What Might Hegel and Wittgenstein Have Seen in Goethe’s Colour Theory?
-
Paul Redding
Abstract
Hegel and Wittgenstein were both attracted to the idiosyncratic theory of colour that Goethe had put forward in 1810 in the work Zur Farbenlehre. The phenomena to which Goethe had pointed brought to the surface fundamental flaws in standard ways of thinking about logic, especially, the reduction of negation to the single relation of contradiction. For Hegel, Goethe’s critique of Newton’s approach showed the need for two distinct ways in which individual colours could be conceptualized, admitting both contrariety and contradiction between colour concepts. In relation to this, parallels can be found between Hegel’s logic and that of late nineteenth-century ‘algebraists’ such as W.E. Johnson and Charles Sanders Peirce. In the case of Wittgenstein, these logicians provide alternatives to Frege’s classical logic on which Wittgenstein had earlier relied. Moreover, behind these logical issues, we can glimpse concerns with ethical issues concerning the nature of the good.
Abstract
Hegel and Wittgenstein were both attracted to the idiosyncratic theory of colour that Goethe had put forward in 1810 in the work Zur Farbenlehre. The phenomena to which Goethe had pointed brought to the surface fundamental flaws in standard ways of thinking about logic, especially, the reduction of negation to the single relation of contradiction. For Hegel, Goethe’s critique of Newton’s approach showed the need for two distinct ways in which individual colours could be conceptualized, admitting both contrariety and contradiction between colour concepts. In relation to this, parallels can be found between Hegel’s logic and that of late nineteenth-century ‘algebraists’ such as W.E. Johnson and Charles Sanders Peirce. In the case of Wittgenstein, these logicians provide alternatives to Frege’s classical logic on which Wittgenstein had earlier relied. Moreover, behind these logical issues, we can glimpse concerns with ethical issues concerning the nature of the good.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Works IX
- Notes on Authors XI
- Introduction: Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy – Logic, Language, Life 1
-
I Logic
- Differences in Form, Identities in Content – Wittgenstein and Hegel on Two Complementary Aspects of Meaning 13
- What Might Hegel and Wittgenstein Have Seen in Goethe’s Colour Theory? 35
- Shining and Showing 53
- Two Faces of Contradiction 81
- Infinity as the Form of the Finite: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks, XII and the Notion of the Infinite in the Critique of Pure Reason 101
-
II Language
- Talking is Lying: On One Suspicious Metaphor 125
- Rhetoric, Negativity, and Philosophy of Language – Hegel’s Sophists as Early Wittgensteinians 137
- Reflections on Rule-Following 147
- Wittgenstein’s Übersichtliche Darstellung and Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy 167
- Wittgenstein and Schlegel on Forms of Life: Talking To or Past Each Other 183
-
III Life
- Hegel, the Pragmatic Turn, and the Later Wittgenstein 201
- Following the Rule Without Interpreting It? – Gadamarian and Kantian Revision of Brandom’s Solution to the Wittgensteinian Problem 213
- Following a Rule Blindly: Hegel and Wittgenstein on the Immediacy of Habit 225
- Wittgenstein and Critical Theory – From ‘Sub Specie Aeterni’ to the ‘Entanglement in Our Rules’ – Wittgenstein, Adorno, Marx 255
- Wittgenstein and Hegel on Art and the Everyday 277
- Subject Index 297
- Person Index 307
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Works IX
- Notes on Authors XI
- Introduction: Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy – Logic, Language, Life 1
-
I Logic
- Differences in Form, Identities in Content – Wittgenstein and Hegel on Two Complementary Aspects of Meaning 13
- What Might Hegel and Wittgenstein Have Seen in Goethe’s Colour Theory? 35
- Shining and Showing 53
- Two Faces of Contradiction 81
- Infinity as the Form of the Finite: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks, XII and the Notion of the Infinite in the Critique of Pure Reason 101
-
II Language
- Talking is Lying: On One Suspicious Metaphor 125
- Rhetoric, Negativity, and Philosophy of Language – Hegel’s Sophists as Early Wittgensteinians 137
- Reflections on Rule-Following 147
- Wittgenstein’s Übersichtliche Darstellung and Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy 167
- Wittgenstein and Schlegel on Forms of Life: Talking To or Past Each Other 183
-
III Life
- Hegel, the Pragmatic Turn, and the Later Wittgenstein 201
- Following the Rule Without Interpreting It? – Gadamarian and Kantian Revision of Brandom’s Solution to the Wittgensteinian Problem 213
- Following a Rule Blindly: Hegel and Wittgenstein on the Immediacy of Habit 225
- Wittgenstein and Critical Theory – From ‘Sub Specie Aeterni’ to the ‘Entanglement in Our Rules’ – Wittgenstein, Adorno, Marx 255
- Wittgenstein and Hegel on Art and the Everyday 277
- Subject Index 297
- Person Index 307