Band 16, Heft 1

In recent years, Wittgenstein scholarship has renewed its focus on the relationship between Wittgenstein, modernism, and the arts, with particular emphasis on the aesthetic and modernist value of his early work, the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. Specifically, the paper aims to explore the aesthetic significance of Wittgenstein’s notion of nonsense (Unsinn) and how it can be applied to understanding literary language. The central thesis is that the interpretation of the relationship between nonsense and literary language, as well as its broader implications, shifts depending on the interpretive approach one adopts when reading the Tractatus. Three primary readings have emerged: the ineffability approach, where nonsense is a necessary byproduct of the attempt to speak about what lies beyond the limits of language; the resolute program, which translates the insights of the resolute reading into the aesthetic domain; and the grammatical approach, which considers ‘grammatical’ nonsense as having a fundamentally positive function-insofar as it creatively displays the criteria governing the grammar of our language. Each of these interpretations allows us to understand in different ways how the concept of nonsense can be transformed from a logical limit into an aesthetic resource, significantly affecting our understanding of literary practice. In particular, it will be the insights of the resolute program that will be favored to point to its possible developments in the literary field.

This article aims to challenge the idea that the ‘Middle Wittgenstein’ restricted himself to a so-called ‘calculus’ approach to aesthetics, i. e., to a conception of aesthetic language and judgement as rigidly determined by the rules of ‘autonomous systems’, and thereby allocated only a minor role to human practice and agency. The incompleteness of such a view will be addressed by highlighting the various ‘anthropological’ considerations that guided Wittgenstein’s treatment of aesthetics in his 1933 Cambridge lectures. This will be done by inquiring into his discussions about (1) the word ‘beautiful’. By reflecting on this ‘difficult case’, Wittgenstein came to illustrate the limitations of the calculus approach, anticipate the methods of the Blue Book, and direct his gaze to ‘actual aesthetic controversies and enquiries’, as well as (2) his ‘propaganda for a descriptive rather than explanatory method’ in aesthetics. By critiquing Frazer and the conflation of aesthetics and psychology, Wittgenstein argued for a descriptive aesthetics where perspicuous presentations and a person’s aesthetic puzzlement play a central role. Lastly, (3) Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘ideals’ in aesthetics will be clarified in relation to the judgements and the language of musicians, painters, architects, etc., as well as in relation to our own accounts of aesthetic practices.

According to the doctrine of linguistic idealism in the version discussed here, there is an essential isomorphism between language and the world because the form of language determines the form of the world. In this paper, I will propose an argument in favor of the idealist interpretation of the Tractatus. From an examination of a certain imaginary scenario, I will conclude that the form of objects, that is, the possible combinations of them into facts, is determined by the form of their names, that is, the possible combinations of those names into propositions. Additionally, I will present an interpretation under which Tractarian solipsism is nothing other than a formulation of the idealist conception of the world in first-person terms.

Friedrich Waismann’s views sometimes hide Wittgenstein’s ideas and methods and sometimes they appear mixed with them. In light of the recent literature and guided by a contrasting overview of Waismann’s and Wittgenstein’s published and unpublished works, I argue that underlying Waismann’s variations on themes by Wittgenstein was the logical empiricist aspiration to unify various kinds of knowledge and explain their relative position within the web of science. Waismann’s unique variation of logical empiricism is meant to accommodate Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy in an alternative account of the relative position of logic, mathematics, natural science, ethics, and religion. I intend to delineate some aspects of this ambitious project underlying Waismann’s writings.

The Limits of which Language? Considering Wittgensteinian Epistemologies of Literary Translation in the Encounter with Rabindranath Tagore’s Play The King of the Dark Chamber: In this paper, I attempt to look at Wittgenstein’s commentary on the translatability of literature through the lens of his evolving philosophy of language - and vice versa. The examination is grounded in a close reading of two documents, both relating to the Indian polymath Rabindranath Tagore’s play The King of the Dark Chamber (1910). The first datum is a letter to Paul Engelmann, written in 1921, in which Wittgenstein complains that he perceives a ‘chasm’, possibly the result of an inadequate German translation, between himself and the text; the second, crafted alongside Yorick Smythies in 1939, is a translation of a single pivotal scene from Tagore’s ornate style into a plain, contemporary English. An interpretation of this rendering’s aims and accomplishments suggests a Wittgensteinian approach to literary translation which hinges on a contention somewhat resonant with the play’s mysticism: the profound contingency of the outlook, or aspect, engendered by one’s own language and form of life is impossible to address head-on through saying, but can be shown in the act of translation - if one only finds a way to let a sense of cultural alterity show through the words on the page.

Wittgenstein’s comments on Freud’s work have been widely discussed. Scholars such as Bouveresse (1995) and Cioffi (2009) have explored Wittgenstein’s conception of the unconscious, while McGuinness (2002) examined their intellectual relationship, and Harcourt (2017) addressed Wittgenstein’s ties to psychoanalysis. Despite recent efforts to connect Wittgenstein’s work with psychology, little attention has been given to the subject that intrigued Wittgenstein most: dreams. His interest in hypnotic phenomena and dream interpretation significantly predates his engagement with Freud (cf. Monk 1990; McGuinness 1988). This paper explores Wittgenstein’s engagement with dreams, primarily as reflected in his “Conversations on Freud”. This analysis will address issues related to the philosophy of science-such as evidence, explanation, and justification-as well as key concerns in Wittgenstein’s work, including his concept of meaning as use and his notion of change of aspect. While Wittgenstein ultimately rejected Freud’s theory due to its scientific and philosophical shortcomings, his admiration for it mirrored his regard for Darwin and Copernicus: not flawless, but profoundly generative.

Wittgenstein on the Recognition of Others: Doubt about the possibility of knowledge that could be expressed by saying “I know that …” - regardless of whether this concerns objects of the so-called external world, the meaning of expressions or the mental life of other people - pervades all of Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that doubt about the possibility of knowledge is at the center of Wittgenstein’s philosophy because he conceives doubt about the possibility of knowledge - both in its skeptical and anti-skeptical form - to consist in a radical denial of the human form of life that threatens this form of life from within. Skeptical doubt - and thus the denial of the human - represents a way of inhabiting the human form of life that this form of life cannot prevent. Rather, the possibility of denying the human form of life shows that the human form of life is dependent upon a form of “knowledge of itself” without which it cannot be what it is.

I consider two examples of experiences of being struck by thoughts that, upon initial reflection, both speakers suspect to be thoughts they must have surely already been previously aware of. The first is Allison Hope’s description of the thought, in the midst of the global coronavirus pandemic, “I could easily die sooner than later”. The second is Martin Gustafsson’s description of the thought, in relation to his then one-year-old daughter, “She is going to survive me”. Gustafsson draws on the work of both Ludwig Wittgenstein and Cora Diamond to describe his experience of the thought that struck him as both “unfathomable” to doubt, and as the kind of thought that involves “one’s whole view of, and mode of being in the world”. Though not explicitly mentioned by Gustafsson, I suggest there are important similarities between his description and some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty, and that these similarities can also be seen in Hope’s case. This leads me to suggest that both Hope’s and Gustafsson’s experiences are instances of fundamental moral change that go beyond Wittgenstein’s “river-bed” metaphor as it is ordinarily understood. I suggest this insight highlights important differences between an account of moral certainty and moral change exemplified by Hope and Gustafsson, and the account of moral change developed by proponents of what I call the dominant reading of moral certainty, and their use of Wittgenstein’s “river-bed” metaphor.

Following Robert Fogelin’s “The Logic of Deep Disagreement” (2005), the Wittgensteinian idea of deep disagreement has gathered considerable attention. Philosophers have mostly engaged with the implications of deep disagreement in epistemological discussions. Religious beliefs are usually used as examples in discussions of deep disagreement. This paper will focus on deep moral disagreement between theistic and atheistic frameworks. Three ways deep moral disagreement between theists and atheists could be accounted for will be identified. Deep moral disagreements could take place because of moral hinges or non-moral hinges or could be accounted for in meta-ethical terms. Given the interconnectedness of hinges, singling out a moral hinge and discussing the deep disagreement between theists and atheists based on that hinge could be misleading. To make this point, I will focus on the idea of moral certainty presented and discussed by Nigel Pleasants (2008, 2009, 2015). Finally, the account of moral certainty presented by Pleasants will be challenged by examining divine command theory.

In 2022-2024, on the initiative of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, a project was undertaken to digitally remake all the drawings in the Nachlass. The objective was to “normalise” them in a way similar to that in which text is normalised when transcribing and editing a manuscript for publication. Thanks to a cooperation between the directors of the WAB and two graphic artists, with further input from many experts, the approximately 1000 drawings were copied from facsimiles of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts as highquality vector images. Before and during this process, discussions were had about technical choices as well as the philosophical role of individual items, the interpretation of which affected the way they were redrawn. The resulting visuals were embedded in the WAB’s transcriptions of the Nachlass; moreover, a dedicated Wittgenstein Nachlass Graphics website was built to make the new, freely-licenced drawings available to browse, download and search by taxonomical tags. This paper aims to give an account of the project’s history and editorial approach and to provide technical guidance on how to use the graphic files and the website through which they are made available.

Text and Context: Wittgenstein and His Time: This paper examines the relationship between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the socio-cultural context of his time, specifically within the milieu of Viennese Modernity around 1900. The investigation is rooted in the growing scholarly interest in understanding Wittgenstein’s work in light of his cultural environment. Central to this analysis is the Viennese response to the dissolution of traditional value systems, the rise of identity crises, and the emergence of holistic responses by intellectuals to address perceived cultural and social fragmentation. Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections, marked by a critical stance toward Western civilization’s progressive and mechanistic outlook, resonate with broader critiques of modernity from contemporaries like Karl Kraus or Oswald Spengler. The study traces Wittgenstein’s alignment with cultural pessimism and anti-technological sentiments, his conception of ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’, and his critique of ‘progress’ as mere accumulation without essence. Wittgenstein’s remarks on clarity as a philosophical goal are contrasted with the relentless pursuit of external achievements in modern civilization. The paper focuses on how Wittgenstein’s thoughts also align with a broader intellectual movement in Vienna and Central Europe around 1900 that sought to preserve internal cultural values amidst the external forces of civilization and modernization.

Why Art and Philosophy in Times of Cultural Decadence (“Unkultur”)? Starting from Wittgenstein’s critical remarks on modern civilization in the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, I will discuss the reasons which might have led to his critical, even pessimistic view of his time. These reasons are to be found in an ever-increasing and unscrupulous striving for progress and profit while lacking any ethical consciousness, let alone any religious awareness. In order to present my assumptions, I will discuss the example of a letter-fragment presumably written by Wittgenstein in 1925. In this text his very personal and pessimistic attitude towards both culture and science of modern civilization is more than obvious. At the same time Wittgenstein emphasizes the significance of real “Geistigkeit” which he associates with white and pure light, thus with “transparency”. In this sense he distinguishes between those people who engage in art or science in a superficial way, unaware of an ethical and religious consciousness, and those who create their works in view of something higher viz the so-called “pure” light - in other words “sub specie aeternitatis”. In view of the decline of culture and thus lack of truthfulness and authenticity, the question arises as to whether art and philosophy can contribute to a change of mankind by realizing the significance of ethics in their way of life.

“I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.” Does Wittgenstein offer a religious critique of progress? This article examines Ludwig Wittgenstein’s critique of the modern ideology of progress and its relation to religion. Wittgenstein, having a deep interest in the Christian religion, sees his philosophical quest for clarity as a self-sufficient ethical act, rather than a means to an end, and understands this attitude not only as fundamentally opposed to modernity, but also as ‘religious’ in some sense. Against first appearances, however, Wittgenstein’s criticism of modernity cannot be attributed to a Christian-conservative type. His decidedly anti-dogmatic understanding of the Christian religion, mainly shaped by dissident Christian thinkers such as Tolstoi and Kierkegaard, is anything but traditional. The article concludes by suggesting that Wittgenstein’s ideas of Christianity and of being ‘religious’, though ethically powerful, remain disengaged from the habitual, ritual and narrative character of lived Christian practice.

Wittgenstein’s ‘redemptive words’: Wittgenstein uses expressions such as ‚Erlösung” or ‚erlösende Worte‘ (‘redemption’ or ‘redemptive words’) in various places. Yet, there are not too many such passages, and those that do exist hardly refer to each other; they also belong to different creative periods and concern different subjects. - What one might call ‘the unity in the various relevant statements’ is therefore not obvious. It can be of quite different kinds in different creative periods, and in the end must consist in nothing more than the fact that they are Wittgenstein’s utterances. Here, they are ordered around the ideas of the Abhandlung being highly systematic, and the later philosophical remarks being connected via the concept of family resemblance. In both cases, Wittgenstein’s philosophy might be called ‘Philosophie der Erlösung’, though in each case in a different, yet related sense.

Wittgenstein on the formation of concepts: This article envisages Wittgenstein‘ s account of concepts from a somewhat unusual angle. Instead of directly addressing the topic of ‛family resemblance’, it rather targets a misleading philosophical picture of concepts. According to this picture, concepts have ‛counterparts’ contained in the things that fall under them (§1). It is in the course of a critique of this idea that Wittgenstein introduces an alternative view of concepts that is guided by the picture of family resemblances (§2). However, attempts to spell-out a family resemblant conception of concepts have long been known to be subject to the so-called problem of ‛wide open texture’. According to this problem, extending a concept in a way that is guided by resemblances between its instances threatens its content with arbitrariness (§3). Examining existing solutions, the article provides a view of concepts as neither determined by how things are nor as merely contingent expressions of historically changeable speaker dispositions (§§4-5). Rather, concepts are shown to be logical achievements whose expansion in the face of unprecedented circumstances brings about an increase of knowledge that is reflected in them (§§6-7). It is then argued that the logico-epistemic dimension of our use of concept words is interspersed with contingent features which might conceal their rational form (§8). The article ends with remarks that seek to exhibit the account of concepts presented before as a foil of Wittgenstein‘s critique of culture (§9).