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Price-level instability and international monetary policy coordination

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Published/Copyright: October 11, 2014

Abstract

In a two-country open economy model, Bencivenga, Huybens, and Smith [2002, What to Stabilize in the Open Economy, International Economic Review 43, 1289–1307] investigate three policy regimes and find that a fixed exchange rate regime, where the country with the lowest reserve-to-deposit ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate, and a price-level targeting regime are both more prone to price-level instability than a constant money growth rate regime. This paper, by replacing their “helicopter drops” assumption with an open market operations assumption, shows that the two rules of fixing the money growth rate and targeting the time path of the price level work equally well. Additionally, under a regime of fixed exchange rates, it does not matter which country is charged with keeping the fixed exchange rate.

JEL: E52; E61; F42; H50

Corresponding author: Hong Thang Nguyen, Faculty of Banking, Banking Academy of Vietnam, 12 Chua Boc Street, Dong Da district, Hanoi, Vietnam, Tel: +84438521305, e-mail:

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Noritaka Kudoh, Jun-ichi Itaya, Ryoji Ohdoi and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own responsibility. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Government of Japan for their financial support during my PhD program at the Hokkaido University.

Appendix 1

Solving the optimization problems of a young lender and a young borrower

a. For a young lender: A young lender in country 1 at t seeks to maximize lnc1t1+βlnc2t+11 subject to (5) and (6). The Lagrangian is

χ=lnc1t1+βlnc2t+11+κ1[w(c1t1+Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ2+bt2)]+κ2{[(1θ1)Rt+11+θ1pt1pt+11]Lt11θ1+bt1rt+11+[(1θ2)Rt+12+θ2pt2pt+12]Lt21θ1+bt2rt+12c2t+11},

where κ1 and κ2 are Lagrangian multipliers. I use (7) to rewrite the Lagrangian as follows

χ=lnc1t1+βlnc2t+11+κ1[w(c1t1+Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ2+bt2)]+κ2[rt+1(Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ1+bt2)c2t+11].

Taking derivatives of χ with respect to c1t1,c2t+11,(Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ1+bt2),κ1 and κ2 gives

χ/c1t1=1/c1t1κ1=0,χ/c2t+11=β/c2t+11κ2=0,χ/(Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ1+bt2)=κ1+κ2rt+1=0,χ/κ1=w(c1t1+Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ2+bt2)=0,χ/κ2=rt+1(Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ1+bt2)c2t+11=0.

These then lead to

κ1/κ2=c2t+11/(βc1t1)=rt+1,c2t+11=(Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ1+bt2)c2t+11/(βc1t1),c1t1=w[(Lt11θ1+bt1)+(Lt21θ1+bt2)]c2t+11/(βc1t1).

Hence,

βc1t1=Lt11θ1+bt1+Lt21θ1+bt2,(1+β)c1t1=w.

As a result, the savings demand function σ=βw/(1+β) is obtained, where ςLt1/(1θ1)+bt1+Lt2/(1θ1)+bt2.

b. For a young borrower: A young borrower in country 1 at t seeks to maximize lnC1t1+βlnC2t+12 subject to (11) and (12). The Lagrangian is

Γ=lnC1t1+βlnC2t+12+ν1(lt1C1t1)+ν2(ylt1Rt+11C2t+11),

where ν1 and ν2 are Lagrangian multipliers. Taking derivatives of Γ with respect to C1t1,C2t+11,lt1,ν1 and ν1 gives

Γ/C1t1=1/C1t1ν1=0,Γ/C2t+11=β/C2t+11ν2=0,Γ/lt1=ν1ν2Rt+11=0,Γ/ν1=lt1C1t1=0,Γ/ν2=ylt1Rt+11C2t+11=0.

It can be deduced from the first three equations that

C1t1/C2t+11=1/(βRt+11),

while the last two equations give

C1t1/C2t+11=lt1/(ylt1Rt+11).

As a result, the loan demand function lt1=y/(1+β)Rt+11 is obtained. A similar reasoning for country 2 gives lt2=y/(1+β)Rt+12.

Appendix 2

Proof of Proposition 3

Let κ1, κ2 be the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J, then κ1, κ2 are two roots of the characteristic polynomial p(κ)=κ2+D=0. The trace, T, and the determinant, D, of matrix J are evaluated as follows

T=ΩR2[N1α1y/(1+β)R1+N2α2y/(1+β)R2+ϕ(θ1/σ1+θ2/σ2)]>0,D=ΩR2ϕ[(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1]>0.

It is immediate that p(–1)=1+T+D>0, while

p(1)=1+DT=Ω[N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2θ2/σ2R2+N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2θ1/σ1R1+ϕθ1/σ1R1θ2/σ2R21θ1+θ1/σ1R1+ϕ(1θ1)R1θ2/σ2R2N1α1y/(1+β)R1R2N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2]=Ω[ϕ(θ1/σ1R1θ2/σ2R21θ1+θ1/σ1R1+(1θ1)R1θ2/σ2R2)N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2(R1R2θ2/σ2R21θ1+θ1/σ1R1)N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2(1θ1/σ1R11θ1+θ1/σ1R1)]=Ω[ϕ(1θ1)(1θ2)1θ1+θ1/σ1R1N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)21θ21θ1+θ1/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)21θ11θ1+θ1/σ1R1]=Ω(1θ1)(1θ2)1θ1+θ1/σ1R1[ϕN1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2].

Recall that f(RH1)>0 and f(RL1)<0. It is immediate that 1+D>T, or p(1)>0 at R1=RH1 and 1+D<T, or p(1)<0 at R1=RL1. It is easy to verify that –1, κ1<1<κ2 at RL1, so the stationary equilibrium at RL1 is a saddle. In order to determine whether the stationary equilibrium at RH1 is unstable, I consider

(44)D1=ΩR2{ϕ[(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1]N1α1y/(1+β)R1(θ2/σ2)+N2α2y/(1+β)R2(θ1/σ1)+ϕ(θ1/σ1)(θ2/σ2)(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1}=ΩR2{ϕ[(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1(θ1/σ1)(θ2/σ2)(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1]N1α1y/(1+β)R1(θ2/σ2)+N2α2y/(1+β)R2(θ1/σ1)(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1}=ΩR2{ϕ[(1θ1)R1+(1θ2)R2(θ1/σ1)(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1][N1α1y/(1+β)R1(θ2/σ2)+N2α2y/(1+β)R2(θ1/σ1)][(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1]1}. (44)

It is then deduced from (34) that

D1>ΩR2{[N1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2+N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2][(1θ1)R1+(1θ2)R2θ1/σ1(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1][N1α1y/(1+β)R1(θ2/σ2)+N2α2y/(1+β)R2(θ1/σ1)][(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1]1}=ΩR2{N1α1y/(1+β)R1[1+(1θ2)R2θ1/σ1(1θ1)R1θ2/σ2(1θ2)R2+θ2/σ2]+N2α2y/(1+β)R2[1+(1θ1)R1θ2/σ2(1θ2)R2θ1/σ1(1θ1)R1+θ1/σ1]}=ΩR2[N1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2(1θ2)R2+N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2(1θ1)R1]>0

or D>1. Recall that T>0, it is easy to verify that 1<κ1<κ2, or that the steady state at RH1 is unstable. Note that the variables under consideration, Rtj, are jump variables. Hence, the steady state at RH1 is determinate.

Appendix 3

Proof of Proposition 5

Let κ1, κ2 be the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J, then κ1, κ2 are two roots of the characteristic polynomial p(κ)=κ2+D=0. The trace, T, and the determinant, D, of matrix J are evaluated as follows:

T=Ψ[(1θ1+(θ1θ2)/σ1R1)N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2+(1θ2)(N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2+ϕθ1/σ1R1)],D=Ψϕ(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2).

Now, I consider two cases:

(i) If θ1>θ2, then D>0 and T>0. It is immediate that p(–1)=1+T+D>0. I then consider

p(1)=1+DT=Ψ{ϕ(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)+(θ1θ2)/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2(1θ2)(N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2+ϕθ1/σ1R1)(1θ1+(θ1θ2)/σ1R1)N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2}=Ψ[ϕ(1θ1)(1θ2)(1θ1)N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2(1θ2)N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2]=Ψ(1θ1)(1θ2)[ϕN1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2].

It is easy to verify from (34) and (35) that 1+D>T, or p(1)>0 at R1=RH1 and 1+D<T, or p(1)<0 at R1=RL1. Thus, –1<κ1<1<κ2 at RL1, or the stationary equilibrium at RL1 is a saddle. In addition,

D1=Ψ[ϕ(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)(θ1θ2)/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2]>Ψ[N1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2+N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2](1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)(θ1θ2)/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2]=Ψ{N2α2y/(1+β)R1(R2)2[(1θ1)R1+θ2/σ1]+1θ21θ1N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)}>0

or D>1 at R1=RH1. Thus, 1<κ1<κ2, or the steady state at RH1 is unstable. Note that the variables under consideration, Rtj, are jump variables. Hence, the steady state at RH1 is determinate.

(ii) If θ1<θ2, then D<0 and T<0. Besides,

|1+D||T|=Ψ(1θ1)(1θ2)[ϕN1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2]

or |1+D|>|T| holds at R1=RH1 and |1+D|<|T| holds at R1=RL1. Thus, the stationary equilibrium at RL1 is a saddle. In addition,

|D|1=Ψ[ϕ(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)(θ2θ1)/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2]>Ψ{[N1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2+N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2](1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)(θ2θ1)/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2}=Ψ{N2α2y/(1+β)R1(R2)2[(1θ2)R2+θ1/σ1]+1θ21θ1N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)}>0

or |D|>1 also holds at R1=RH1. Thus, the steady state at RH1 is a source. Note that the variables under consideration, Rtj, are jump variables. Hence, the steady state at RH1 is determinate.

Appendix 4

Proof of Proposition 7

Let κ1, κ2 be the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J, then κ1, κ2 are two roots of the characteristic polynomial p(κ)=κ2+D=0. The trace, T, and the determinant, D, of matrix J are evaluated as follows

T=φ[(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2+(1θ2)(N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2+ϕθ1/σ1R1)]>0D=φϕ(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)>0.

It is immediate that p(–1)=1+T+D>0, while

p(1)=1+DT=φ[ϕ(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)+θ1/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2(1θ2)(N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2+ϕθ1/σ1R1)]=φ[ϕ(1θ1)(1θ2)(1θ1)N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2(1θ2)N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2]=φ(1θ1)(1θ2)[ϕN1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2].

Once again, 1+D>T, or p(1)>0 at R1=RH1, and 1+D<T, or p(1)<0 at R1=RL1. Thus, –1<κ1<1<κ2 at RL1, or the stationary equilibrium at RL1 is a saddle. Additionally,

D1=φ[ϕ(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)θ1/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2]>φ{[N1α1y/(1+β)(1θ1)(R1)2+N2α2y/(1+β)(1θ2)(R2)2](1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)(1θ2)θ1/σ1R1N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2}=φ[N2α2y/(1+β)(R2)2(1θ1)+1θ21θ1N1α1y/(1+β)(R1)2(1θ1+θ1/σ1R1)]>0,

or D>1 at R1=RH1. Thus, 1<κ1<κ2, or the steady state at RH1 is a source. Note that the variables under consideration, Rtj, are jump variables. Hence, the steady state at RH1 is determinate.

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Published Online: 2014-10-11
Published in Print: 2015-1-1

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