Hegel’s Metaphysical Alternative to the Choice between an Unrealistic Platonic Realism and an Opposing Skeptical Anti-realism
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Paul Redding
Abstract
In this paper I argue for an interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy beyond a choice between two distinctly “unrealistic” options: Robert Brandom’s “robust” realism and Richard Rorty’s skeptical anti-realism. I thus interpret Hegel’s idealism as a form of weakened Platonic realism (a realism about ideas, or realistic idealism) that falls between the interpretations of Rorty and Brandom. This position broadly coincides with the “actualism” found within debates over modality within analytic philosophy and represented there by Arthur Prior and Robert Stalnaker. For the actualist, there is a sense in which the actual world necessarily contains “mind” and its ideational contents, but this is a trivial sense. What we mean by the actual world, in contrast to some of the non-actual possible alternatives to it, is the world as containing us, and we have no option other than to think of ourselves as “minded”.
Abstract
In this paper I argue for an interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy beyond a choice between two distinctly “unrealistic” options: Robert Brandom’s “robust” realism and Richard Rorty’s skeptical anti-realism. I thus interpret Hegel’s idealism as a form of weakened Platonic realism (a realism about ideas, or realistic idealism) that falls between the interpretations of Rorty and Brandom. This position broadly coincides with the “actualism” found within debates over modality within analytic philosophy and represented there by Arthur Prior and Robert Stalnaker. For the actualist, there is a sense in which the actual world necessarily contains “mind” and its ideational contents, but this is a trivial sense. What we mean by the actual world, in contrast to some of the non-actual possible alternatives to it, is the world as containing us, and we have no option other than to think of ourselves as “minded”.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Abbreviations VII
- Introduction: Impulses for a New Idealism IX
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Part I: The Neglected Impulses of Idealism in the History of Philosophy
- How Ideal Is the Ancient Self? 1
- De-Symbolization of the World and the Emergence of the Self: A Historically-Idealist Theory of the Subject 27
- Genesis, Structure, and Ideas: Genetic Epistemology in Early Modern Philosophy 69
- Diluvian Philosophy: Utilitarian Motifs in Moby-Dick 93
- Thinking Free Release in Hegel’s System 111
- Idealism and the Problem of Finitude: Heidegger and Hegel 127
- Hegel’s Metaphysical Alternative to the Choice between an Unrealistic Platonic Realism and an Opposing Skeptical Anti-realism 151
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Part II: Contemporary Impulses for a New Idealism
- A Materialist Defense of an Idealist Subjectivity 171
- Philosophy and Its History 193
- Beyond Realism and Correlationism, the Idealist Path 209
- A Typology of Idealism 231
- Fiction: The Truth of Idealism and Realism 251
- Virus and Idea 269
- Index 283
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Abbreviations VII
- Introduction: Impulses for a New Idealism IX
-
Part I: The Neglected Impulses of Idealism in the History of Philosophy
- How Ideal Is the Ancient Self? 1
- De-Symbolization of the World and the Emergence of the Self: A Historically-Idealist Theory of the Subject 27
- Genesis, Structure, and Ideas: Genetic Epistemology in Early Modern Philosophy 69
- Diluvian Philosophy: Utilitarian Motifs in Moby-Dick 93
- Thinking Free Release in Hegel’s System 111
- Idealism and the Problem of Finitude: Heidegger and Hegel 127
- Hegel’s Metaphysical Alternative to the Choice between an Unrealistic Platonic Realism and an Opposing Skeptical Anti-realism 151
-
Part II: Contemporary Impulses for a New Idealism
- A Materialist Defense of an Idealist Subjectivity 171
- Philosophy and Its History 193
- Beyond Realism and Correlationism, the Idealist Path 209
- A Typology of Idealism 231
- Fiction: The Truth of Idealism and Realism 251
- Virus and Idea 269
- Index 283
