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Differences in Form, Identities in Content – Wittgenstein and Hegel on Two Complementary Aspects of Meaning

  • Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer
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Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy

Abstract

According to intentionalism, what an author means seems to be ‘more distinct’ than ‘what’ he says. However, the meaning of an utterance is never more fine-grained than its type, even though these types are finer than the linguistic expressions used. In partial contrast to Wittgenstein’s teaching differences, Hegel sees that what we understand in thought and reflection presupposes relevant equivalence relations and that the concrete meanings of utterances in context- related speech or parole are particular instantiations of the merely generic meanings of sentences ‘per se’ or an sich. We need situation-adapted cooperative reason in order to recognize in dialectical reflections the essential identities and distinctions in joint understanding.

Abstract

According to intentionalism, what an author means seems to be ‘more distinct’ than ‘what’ he says. However, the meaning of an utterance is never more fine-grained than its type, even though these types are finer than the linguistic expressions used. In partial contrast to Wittgenstein’s teaching differences, Hegel sees that what we understand in thought and reflection presupposes relevant equivalence relations and that the concrete meanings of utterances in context- related speech or parole are particular instantiations of the merely generic meanings of sentences ‘per se’ or an sich. We need situation-adapted cooperative reason in order to recognize in dialectical reflections the essential identities and distinctions in joint understanding.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements V
  3. Table of Contents VII
  4. List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Works IX
  5. Notes on Authors XI
  6. Introduction: Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy – Logic, Language, Life 1
  7. I Logic
  8. Differences in Form, Identities in Content – Wittgenstein and Hegel on Two Complementary Aspects of Meaning 13
  9. What Might Hegel and Wittgenstein Have Seen in Goethe’s Colour Theory? 35
  10. Shining and Showing 53
  11. Two Faces of Contradiction 81
  12. Infinity as the Form of the Finite: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks, XII and the Notion of the Infinite in the Critique of Pure Reason 101
  13. II Language
  14. Talking is Lying: On One Suspicious Metaphor 125
  15. Rhetoric, Negativity, and Philosophy of Language – Hegel’s Sophists as Early Wittgensteinians 137
  16. Reflections on Rule-Following 147
  17. Wittgenstein’s Übersichtliche Darstellung and Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy 167
  18. Wittgenstein and Schlegel on Forms of Life: Talking To or Past Each Other 183
  19. III Life
  20. Hegel, the Pragmatic Turn, and the Later Wittgenstein 201
  21. Following the Rule Without Interpreting It? – Gadamarian and Kantian Revision of Brandom’s Solution to the Wittgensteinian Problem 213
  22. Following a Rule Blindly: Hegel and Wittgenstein on the Immediacy of Habit 225
  23. Wittgenstein and Critical Theory – From ‘Sub Specie Aeterni’ to the ‘Entanglement in Our Rules’ – Wittgenstein, Adorno, Marx 255
  24. Wittgenstein and Hegel on Art and the Everyday 277
  25. Subject Index 297
  26. Person Index 307
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110698497-004

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements V
  3. Table of Contents VII
  4. List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Works IX
  5. Notes on Authors XI
  6. Introduction: Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy – Logic, Language, Life 1
  7. I Logic
  8. Differences in Form, Identities in Content – Wittgenstein and Hegel on Two Complementary Aspects of Meaning 13
  9. What Might Hegel and Wittgenstein Have Seen in Goethe’s Colour Theory? 35
  10. Shining and Showing 53
  11. Two Faces of Contradiction 81
  12. Infinity as the Form of the Finite: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks, XII and the Notion of the Infinite in the Critique of Pure Reason 101
  13. II Language
  14. Talking is Lying: On One Suspicious Metaphor 125
  15. Rhetoric, Negativity, and Philosophy of Language – Hegel’s Sophists as Early Wittgensteinians 137
  16. Reflections on Rule-Following 147
  17. Wittgenstein’s Übersichtliche Darstellung and Hegel’s Speculative Philosophy 167
  18. Wittgenstein and Schlegel on Forms of Life: Talking To or Past Each Other 183
  19. III Life
  20. Hegel, the Pragmatic Turn, and the Later Wittgenstein 201
  21. Following the Rule Without Interpreting It? – Gadamarian and Kantian Revision of Brandom’s Solution to the Wittgensteinian Problem 213
  22. Following a Rule Blindly: Hegel and Wittgenstein on the Immediacy of Habit 225
  23. Wittgenstein and Critical Theory – From ‘Sub Specie Aeterni’ to the ‘Entanglement in Our Rules’ – Wittgenstein, Adorno, Marx 255
  24. Wittgenstein and Hegel on Art and the Everyday 277
  25. Subject Index 297
  26. Person Index 307
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Heruntergeladen am 3.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110698497-004/html
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