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64 Letter to Fernand Robert, September 29, 1911

  • Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
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Correspondence
This chapter is in the book Correspondence

 

R L 378, Houghton Library. Peirce responded in French to Fernand Robert’s inquiry about his logical writings, despite failing health. He catalogues key publications (1867–1901), highlighting the critiques of Pearson and Fechner and his own work on sensation, colour, and relational algebra. Central is his current project of Logical Critique, divided into three branches: Elements (the study of signs as propositional vehicles), Critic (deductive reasoning, independent of psychology/metaphysics), and Methods of Science (scientific inquiry). Peirce champions his existential graphs as a tool for dissecting deduction, demonstrating its diagrammatic syntax via shaded diagrams that deny or assert identities (e.g., “Every man loves some woman” vs. “Some man loves some woman”). He stresses that mathematical reasoning is a peculiar kind of deduction and that his endoporeutic diagrammatic syntax can help analyse the nature of that peculiarity. The letter draft, never sent, underlines Peirce’s view of logic as a normative science, rooted in diagrammatic clarity and analytic creativity, antagonistic to psychologism; a nearly final plea amid his physical decline for scientific rigor to be exercised in philosophy.

 

R L 378, Houghton Library. Peirce responded in French to Fernand Robert’s inquiry about his logical writings, despite failing health. He catalogues key publications (1867–1901), highlighting the critiques of Pearson and Fechner and his own work on sensation, colour, and relational algebra. Central is his current project of Logical Critique, divided into three branches: Elements (the study of signs as propositional vehicles), Critic (deductive reasoning, independent of psychology/metaphysics), and Methods of Science (scientific inquiry). Peirce champions his existential graphs as a tool for dissecting deduction, demonstrating its diagrammatic syntax via shaded diagrams that deny or assert identities (e.g., “Every man loves some woman” vs. “Some man loves some woman”). He stresses that mathematical reasoning is a peculiar kind of deduction and that his endoporeutic diagrammatic syntax can help analyse the nature of that peculiarity. The letter draft, never sent, underlines Peirce’s view of logic as a normative science, rooted in diagrammatic clarity and analytic creativity, antagonistic to psychologism; a nearly final plea amid his physical decline for scientific rigor to be exercised in philosophy.

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