Abstract: This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric
Bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent, then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the literature on global games, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The game satisfies the assumptions of Van Zandt and Vives (2007). It follows that there are least and greatest equilibria and these are monotone. Since the game is symmetric these must be symmetric. For if, say
is the least equilibrium in cutoff strategies, then
must also be the least equilibrium by symmetry. Hence,
. To prove the result it is therefore sufficient to show that any symmetric equilibrium in cutoff strategies has the desired properties.
The interim payoff to player i at cutoff k from choosing action 1 rather than 0 is
![[30]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq30.png)
On the other hand, since
and
are strictly increasing and continuous, so uniformly continuous on
, for any
, one can find
so that
![[31]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq31.png)
From Assumption 4, an equilibrium cutoff k must belong to the compact interval
in the interior of
. Applying 2, proved below,
is uniformly close to
for all
for large enough
, so applying this to [31], one obtains that for all
greater than some
for 
![[32]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq32.png)
Hence, for
any symmetric equilibrium cutoff must belong to
, which proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows the lines indicated in the text. By letting u be its mid-point, any open interval in the interior of
can be written as
. It will be shown that for any such interval
![[33]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq33.png)
Since
converges to
, the associated measures converge in distribution, so the measure under
of any set whose boundary has measure zero under M converges to that under M (see Billingsley (1995, Theorem 29.1)). In particular, the areas of the rectangles
and
converge to their areas under M, since M is concentrated on the diagonal and is atomless. On the other hand,
, so as argued in the text,
converges to
, which, together with symmetry, establishes [33].
Suppose now that
does not converge pointwise to
for some u in the interior of
. If, say,
, then one can find a subsequence
, with
with
. In particular, given
with
,
for all n greater than some N. Since
is increasing
for all
if
. This, however, contradicts [33]: consider an interval
,
– from what has been shown on the left hand-side of [33] is bounded above by
for all
. Similarly, if
, then
for all
for all sufficiently large
, which leads to a contradiction of [33]. It follows that
. A similar argument shows that
, so
indeed converges to
.
To prove uniform convergence, let
be a closed interval in the interior of
. Since
converges to
at u, given
one can find
such that
for all
. Similarly, given
, one can find
such that
for all
. Let
. Since
is increasing,
for all
if
. This implies the stated uniform convergence.21
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 1 with
replacing
. Since
converges uniformly to
, given
, one can find
such that [31] holds for
for all large enough
. Similarly, since Assumption 4 holds for
, one can find a compact interval T in the interior of
such that for all large enough
, equilibrium cutoffs must belong to T. The remainder of the proof is as before with
replacing
.
Proof of Theorem 3
By Assumption 13, interim payoffs can be uniformly approximated by [30], replacing
by
. The proof then proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 1 replacing
by
.
Proof of Lemma 4
![[34]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq34.png)
Now
![[35]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq35.png)
as
since
for any x,
, and
as F is a joint distribution function.22 In the case
(or mutatis mutandis with inequalities reversed) note that
and
as
is the marginal distribution of the first component.
So, by the dominated convergence theorem
![[36]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq36.png)
The last equality holds since G is increasing.
Now
![[37]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq37.png)
So, by a similar argument as above
![[38]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq38.png)
Now, G is strictly increasing on its support, as g is strictly positive, and so it follows that
is continuous. Hence, it follows from van der Vaart (1998, 305, Lemma 21.2) that
![[39]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq39.png)
where
is defined as in [5]. Since from [4]
![[40]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq40.png)
![[41]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq41.png)
as was to be shown.
Proof of Lemma 5
Parts (a) and (b) were proven in the text. For part (c), note from the discussion in Sections 4 and 5 that part (iii) of Assumption 5 is equivalent to the assertion that the distribution of
dominates that of
and
in the likelihood ratio order.
Now
![[42]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq42.png)
under [25].
The density function of
is
![[43]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0012/asset/graphic/bejte-2012-0012_eq43.png)
where h and H are the density and distribution functions of the
(assumed identically distributed).
clearly dominates each
in the likelihood ratio order.
According to Theorem 2.1(d) of Keilson and Sumita (1982), if
and
are two random variables such that
dominates
in the likelihood ratio order and
has a log-concave density function and is independent of
and
, then
dominates
in the likelihood ratio order. Taking
and
,
proves the result since
and from [42],
.
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- 1
The body of their paper considers common values but, as they note, their arguments extend to the case of private values, as in this example.
- 2
This is shown formally in Section 7.2.
- 3
One can of course always write
, where
, but in general the
will not be independent of t nor will
enter multiplying
. - 4
See Nelsen (2006, Section 2.3) for a proof.
- 5
see for example Billingsley (1995, Exercise 14.3).
- 6
See for example Joe (1997, Exercise 2.10, 54).
- 7
See for example, Müller and Stoyan (2002, Theorem 3.8.2). Note, however, that this equivalence does not hold in more than two dimensions and that the definition of the concordance order needs to be adapted in higher dimensions – see Müller and Stoyan (2002, Chapter 3). This definition of the supermodular ordering is analogous to that of first-order stochastic dominance, which imposes the condition that u be increasing rather than supermodular.
- 8
See for example Joe (1997, 140–42) for these facts. Note that he refers to the Clayton copula as the Kimeldorf–Sampson copula.
- 9
See for example Morris and Shin (2003).
- 10
See Müller and Scarsini (2005, Theorem 2.8(d)) and note that they define an Archimedean copula to have form the
. - 11
Indeed, as Nelsen et al. (2008, 480) note it holds for all but one copula (4.2.18) in the table of 22 Archimedean copulas on pp. 116–118 of Nelsen (2006).
- 12
See, for example, Müller and Stoyan (2002, 12, Theorem 1.4.4) for a proof that the likelihood ratio order is stronger than first-order stochastic dominance.
- 13
In the language of functional analysis, without it, the argument shows that
converges weakly to the constant function
, that is
for every interval, and by an approximation argument any set S, in the interior of
. In general, weak convergence does not imply pointwise convergence. - 14
Convexity is not however invariant to monotone transformations of the dependent variables, so
need not be convex in s even if
is convex in u. - 15
See for example Billingsley (1995, Exercise 14.8).
- 16
See for example Appendix D of Krishna (2002).
- 17
This is true even if the signals are transformed to have uniform marginals.
- 18
See Milgrom and Weber (1982, Theorem 3).
- 19
Note that since
and, if the joint distribution has a density,
,
cannot be decreasing everywhere but it is enough that it be outside the dominance regions, since equilibrium cutoffs must lie outside them. - 20
It is easy to see that the argument in the proof of 2 would also go through if
were decreasing, although in this case, equilibrium is unique for finite
by the argument above. As noted in Section 5, the assumption of monotonicity of
may not be necessary. - 21
The result also follows from the standard result that if a sequence of monotonic functions converges uniformly to a monotonic function F at each point of continuity of F, then convergence is uniform on each compact interval of continuity of F (see for example Doob (1994, 166) but the direct proof is easy, so is given.
- 22
See for example Billingsley (1995, 260).
©2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston
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- Masthead
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- Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games
- Monopolistic Signal Provision†
- Multi-task Research and Research Joint Ventures
- Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
- A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value
- On the Difference between Social and Private Goods
- Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly
- Labor Market and Search through Personal Contacts
- Contributions
- Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information
- Are Trust and Reciprocity Related within Individuals?
- Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs
- Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent
- Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector
- Topics
- Poverty Orderings with Asymmetric Attributes
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
- When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry?
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
- Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Masthead
- Advances
- Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games
- Monopolistic Signal Provision†
- Multi-task Research and Research Joint Ventures
- Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
- A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value
- On the Difference between Social and Private Goods
- Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly
- Labor Market and Search through Personal Contacts
- Contributions
- Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information
- Are Trust and Reciprocity Related within Individuals?
- Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs
- Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent
- Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector
- Topics
- Poverty Orderings with Asymmetric Attributes
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
- When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry?
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
- Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations