or higher growth rates. The impact of evacuation on total income was blunted to some extent by government transfer payments and by self-employment activities. Overall, there is little evidence to support the notion that poor underemployed residents of the New Orleans area were disadvantaged by their location in a relatively depressed region.

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) provides food vouchers, nutritional counseling, and health care referrals to low-income pregnant and breastfeeding women and their young children. This paper uses duration models to study the factors that influence the timing of prenatal WIC participation among pregnant women. The estimates show that Hispanic women, women with low levels of education, women who have no private insurance, and women who are overweight participate in WIC earlier than others. WIC program rules such as allowing applicants to self-declare income and linking WIC eligibility to Medicaid eligibility are related to earlier participation for women experiencing their first pregnancies. Extending the analysis to women pregnant for the second time shows a strong relationship between WIC participation during the first pregnancy and the timing, and likelihood, of participation during the second pregnancy.

The main aim of this paper is to investigate the role of distance in gravity regressions in relation to the missing globalisation puzzle cited by Coe et al. (2002). These authors claimed that the fact that distance coefficients do not fall over time is another puzzle that should have been added in Obsfeld and Rogoff's (2000) paper, in which six major puzzles in international macroeconomics were cited. In order to do so, a linear and a non-linear gravity model are estimated for a cross-section of 65 countries over the period 1980-1999. Non-linear specifications of the gravity model have been recently used in the literature to address the issue of non-declining transport costs over time (Coe et al., 2002 and Croce et al., 2004). However, we claim that there is no missing globalisation puzzle once the linear specification results are correctly interpreted. The main findings are that distance has a different effect for developed and developing countries and that the grounds for using a non-linear specification are not clear since the linear specification, in general terms, shows better performance than the non-linear one.

This paper compares the performance of a two-sided combinatorial call market, direct negotiation, and double auction for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms. The combinatorial call market tends to alleviate the exposure problem, and performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable, and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are unchallenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market, however, suffers from the holdout problem when the number of subjects and commodities is small.

To control tailpipe pollution, governments often use environmental product standards and consumption taxes in conjunction (for example, the use of fuel economy standards and gasoline taxes to restrict automobile pollution in the US). Further, the choice of standards and consumption taxes is often independently influenced by special interests. For example, domestic producers have the incentive to influence environmental product standards, and likewise, domestic consumers have the incentive to influence the choice of the consumption tax. In this paper we explore the political link between environmental standards and consumption taxes in the presence of independent special interests. We find that despite the independence of special interests, the political outcome is inextricably linked. This political link is different from the welfare maximizing second-best link usually expected between two related policies, and is crucial in correctly anticipating policy outcomes. Specifically, we find that the government's choice of an environmental standard influences political incentives in the choice of the consumption tax. As the environmental standard falls, a higher demand for the environmentally damaging product develops. This higher demand increases the incentives for consumers to lobby for lower consumption tax. Under certain conditions, this political link is large enough to result in a complementary relationship between the two policies in equilibrium. The complementary relationship implies that a lower standard results in a lower consumption tax and vice versa when the standard is higher.

I argue that the measure of credit card debt used by researchers has grown rapidly in part because it captures debt arising from transactions in which a credit card is used because of its advantages over other payment instruments. Increases in debt stemming from such use may not signal greater household financial vulnerability if households are willing and able to repay this short-term debt. However, it may suggest that the cost of using credit cards to pay for purchases has declined relative to other payment instruments. I conclude that had transactions demand remained at its real 1992 levels, rather than growing almost 15 percent per year, measured credit card debt would have grown a bit less than 1 percentage point slower per year between 1992 and 2001. Moreover, I show that removing transactions demand from aggregate consumer credit can alter conclusions about the relationship between credit and consumption.

The paper shows that corruption at the federal level may be contagious for regional governments suggesting that federal structure of the government may be one of the reasons for persistence of corruption. The analysis reveals that well-informed voters may rationally forego their chance to elect a benevolent government and vote for rent-seeking politicians instead. Whereas most models of the political rent seeking in a federation make assumptions about exogenous and independent levels of capture of the central and regional governments the present paper endogenizes the incidence of corruption in a federation.

We analyze how the cost-effectiveness of R&D influences the incentives for governments to impose export subsidies. Governments first impose an export subsidy, or a tax. After observing export policy, firms invest in cost reducing R&D and subsequently compete in the market. Governments subsidize exports under Cournot competition. Under Bertrand competition and for linear demands and constant marginal costs, export subsidies are positive whenever R&D is sufficiently cost-effective at reducing marginal costs, and negative otherwise. The trade policy reversal found in models without endogenous sunk costs disappears if R&D is sufficiently cost-effective. Thus, output subsidies seem more robust than implied by the recent literature.

This paper uses a two-stage Cournot duopoly model with demand uncertainly to examine the strategic role debt plays in deterring a company from entering when a potential entrant can enter one of several markets. We show that as the number of alternative markets available for entry rises, the incumbents' incentive to use debt as a deterrent falls. Thus, a potential entrant will prefer to have a larger number of alternative markets to enter in order to lower the incumbents' incentive to take strategic actions against it.

This paper quantifies the magnitude and nature of migration flows from the Caribbean and estimates their costs and benefits. The Caribbean countries have lost 10–40 percent of their labor force due to emigration to OECD member countries. The migration rates are particularly striking for the high-skilled labor force. Many countries have lost more than 70 percent of their labor force with more than 12 years of completed schooling—among the highest emigration rates in the world. The region is also the world's largest recipient of remittances as a percent of GDP. Remittances constituted about 13 percent of the region’s GDP in 2002. Simple welfare calculations (under very conservative assumptions of elasticities) suggest that the losses due to high-skill migration (ceteris paribus) outweigh the official remittances to the Caribbean region.

We provide the first historical comparative analysis of the effects of Minimum Legal Drinking Ages (MLDA), beer taxes, and "Zero Tolerance" (ZT) underage drunk driving laws on the drinking behaviors of high school seniors using confidential area-identified data from the 1976-2003 waves of the Monitoring the Future (MTF) Surveys. We estimate reduced form models of drinking participation and heavy episodic drinking that account for state and year fixed effects. Our findings confirm that nationwide increases in the MLDA in the late 1970s and 1980s and adoption of ZT laws in the 1990s both significantly reduced alcohol consumption by high school seniors, with larger effects for the MLDA than for ZT laws. Higher beer taxes are also estimated to reduce youth drinking participation. Overall, the results confirm that a variety of types of government intervention can have important effects on youth alcohol consumption.

According to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), weak environmental policies improve a country's comparative advantage in the polluting sector, thus promoting its expansion. In this paper, we develop a neo-classical general equilibrium model with two goods and two factors and show that the relationship between environmental policies and comparative advantage can be ambiguous. We focus entirely on emission caps or command and control (CAC) programs of regulation and treat abatement as equivalent to a technological retardation. We show that when the technological retardation is Hick neutral, the PHH holds and the Heckscher Ohlin Samuelson (HOS) theorem determines trade patterns between a capital-abundant country and a labor-abundant country that follow different environmental policies. If pollution abatement is capital biased in the polluting sector, the standard trade theorems and the PHH may not hold. The paper derives a sufficient condition under which the PHH would hold. However, if this condition is violated, the PHH as well as the HOS theorem may not hold.

This paper analyzes the effects of human capital on welfare dynamics in Canada using data from the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP). SSP offered a time-limited earnings supplement to a randomly assigned group of new welfare applicants who remained on welfare for one year and, in the subsequent year, left welfare for full-time employment. The results suggest that high school completion has no significant impact on the exit rate from welfare or on the re-entry rate. Moreover, full-time work experience is found to reduce the risk of returning to welfare but not for respondents who were assigned to the treatment group. This finding suggests that the provision of an earnings subsidy encourages welfare recipients to accept low-wage jobs with little gains from work experience. Thus, the rationale for such a policy that work today will raise experience and consequently future wages is not supported by the results in this paper.

This paper revisits the 'jobs versus the environment' debate and provides the first analysis for a country other than the US. We firstly examine the impact of environmental regulations on employment assuming such regulations are exogenous. However, for the first time in a study of this nature, we then allow environmental regulation costs and employment to be endogenously determined. Environmental regulation costs are not found to have a statistically significant effect on employment whether such costs are treated as being exogenous or endogenous. We therefore find no evidence of a trade-off between jobs and the environment.

Does the Internet provide a failsafe against media consolidation in the wake of an easing of media ownership rules? This paper posits a model of news outlet selection on the Internet in which consumers experience cognitive costs that increase with the number of options faced. Consistent with psychological evidence, these costs may be reduced by constraining one's choice set to "safe bets" familiar from offline (e.g., CNN.com). It is shown that, as the number of outlets grows, dispersion of patronage across outlets inevitably declines. Consequently, independent Internet outlets may fail to mitigate lost outlet independence on other media.

Stringent environmental taxes in high-income countries are assumed to drive dirty industries to low-income countries, but the empirical evidence for ``pollution havens" is surprisingly weak. We demonstrate that a government trying to prevent flight by a ``dirty" durable good monopolist can impose an effluent tax that is offset by a lump-sum subsidy so that both firm profits and host-country welfare are increased. The scheme exploits the Coase Conjecture insight: a durable goods monopolist has a time-consistency dilemma that limits its ability to restrict future output. In this environment the effluent tax provides a credible commitment that restricts future supply. We assert that the use of lump-sum subsidies in strategic location competition is consistent with this mechanism, and this paradigm may be an important piece of the ``pollution haven paradox."

Insurance companies, employer pension plans, and the U.S. government all provide annuities and therefore assume aggregate mortality risk. Using the widely-cited Lee-Carter mortality model, we quantify aggregate mortality risk as the risk that the average annuitant lives longer than is predicted by the model, and we determine that annuities expose providers to substantial risk. We also find that other recent actuarial forecasts lie at the edge or outside of Lee-Carter's 95% confidence interval, suggesting even more uncertainty about future mortality.We then evaluate the implications of aggregate mortality risk for insurance companies; this analysis can be extended to private pension providers and Social Security. Given the forecasts of the Lee-Carter model, we calculate that a markup of 3.9% on an annuity premium (or shareholders' capital equal to 3.9% of the expected present value of annuity payments) would be required to reduce the probability of insolvency resulting from aggregate mortality shocks to 5%, and a markup of 5.7% would reduce the probability of insolvency to 1%. Based on the same model, we find that a projection scale commonly referred to by the insurance industry underestimates aggregate mortality improvements and would leave annuities underpriced.Annuity providers could manage aggregate mortality risk more efficiently by transferring it to financial markets through mortality-contingent bonds. We calculate the returns that one recently proposed mortality bond would have paid had it been available over a long period. Using both the Capital and the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Models, we determine the risk premium that investors would have required to hold the bond. At plausible coefficients of risk aversion, annuity providers should be able to hedge aggregate mortality risk via such bonds at very low cost.

This paper uses data from electric guitar auctions on eBay to further examine the impact of reputation on the likelihood that an auction ends in a sale. It extends the existing literature by examining both the impact of the overall eBay feedback rating as well as feedback from shorter time periods. The results of this paper suggest that recent feedback, and in particular recent negative feedback, is of particular importance in explaining the likelihood that an auctioned item sells. Other feedback related factors included in this paper are measures for the source of feedback (i.e. buying or selling behavior) and whether negative feedback is product or seller related.

This study examines the child care "expenditure share," defined as child care expenses divided by after-tax income. We estimate that the average child under six years of age lives in a family that spends 4.9 percent of after-tax income on child care. However, this conceals wide variation: 63 percent of such children reside in families with no child care expenses and 10 percent are in families where the expenditure share exceeds 16 percent. The proportion of income devoted to child care is typically greater in single-parent than married-couple families but is not systematically related to a constructed measure of socioeconomic status. One reason for this is that disadvantaged families use lower cost modes and pay less per hour for given types of care. The expenditure share would be much less equal without low cost (presumably subsidized) formal care focused on needy families, as well as government tax and transfer policies that redistribute income towards them.

To say that financial aid is a key component of the college admissions process is an understatement. For the student and her family, financial aid is a way to afford quality post-secondary education that otherwise may have been unobtainable. For the college, financial aid is a method to compete for the best and brightest students. For policymakers, financial aid is a subsidy for educational expenses where constituencies often differ over its merits. This research attempts to analyze the financial aid process by considering the ability of a student to act strategically. A game-theoretic model developed by Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg (2005) is utilized and evaluated using empirical evidence from the 1996 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS:96). It is shown that a student can maximize her financial aid offer by increasing the number of schools to which she has been accepted after controlling for ability, demographics, state fixed effects and institutional characteristics. A matching estimator to calculate average treatment effects and properly address endogeneity concerns.

This paper features a continuum of firms that apply for a permit and randomly get matched with a potentially corrupt bureaucrat. Although firms have the reporting option, they prefer paying low enough bribes to avoid reporting costs. Hence, full-corruption is the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the value of entry is always negative for the marginal firm. Hence, there will be no entry. If firms are offered sufficiently high rewards for reporting, corruption could be eliminated. However, a reward high enough to uproot corruption would lead to false accusations. Thus, rewarding could help reduce corruption, but only if the market is viable in its absence. The paper also argues that in the presence of corruption, the shadow economy and the official economy are complements. Similarly, formal punishment for corruption and the moral cost of corruption could complement each other.

Does more wealth inequality lead to more inequitable trade policies? To answer this question, this study develops a political economy model of international trade theory and predicts that in a pro-worker regime, an increase in wealth inequality leads to more equitable trade policies. In a pro-capitalist regime, an increase in wealth inequality leads to more inequitable trade policies. Using cross-country data on political ideology, wealth inequality and different measures of trade policies, this paper finds empirical support for these predictions.

Prior to implementation of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), many estimates of the marginal cost of SO2 abatement were provided to guide policy makers. Numerous studies estimated the marginal cost of abatement to be between $250 and $760 per ton, though permits initially traded well below $200 and remained below $220 until 2004. We use a fixed effects estimator and a hedonic price model of coal purchases in order to determine the implicit price of sulfur. Data on contract coal purchases are divided into regulatory regimes based on when the contract was signed or re-negotiated. We find that purchases by Phase I plants made under contracts signed or re-negotiated after the passage of the 1990 CAAA show an implicit price of SO2 of approximately $50 per ton, an amount much closer to the eventual permit price. The implicit market price of sulfur seems to have revealed better information than did the calculations of industry experts.

We analyze allocation of foreign aid to different sectors in a recipient developing country. Donors tend to favor social sectors over other public expenditure programs. Due to incomplete information coordination failure occurs. The donors may concentrate too much on the priority sectors leaving the lower priority, yet important, sectors lacking of funds. Alternatively there may be gaps in services in the priority areas because of the information problem. We find that the more similar preferences the donors have, the more scope there is for coordination failure.

This paper looks at a model in which two countries trade agricultural and manufactured commodities. The manufactured-goods sector produces with increasing returns to scale under conditions of monopolistic competition. It is shown that an increase in land endowment (or an increase in agricultural productivity) can have negative welfare implications for both countries. This outcome can result under three different scenarios: asymmetries across countries, i.e. a North-South model, a neoclassical labor market instead of a Lewisian market in the home country, and alternative utility functions.

Copyright protection can be used to raise entry barriers by impairing the demand. When there is a complementary market in addition to the copyrighted goods market, the incumbent prefers stronger copyright protection than is needed to maximize the sales profit in the primary market. Although strong protection can reduce demand substitution by copies, it makes it more difficult for the entrant to reach a large audience and become established. In some cases, the entrant may choose to opt out of copyright protection.

Donohue and Levitt (2001) attribute over half of the decline in U.S. crime rates during the 1990s to abortion legalization. This paper conducts similar research by exploiting cross-province time-series variation in Canadian data. The use of Canadian data allows me to separate the effects of teenage abortions from general abortion rates. This distinction is important, as more than a quarter of the drop in violent crime can be attributed to the increase in teenage abortions that occurred after legalization. These results suggest that lower crime rates from abortion legalization are due to better timing of births rather than lower cohort size. They are further substantiated by OLS estimates, which imply that the drop in teenage fertility rates during the 1960s and 1970s is responsible for more than half of the decline in violent crime rates witnessed during the 1990s.

We study how local environmental pollution affects spatial patterns of economic activities when workers can migrate. Based on a New Economic Geography model, we analytically characterize the stability conditions for three different types of equilibria: symmetric spreading, partial and full agglomeration. We show that the extent of agglomeration crucially depends on the damages caused by local pollution. We thereby provide a unified framework for discussing different relationships between the extent of agglomeration and trade freeness that have been found in the literature.

Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption shocks. The higher this level of illiquidity insurance the lower the investments in long run assets, and the higher the risk of a bank run generated by a real negative shock. If individuals are sufficiently risk averse, competitive banks trade off liquidity insurance for portfolio risk. High growth expectations, typical of emerging economies, increase the optimal liquidity supply even when this increases the risk of a bank run. On the contrary, deposit contracts offered when economic performances are very uncertain (like in less developed economies), and where output fluctuations are milder (like in developed economies), are less exposed to the risk of a bank run. In this setting, a bail-out in case of crisis is ex-ante Pareto efficient even if it always increases the risk of crisis.

To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in the recent experience of public utilities' regulation, some regulators have introduced a profit-sharing (PS) rule that revises prices to the benefit of consumers. However, in order to be successful, a PS rule should satisfy appropriate incentive conditions.In this paper, we study the incentive properties of a second best PS mechanism designed by the regulator to induce a regulated monopolist to divert its "excessive" profits to the customers. In a real option model where a regulated monopolist manages a long-term franchise contract and the regulator has the option to revoke the contract if there is serious welfare loss, we first endogenously derive the welfare maximising PS rule under the verifiability of profits. We then explore the dynamic efficiency of this PS rule under the non-verifiability of profits and study the firm's incentive to comply with it in an infinite-horizon game. Finally, we derive the price adjustment path which follows the adoption of a PS rule in a price cap regulation.We show that the riskiness of the distribution of the firm's future profits and the regulator's cost in revoking the franchise contract are key factors in determining the equilibrium properties of a dynamic PS rule.

In this study, we draw upon data from the low-income Lifeline Assistance Program (Lifeline) for telephone service to examine the participation of eligible households in social programs designed to alleviate financial hardship. Utilizing panel data on participation levels in 1997 and 2003 and the associated variation in state-level policies, we are able to identify program characteristics that significantly affect participation rates. In particular, we find that participation rates are significantly negatively influenced by limitations that some states place on the ability of Lifeline subscribers to utilize optional calling features such as three-way calling or call forwarding. We also find that program participation is positively influenced by the longevity of the individual state's Lifeline program. While no direct test of state-level advertising is feasible, this result is suggestive of an inter-temporal pattern of information dissemination that grows with program longevity. Because eligibility for the Lifeline service is conditional upon participation in other low-income public programs, we also find that: (1) the larger the number of "portals" (i.e., low income public programs that states identify as creating Lifeline eligibility), the higher is participation; and (2) higher financial benefits of these portal programs attract greater participation in Lifeline programs. These results suggest important linkages that may be exploited through coordination of low-income assistance programs. Finally, we test for, and find that variations in Lifeline benefits significantly influence participation rates.

In this article we present new evidence of cross-border shopping in response to sales taxation. While several instructive studies provide estimates of the cross-border shopping effect, we utilize a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect of a large discrete change in sales tax policy. Using county level data on food sales and sales tax rates for West Virginia over the 1988-1991 period we estimate that for every one-percentage point increase in the county relative price ratio due to the sales tax change, per capita food sales decreased by about 1.38 percent. Our estimates indicate that food sales fell in West Virginia border counties by about eight percent as a result of the imposition of the six percent sales tax on food at the beginning of 1990.