Startseite Philosophie Reflections on Rule-Following
Kapitel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

Reflections on Rule-Following

  • Andrej Sascha Peter
Veröffentlichen auch Sie bei De Gruyter Brill

Abstract

John McDowell’s reading of what has been called ‘the rule-following paradox’ is ultimately quietist: not all understanding is an interpretation. Sebastian Rödl believes the paradox shares a similar form to Kant’s Third Antinomy. According to Rödl, some explanation of what it means to follow a rule is constitutive of practice. Explanation is constitutive because rule-following is self-conscious. Rödl rejects a quietist reading of Wittgenstein’s investigations in favour of a Hegelian one. In this essay, I shall draw attention to the contradictory character of the Hegelian concept of a self-explanatory idea. However, my intention is not to dismiss that concept. Instead, I am guided by the Hegelian belief that contradiction is constitutive of understanding what it means to be a thinker and an agent.

Abstract

John McDowell’s reading of what has been called ‘the rule-following paradox’ is ultimately quietist: not all understanding is an interpretation. Sebastian Rödl believes the paradox shares a similar form to Kant’s Third Antinomy. According to Rödl, some explanation of what it means to follow a rule is constitutive of practice. Explanation is constitutive because rule-following is self-conscious. Rödl rejects a quietist reading of Wittgenstein’s investigations in favour of a Hegelian one. In this essay, I shall draw attention to the contradictory character of the Hegelian concept of a self-explanatory idea. However, my intention is not to dismiss that concept. Instead, I am guided by the Hegelian belief that contradiction is constitutive of understanding what it means to be a thinker and an agent.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements V
  3. Table of Contents VII
  4. List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Works IX
  5. Notes on Authors XI
  6. Introduction: Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy – Logic, Language, Life 1
  7. I Logic
  8. Differences in Form, Identities in Content – Wittgenstein and Hegel on Two Complementary Aspects of Meaning 13
  9. What Might Hegel and Wittgenstein Have Seen in Goethe’s Colour Theory? 35
  10. Shining and Showing 53
  11. Two Faces of Contradiction 81
  12. Infinity as the Form of the Finite: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks, XII and the Notion of the Infinite in the Critique of Pure Reason 101
  13. II Language
  14. Talking is Lying: On One Suspicious Metaphor 125
  15. Rhetoric, Negativity, and Philosophy of Language – Hegel’s Sophists as Early Wittgensteinians 137
  16. Reflections on Rule-Following 147
  17. Wittgenstein’s Übersichtliche Darstellung and Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy 167
  18. Wittgenstein and Schlegel on Forms of Life: Talking To or Past Each Other 183
  19. III Life
  20. Hegel, the Pragmatic Turn, and the Later Wittgenstein 201
  21. Following the Rule Without Interpreting It? – Gadamarian and Kantian Revision of Brandom’s Solution to the Wittgensteinian Problem 213
  22. Following a Rule Blindly: Hegel and Wittgenstein on the Immediacy of Habit 225
  23. Wittgenstein and Critical Theory – From ‘Sub Specie Aeterni’ to the ‘Entanglement in Our Rules’ – Wittgenstein, Adorno, Marx 255
  24. Wittgenstein and Hegel on Art and the Everyday 277
  25. Subject Index 297
  26. Person Index 307
Heruntergeladen am 3.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110698497-011/html
Button zum nach oben scrollen