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Talking is Lying: On One Suspicious Metaphor

  • Vojtěch Kolman
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Abstract

“Talking is lying,” says Nietzsche. “But in saying this,” retorts Carnap, “are you lying or telling the truth?”-“The latter,” intercedes Hegel, “because in lying the language turns out to be more truthful.”-“This is scandalous! A lie is not true simply by definition,” exclaims Russell, only to be interrupted by Oscar Wilde: “But what is a fine lie? Simply that which is its own evidence.” This fictitious dialogue demarcates both the range of my chapter, which covers some philosophical opinions on language as the bearer of truth and falsity, as well as my chapter’s actual subject, which is language’s metaphorical nature. That “talking is lying” is a metaphor, i. e. something devised as transparently untrue in order to achieve some deeper understanding. And this amounts to seeing the metaphor as an inherent quality of language to distort reality in a way which becomes its own evidence.

Abstract

“Talking is lying,” says Nietzsche. “But in saying this,” retorts Carnap, “are you lying or telling the truth?”-“The latter,” intercedes Hegel, “because in lying the language turns out to be more truthful.”-“This is scandalous! A lie is not true simply by definition,” exclaims Russell, only to be interrupted by Oscar Wilde: “But what is a fine lie? Simply that which is its own evidence.” This fictitious dialogue demarcates both the range of my chapter, which covers some philosophical opinions on language as the bearer of truth and falsity, as well as my chapter’s actual subject, which is language’s metaphorical nature. That “talking is lying” is a metaphor, i. e. something devised as transparently untrue in order to achieve some deeper understanding. And this amounts to seeing the metaphor as an inherent quality of language to distort reality in a way which becomes its own evidence.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements V
  3. Table of Contents VII
  4. List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Works IX
  5. Notes on Authors XI
  6. Introduction: Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy – Logic, Language, Life 1
  7. I Logic
  8. Differences in Form, Identities in Content – Wittgenstein and Hegel on Two Complementary Aspects of Meaning 13
  9. What Might Hegel and Wittgenstein Have Seen in Goethe’s Colour Theory? 35
  10. Shining and Showing 53
  11. Two Faces of Contradiction 81
  12. Infinity as the Form of the Finite: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks, XII and the Notion of the Infinite in the Critique of Pure Reason 101
  13. II Language
  14. Talking is Lying: On One Suspicious Metaphor 125
  15. Rhetoric, Negativity, and Philosophy of Language – Hegel’s Sophists as Early Wittgensteinians 137
  16. Reflections on Rule-Following 147
  17. Wittgenstein’s Übersichtliche Darstellung and Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy 167
  18. Wittgenstein and Schlegel on Forms of Life: Talking To or Past Each Other 183
  19. III Life
  20. Hegel, the Pragmatic Turn, and the Later Wittgenstein 201
  21. Following the Rule Without Interpreting It? – Gadamarian and Kantian Revision of Brandom’s Solution to the Wittgensteinian Problem 213
  22. Following a Rule Blindly: Hegel and Wittgenstein on the Immediacy of Habit 225
  23. Wittgenstein and Critical Theory – From ‘Sub Specie Aeterni’ to the ‘Entanglement in Our Rules’ – Wittgenstein, Adorno, Marx 255
  24. Wittgenstein and Hegel on Art and the Everyday 277
  25. Subject Index 297
  26. Person Index 307
Heruntergeladen am 3.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110698497-009/html
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