Abstract
We provide new evidence about a positive correlation between the own amount sent and the own amount returned in the investment game. Our analysis relies on the experimental data collected under the strategy method. While the percentage returned is independent of the amount received for most of our subjects, it is strongly correlated to their amount sent as a trustor. Our analysis is based on a two-way classification of subjects: according to their trusting type and according to their reciprocal type. We show the existence of a strong positive relation between trusting types and reciprocal types within subjects.
Appendix
Average sent amounts according to demographic variables.
Gender | # | Mean | St. dev. |
Female | 45 | 4.56 | 2.53 |
Male | 28 | 5.96 | 3.02 |
Total | 73 | 5.10 | 2.79 |
Academic major | |||
Economics | 2 | 6.50 | 4.95 |
Law | 14 | 6.36 | 2.65 |
Engineering | 20 | 4.95 | 2.86 |
Human arts | 37 | 4.62 | 2.67 |
Total | 73 | 5.10 | 2.79 |
Live with par. | |||
No | 19 | 4.89 | 2.28 |
Yes | 54 | 5.17 | 2.97 |
Total | 73 | 5.10 | 2.79 |
Academic year | |||
1 | 14 | 3.71 | 2.33 |
2 | 20 | 4.40 | 2.54 |
3 | 10 | 5.40 | 3.03 |
4 | 15 | 5.87 | 2.59 |
5 | 14 | 6.43 | 3.06 |
Total | 73 | 5.10 | 2.79 |
Age | |||
–20 | 23 | 4.04 | 2.53 |
21–22 | 25 | 5.40 | 2.71 |
23– | 25 | 5.76 | 2.93 |
Total | 73 | 5.10 | 2.79 |
Pocket money | |||
0–5000 | 36 | 4.75 | 2.47 |
5,001–10,000 | 24 | 5.46 | 3.09 |
10,001– | 13 | 5.38 | 3.18 |
Total | 73 | 5.10 | 2.79 |
ANOVA-tests for demographic variables.
Grouping variable | F-statistics | p |
Gender | 4.605 | 0.035 |
Age | 2.595 | 0.112 |
Academic year | 2.461 | 0.121 |
Academic major | 1.525 | 0.221 |
Pocket money | 0.540 | 0.465 |
Live with parents | 0.131 | 0.718 |
Regression coefficient of returned percentage according to individual standard error categories.
Individual st. error (%) | # | Constant | Own trust (Ti) | s | R2 (%) | p |
0–10 | 16 | 0.2513 | 0.029 | 0.028 | 88.13 | 0.000 |
10.1–20 | 12 | 0.2315 | 0.028 | 0.063 | 58.56 | 0.002 |
20.1–30 | 15 | 0.2088 | 0.040 | 0.107 | 60.09 | 0.001 |
30.1–50 | 10 | 0.3796 | 0.006 | 0.155 | 0.74 | 0.788 |
50.1– | 14 | 0.2420 | 0.032 | 0.342 | 7.88 | 0.328 |
Significant regression coefficients of returned percentages in case of all possible received amounts.
Independent variables (€) | Received amounts | |||||||||
3 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 24 | 27 | 30 | |
Constant | 0.287 | 0.322 | 0.316 | 0.279 | 0.256 | 0.229 | 0.221 | 0.202 | 0.194 | 0.188 |
Own trust (Ti) | 0.016 | 0.019 | 0.021 | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.035 | 0.035 | 0.038 | 0.040 | 0.041 |
s | 0.228 | 0.196 | 0.176 | 0.196 | 0.198 | 0.186 | 0.182 | 0.176 | 0.180 | 0.192 |
R2 (%) | 3.4 | 6.6 | 9.4 | 13.6 | 14.8 | 21.2 | 21.9 | 25.8 | 26.6 | 25.7 |
p | 0.137 | 0.036 | 0.012 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Distribution of returned percentages according to the subjects’ trust category and reciprocity profile.
References
Altmann, S., T. Dohmen, and M. Wibral. 2008. “Do the Reciprocal Trust Less?” Economic Letters 99 (3):454–7.10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.012Search in Google Scholar
Andreoni, J. 1990. “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving.” The Economic Journal 100 (401):464–77.10.2307/2234133Search in Google Scholar
Ashraf, N., I. Bohnet, and N. Piankov. 2006. “Decomposing Trust and Trustworthiness.” Experimental Economics 9:193–208.10.1007/s10683-006-9122-4Search in Google Scholar
Barr, A. 2003. “Trust And Expected Trustworthiness: Experimental Evidence from Zimbabwean Villages.” The Economic Journal 113:614–30.10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00150Search in Google Scholar
Bellemare, C., and S. Kröger. 2007. “On Representative Social Capital.” European Economic Review 51 (1):183–202.10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.03.006Search in Google Scholar
Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe. 1995. “Trust, Reciprocity and Social History.” Games and Economic Behaviour 10:122–42.10.1006/game.1995.1027Search in Google Scholar
Bohnet, I., and R. Zeckhauser. 2004. “Trust, Risk and Betrayal.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 55 (4):467–84.10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.004Search in Google Scholar
Bolton, G.E., and A. Ockenfels. 2000. “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition.” American Economic Review 90:166–93.10.1257/aer.90.1.166Search in Google Scholar
Bornhorst, F., A. Ichino, O. Kirchkamp, K. Schlag, and E. Winter. 2009. “Similarities and Differences When Building Trust: The Role of Cultures.” Working Paper.10.1007/s10683-010-9240-xSearch in Google Scholar
Chaudhuri, A., and L. Gangadharan. 2007. “An Experimental Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness.” Southern Economic Journal 73 (4):959–85.10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00813.xSearch in Google Scholar
Cox, J. 2002. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Other-Regarding Preferences: Groups vs. Individuals and Males vs. Females.” In Experimental Business Research, edited by R. Zwick and A. Rapoport, Chapter 14, 331–49. New York: Kluwer.10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_14Search in Google Scholar
Cox, J. 2004. “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity.” Games and Economic Behaviour 46:260–81.10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00119-2Search in Google Scholar
Csukás, Cs., P. Fracalanza, T. Kovács, and M. Willinger. 2008. “The Determinants of Trusting and Reciprocal Behaviour: Evidence from an Intercultural Experiment.” Journal of Economic Development 33:71–95.10.35866/caujed.2008.33.1.004Search in Google Scholar
Dufwenberg, M., and U. Gneezy. 2000. “Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game.” Games and Economic Behaviour 30:163–82.10.1006/game.1999.0715Search in Google Scholar
Ermisch, J., D. Gambetta, H. Laurie, T. Siedler, and N. Uhrig. 2007. “Measuring People’s Trust.” ISER Working Paper 2007–32.Search in Google Scholar
Fehr, E., and K.M. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:817–68.10.1162/003355399556151Search in Google Scholar
Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher, B. von Rosenbladt, J. Schupp, and G. Wagner. 2003. “A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys.” IZA Discussion Paper, No. 715.Search in Google Scholar
Fröhlich, W.D. 1994. Wörterbuch zur Psychologie, 303. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH.Search in Google Scholar
Gaechter, S., B. Herrmann, and C. Thoeni. 2004. “Trust, Voluntary Cooperation, and Socio-Economic Background: Survey and Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 55:505–31.10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.006Search in Google Scholar
Gambetta, D. 1988. “Can We trust Trust?” in D. Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, 213–37. New York: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Glaeser, E.L., D.I. Laibson, J.A. Scheinkman, and C.L. Soutter. 2000. “Measuring Trust.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3):811–46.10.1162/003355300554926Search in Google Scholar
Greig, F., and I. Bohnet. 2008. “Is There Reciprocity in a Reciprocal-Exchange Economy? Evidence of Gendered Norms from a Slum in Nairobi, Kenya.” Economic Inquiry 46 (1):77–83.10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00081.xSearch in Google Scholar
Gueth, W., M. Königstein, N. Marchand, and K. Nehring. 2000. “Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Game with Indirect Reward.” Homo Oeconomicus XVIII (2):241–62.Search in Google Scholar
Hardin, R. 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russel Sage.10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_383Search in Google Scholar
Holm, H.J., and A. Danielson. 2005. “Tropic Trust versus Nordic Trust: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania and Sweden.” Economic Journal 115 (503):505–32.10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.00998.xSearch in Google Scholar
Holm, H., and P. Nystedt. 2008. “Trust in Surveys and Games – A Methodological Contribution on the Influence of Money and Location.” Journal of Economic Psychology 29 (4):522–42.10.1016/j.joep.2007.07.010Search in Google Scholar
Johansson-Stenman, O., M. Mahmud, and P. Martinsson. 2005a. “Does Stake-Size Matter in the Trust Game?” Economic Letters 88 (3):365–9.10.1016/j.econlet.2005.03.007Search in Google Scholar
Johansson-Stenman, O., M. Mahmud, and P. Martinsson. 2005b. “Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust – Evidence from a Field Experiment in Bangladesh.” Scandinavian Working Paper 166.Search in Google Scholar
Karlan, D. 2005. “Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions.” American Economic Review 95 (5):1688–99.10.1257/000282805775014407Search in Google Scholar
McMahon, F.B., and J.W. McMahon. 1982. Psychology: The Hybrid Science, 541–2. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.Search in Google Scholar
Naef, M., and J. Schupp. 2009. “Can We Trust the Trust Game? A Comprehensive Examination.” Discussion Paper Series, 2009–5, Royal Holloway College.Search in Google Scholar
Priddy, R.C. 1999. “Perception of Reality and Projection.” The Human Whole, Chapter 11. http://home.no.net/rrpriddy/psySearch in Google Scholar
Rotter, J. 1980. “Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness and Gullibility.” American Psychologist 35:1–7.10.1037/0003-066X.35.1.1Search in Google Scholar
Sapienza, P., L. Guiso, and L. Zingales. 2008. “Alfred Marshall Lecture – Social Capital as Good Culture.” Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (2–3):295–320.10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.295Search in Google Scholar
Schotter, A., and B. Sopher. 2006. “Trust and Trustworthiness in Games: An Experimental Study of Intergenerational Advice.” Experimental Economics 9 (2):123–45.10.1007/s10683-006-5386-ySearch in Google Scholar
Straker, D. 2004. “Explanations of Coping Mechanisms.” changingminds.orgSearch in Google Scholar
van der Heijden, E., J. Potters, J. Nelissen, and H. Verbon. 2001. “Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory.” Economic Inquiry 39:280–97.10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00066.xSearch in Google Scholar
Willinger, M., C. Keser, C. Lohmann, and J. Usunier. 2003. “A Comparison of Trust and Reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental Investigation Based on the Investment Game.” Journal of Economic Psychology 24:447–66.10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00165-4Search in Google Scholar
Wittig, A.F., and G. Williams. 1984. Psychology: An Introduction, 427–8. New York: McGraw-Hill.Search in Google Scholar
Yamagishi, T., and M. Yamagishi. 1994. “Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan.” Motivation and Emotion 18 (2):129–66.10.1007/BF02249397Search in Google Scholar
- 1
The standard trust question of the General Society Survey (GSS) and European Social Survey (ESS round 4) is phrased as follows: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The percentage of “yes” answers is taken as a crude measure of trustfulness in the studied sample (in more recent versions respondents are asked to provide a rating between 0 and 10). Two additional questions are used to measure social confidence: “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?”, and “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?”, and respondents are asked to provide a rating between 0 and 10.
- 2
See also Naef and Schupp (2009).
- 3
For instance, Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, and Martinsson (2005a) showed that increasing the stakes in the investment game reduces significantly the proportion of the endowment sent by the trustor.
- 4
Barr (2003) found a positive relation between the amount sent (s) by the trustor and the percentage returned by the trustee (r/s): an increase in r/s leads to an increase in s (while r/s is independent of s in the regression of r/s with respect to s).
- 5
They rely on OLS and force the constant to be zero.
- 6
The experiment started with 74 participants, who were equally split between room I and II, which means 37 subjects in each room. However, during the experiment one participant stopped reading and filling the questionnaires and left the room. Since at this point there was an odd number of participants, one randomly selected B player was actually matched with two A players in order to determine the final payoff of the remaining A player. The selected player B received his payoff according to the decision of the first player A. This had no influence on our data, although it affected the final payoff of one of the A players.
- 7
Based on a two-tailed t-test, as we did not have the individual data of BDMc.
- 8
We provide summary results for the amount sent according to demographic variables in Tables 6 and 7 (see supplementary material). As Table 6 shows the sample was well balanced according to gender, age, academic year, and all other demographic variables, from which only gender appeared as a significant variable determining sent amount.
- 9
The total number of participants was 73, but six observations had to be excluded from the sample because their second mover profile was incomplete.
- 10
The relative standard errors in Table 8 are calculated as the relative difference between the average returned percentage of an individual and the returned percentage estimated by regression [1] for the same individual. This way the participants with very similar individual standard errors were classified into the same cluster and we could set up more particular regressions for the five clusters of subjects. However, the coefficients of the significant regressions are in line with the one we found in Table 1.
- 11
The precondition for these t-tests in case of small samples is equality of variances. The F-statistics reveals no significant differences (5% level) between each pair of the categories.
- 12
The Cramer measure calculated from Table 5 also shows a medium strength relation between the two variables (C
0.35). We take this as further evidence that trusting behaviour and trustworthiness are correlated within individuals.
©2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Masthead
- Advances
- Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games
- Monopolistic Signal Provision†
- Multi-task Research and Research Joint Ventures
- Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
- A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value
- On the Difference between Social and Private Goods
- Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly
- Labor Market and Search through Personal Contacts
- Contributions
- Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information
- Are Trust and Reciprocity Related within Individuals?
- Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs
- Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent
- Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector
- Topics
- Poverty Orderings with Asymmetric Attributes
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
- When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry?
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
- Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Masthead
- Advances
- Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games
- Monopolistic Signal Provision†
- Multi-task Research and Research Joint Ventures
- Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
- A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value
- On the Difference between Social and Private Goods
- Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly
- Labor Market and Search through Personal Contacts
- Contributions
- Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information
- Are Trust and Reciprocity Related within Individuals?
- Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs
- Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent
- Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector
- Topics
- Poverty Orderings with Asymmetric Attributes
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
- When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry?
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
- Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations