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62 Letters to Samuel Barnett, 1909–1910

  • Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
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Correspondence
This chapter is in the book Correspondence

 

R L 36, Houghton Library; Manuscript Collection No. 505. Emory University’s Stuart A. Rose Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library. This chapter compiles Peirce’s letters to Samuel Barnett, an Atlanta-based scholar, centered on the logical foundations of probability and Peirce’s Doctrine of Chances. Peirce critiques Barnett’s approach to reducing chance to elementary simple principles, arguing that such reduction requires prior grounding in the theory of reasoning, exemplified by his system of existential graphs. He emphasises the need for a rigorous, non-circular definition of probability, one that is demonstrably applicable to real-world contexts such as insurance, and rejects psychological or subjective interpretations. Peirce surveys his own probabilistic works (e.g., critiques of Venn and his Studies in Logic essay) while defending his evolutionary view of natural laws as habits shaped by absolute chance. Barnett emerges as a sounding board for Peirce’s insistence on logic’s analytic use, here to use his existential graphs in particular, in defining the concept of probability in an exact fashion.

 

R L 36, Houghton Library; Manuscript Collection No. 505. Emory University’s Stuart A. Rose Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library. This chapter compiles Peirce’s letters to Samuel Barnett, an Atlanta-based scholar, centered on the logical foundations of probability and Peirce’s Doctrine of Chances. Peirce critiques Barnett’s approach to reducing chance to elementary simple principles, arguing that such reduction requires prior grounding in the theory of reasoning, exemplified by his system of existential graphs. He emphasises the need for a rigorous, non-circular definition of probability, one that is demonstrably applicable to real-world contexts such as insurance, and rejects psychological or subjective interpretations. Peirce surveys his own probabilistic works (e.g., critiques of Venn and his Studies in Logic essay) while defending his evolutionary view of natural laws as habits shaped by absolute chance. Barnett emerges as a sounding board for Peirce’s insistence on logic’s analytic use, here to use his existential graphs in particular, in defining the concept of probability in an exact fashion.

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