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Public debt in an OLG model with imperfect competition: long-run effects of austerity programs and changes in the growth rate

  • Peter Skott EMAIL logo and Soon Ryoo
Published/Copyright: August 5, 2014

Abstract

In this paper we consider a modified version of Diamond’s OLG model. We show, first, that dynamic inefficiency may be relevant when the presence of imperfect competition is taken into account. Second, if fiscal policy is used to avoid inefficiency and maintain an optimal capital intensity, the required debt ratio will be inversely related to the growth rate. Third, austerity policies – reductions in government consumption and entitlement programs for the old generation – raise the required debt ratio.

JEL classification: E62; E22

Corresponding author: Peter Skott, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA, and Aalborg University, e-mail:

Appendix A: Existence and stability of steady states

Existence To see the existence of the solution to (24), let us define

(A1)f(R)s[(εε1)11γα11γσγ1γR11γR]1n (A1)

where R=r+δ. We then have two cases:

  1. 0≤γ≤1: f(0)<0, limRf(R)→∞ and f(R) is continuous. Therefore there exists R∈(0, ∞) such that f(R)=0. The convexity of f(R) ensures the uniqueness.

  2. γ<0: f(0)<0, limRf(R)→–∞ and f(R) is continuous. f(R) is concave and initially increasing but decreasing eventually. Therefore if σ is sufficiently large (for given values of ε and α), there exist two distinct roots, namely, R1 and R2 with R1<R2. Note that the concavity of f(R) implies

    (A2)f(R1)=s[11γ(1+1+nsR1)1]>0 (A2)
    (A3)f(R2)=s[11γ(1+1+nsR2)1]<0 (A3)

Stability The left-hand and the right-hand side of (23) are strictly decreasing in rt+1 and rt, respectively. Thus, (23) implies that rt+1 is strictly increasing in rt, i.e., drt+1/drt>0 for all rt. It follows that a fixed point of (23) is locally stable if and only if drt+1/drt<1 at the point.

rt+1 is a decreasing function of Kt+1/Lt+1. To show that drt+1/drt<1 at a stationary point is therefore equivalent to showing that d(Kt+1/Kt)/drt is positive. Intuitively, at a steady state the capital stock grows at the same rate as the labor force; the steady state is stable if a value of r above the steady growth solution (corresponding to a K/L below the equilibrium) generates a growth rate of the capital that exceeds the growth rate of the labor force. We have

(A4)Kt+1Kt=s(wt+πt)LtKt=s[(εε1)11γα11γσγ1γ(rt+δ)11γ(rt+δ)]=f(rt+δ)+1+n (A4)

The stability results now follow from the properties of the f–function (see above): (i) if 0≤γ≤1, the unique stationary solution is stable; (ii) if γ<0, the low solution for r is locally stable and the high solution is unstable.

Appendix B: Effects of a rise in the markup

Re-stating equation (24) we have

1+n=s[(εε1)11γα11γσγ1γ(r+δ)11γ(r+δ)]

By the implicit function theorem,

d(r+δ)d(εε1)=11γ(εε1)11γ1(r+δ)11γ11γ(εε1)11γ(r+δ)11γ1α11γσγ1γ<0

Hence,

d[εε1(r+δ)]d(εε1)=r+δ+εε1d(r+δ)d(εε1)=(r+δ)α11γσγ1γ(r+δ)11γ(εε1)11γ(r+δ)11γα11γσγ1γ(r+δ)<0

Appendix C: The Leontief case

If γ→–∞, the production function converges to the Leontief form,

(C1)yjt=min{σkjt,λljt} (C1)

In order for full-employment growth to be technically feasible, the aggregate capital stock must grow at least as fast as the labor force when all output is being invested. Algebraically,

σKtYt(n+δ)Kt

or

(C2)σn+δ (C2)

This technical feasibility condition is necessary but not sufficient. With a logarithmic utility function and a saving rate of 1/(2+ρ), the parameters need to satisfy the more restrictive condition

sYt=Yt2+ρKt+1=(1+n)Kt1+nσYt

or

(C3)σ(1+n)(2+ρ) (C3)

The economy has two steady growth paths. There is a full-utilization path with σkjt=λljt=yjt, Kt=(λ/σ)Lt and ct=wtλ+rt+δσ. Along this path the pricing equation (11) takes the form 1=pt=pjt=εε1(wtλ+rt+δσ); the real wage and the amount of profits are given by wt=λ(11ε)λrt+δσ and πt=λε, respectively. Using these expressions, equation (22) can be written as

(C4)Kt+1Lt=Kt+1Lt+1(1+n)=λσ(1+n)=s(wt+πt)=s[λλrt+δσ] (C4)

Solving (C4) for the rate of interest and substituting the result back into the factor-price frontier, we have:[13]

(C5)r+δ=σ(2+ρ)(1+n)>0 (C5)
(C6)w=λ(2+ρ)(1+n)σλε (C6)

The steady growth path described by equations (C5)-(C6) is dynamically efficient: the net marginal product associated with a reduction in the capital-labor ratio exceeds the growth in the labor force (σδ>n). This high-interest path is unstable, however. The saving rate, s, is constant (given the logarithmic specification of the utility function); starting from the efficient path, a positive shock to w therefore raises the amount of saving, and the capital intensity increases in the next period to give Kt+1/Lt+1>λ/σ. The young workers’ income (the wage rate plus profits) then rises to λ in subsequent periods,[14] and the economy will be following a steady growth path with excess capacity:

(C7)KL=λ(2+ρ)(1+n)>λσ (C7)

This steady-growth path is dynamically inefficient; the net marginal product of capital is equal to –δ<n; consumption could be increased by reducing investment (eliminating the excess capacity) and having each young generation use some of its saving to finance consumption for the old generation.

Appendix D: Effects of debt elimination on the marginal product

With a Cobb-Douglas production function, Y=KαL1–α, we have

YK=αKα1L1α

and

ΔlogYK=(α1)Δlogk

where k=K/L. The effect on K of eliminating debt follows from the saving equation. If x=(K+B)/K, equation (31) implies that in a steady state

(D1)xk=s1+n(w+πτ)+(1s)11+rϕ=s1+n(1α+αε)kαs1+nτ+(1s)11+rϕ (D1)

Assume that the values of g and φ are kept unchanged. If the optimal steady state (associated with the initial debt-capital ratio of 1/3) has r*=n, it follows from (32) that the value of τ in the zero-debt steady state will also be unchanged, compared to its value in the optimal steady state. Using (D1) and assuming (plausibly) that φ≥0 and s1+nτ(1s)11+rϕ, we now have

dlog[s1+n(1α+αε)kαs1+nτ+(1s)11+rϕ]dlogk>α

Hence,

(1α)Δlogk<Δlogx

and

ΔlogYK=(1α)Δlogk<Δlogx=log1log43

It follows that

logYKnodebt<log(34YKwithdebt)

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Article note

Early versions of this paper have been presented at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, the Analytical Political Economic Workshop, Queen Mary, University of London, and in seminars at the University of Massachusetts and Aalborg University. Comments and suggestions from the editor and two anonymous referees have greatly influenced this version of the paper.


Published Online: 2014-8-5
Published in Print: 2014-1-1

©2014 by De Gruyter

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