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55 Letters on Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1900–1902

  • Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
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Correspondence
This chapter is in the book Correspondence

 

R L 385, R L 34, R L 237, Harvard University’s Houghton Library. Box 73, CLFP, Columbia University’s Butler Library. This chapter compiles Peirce’s correspondence with key figures—including Christine Ladd-Franklin, James Mark Baldwin, and Josiah Royce—during his contentious yet immensely productive collaboration on Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. The letters reveal Peirce’s fierce advocacy for his logical innovations, particularly his system of existential graphs and the emerging conception of “exact logic”, against Baldwin’s editorial constraints favouring “generally accepted” views. Peirce defends the ethical imperative of precise terminology and notation, critiques psychological and linguistic biases in logic, and laments the exclusion of his graphical methods. His exchanges with Ladd-Franklin evince deep technical discussions on logical notation, whereas his frustrated missives to Baldwin underscore his commitment to logic as a formal science that must be taught to future generations. These letters illuminate the institutional resistance Peirce faced, his intellectual isolation, and his unwavering dedication to rigor, setting the stage for his later and yet more thorough logical explorations.

 

R L 385, R L 34, R L 237, Harvard University’s Houghton Library. Box 73, CLFP, Columbia University’s Butler Library. This chapter compiles Peirce’s correspondence with key figures—including Christine Ladd-Franklin, James Mark Baldwin, and Josiah Royce—during his contentious yet immensely productive collaboration on Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. The letters reveal Peirce’s fierce advocacy for his logical innovations, particularly his system of existential graphs and the emerging conception of “exact logic”, against Baldwin’s editorial constraints favouring “generally accepted” views. Peirce defends the ethical imperative of precise terminology and notation, critiques psychological and linguistic biases in logic, and laments the exclusion of his graphical methods. His exchanges with Ladd-Franklin evince deep technical discussions on logical notation, whereas his frustrated missives to Baldwin underscore his commitment to logic as a formal science that must be taught to future generations. These letters illuminate the institutional resistance Peirce faced, his intellectual isolation, and his unwavering dedication to rigor, setting the stage for his later and yet more thorough logical explorations.

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