Volume 48, Issue 1

It seems obvious that Nietzsche has influenced the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947). The extent to which Adorno and Horkheimer base their argument on Nietzsche, however, remains controversial. By analyzing an early draft of the first excursion of the Dialectic of Enlightenment from 1943, this article demonstrates that Nietzsche was more important for the development of its main concepts than has been assumed, in particular his analysis of myth and enlightenment. In the earlier version of the Ulysses-chapter Nietzsche, together with Rudolf Borchardt, is a pivotal point of reference. Indeed, it is the Nietzschean reflection on Homer and on the pre-Homerian epic—and Borchardt’s interpretation of these themes—that Adorno views as the first original form of the dialectics of enlightenment.

The second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals introduces the ‘sovereign individual’ as ‘responsible’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’. Does this affirmative use of moral terminology reveal an unexpected affinity between Nietzsche’s thought and philosophical modernity? In the last decades, this issue has been at the heart of a vast and controversial debate. My analysis shows that, rather than throwing light on Nietzsche’s general position, the specific use of Kantian terms in this passage of GM is due to a polemical intention. Implicitly, Nietzsche rejects Eduard von Hartmann’s criticism of the ‘absolute sovereignty of the individual’. The author of the Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (1879) sees the most radical herald of this ‘sovereignty’ in Max Stirner. From Nietzsche’s point of view, Hartmann’s rejection and Stirner’s affirmation share a reductive conception of ‘sovereignty’. Reinterpreting and ‘revaluing’ Kant’s moral terminology, Nietzsche aims to give an interpretation of individual sovereignty that is at the same time antithetical to Stirner’s and wholly at odds with Hartmann’s ethical views. In showing this, the paper gives a new answer to an old question; for already in the 1890s, Hartmann himself, accusing Nietzsche of plagiarizing Stirner, raised the issue of the historical relationship between the two philosophers. More generally, the paper shows that Nietzsche employs a specific textual strategy, which consists in taking Kantian terms in an ‘anti-Kantian’ sense and systematically cultivating the art of using ‘a moral formula in a supramoral sense’.

Like Hegel, Marx and Engels, Nietzsche has made the Haitian Revolution “unthinkable” (Michel-Rolph Trouillot). He provokes his readers by justifying slavery in the ancient and in the modern world. In order to indicate the problematic dimension of Nietzsche’s cultural legitimation of slavery it is necessary to situate his ideas in the context of the transatlantic slave trade. Furthermore, we need to ask whether his anti-democratic statements regarding the French Revolution could be understood as a “hyper-democratic” commitment to a “coming democracy” (Jacques Derrida) that resists slavery. I raise the question whether Nietzsche, in this context, considers the possibility of overcoming the institution of slavery in modern Europe.

The question of truth is one of the oldest philosophical topics, but perhaps it concerns the world today more than ever.<fnote> Der Beitrag geht auf einen Vortrag zurück, der 2018 in verschiedenen Fassungen beim Nietzsche-Forum München e.V., beim Nietzsche-Forum der Tongji-Universität Shanghai und beim Nietzsche-Kolloquium der Stiftung Nietzsche-Haus in Sils-Maria und 2019 in Machatschkala, Dagestan, gehalten wurde.</fnote> Nietzsche was a realist about truth and he sought to criticize and reject the idealizations and moralizations that continue to dominate philosophical thinking: he wanted to see how truth really stands. Following Nietzsche we can recognize more clearly that we need illusions in order to live, but that these illusions also endanger the very lives they support. We demand a final truth on which we can rely at all times, and which allows us to live together, such as the truth of God, the truth of reason, or the truth of being. But searching for such a final truth, we face “nothing,” or what Nietzsche described as “nihilism.” At the same time, however, we keep on speaking about truth and truths. How to speak—after Nietzsche—about truth without succumbing to illusion? Starting from Nietzsche’s critique of truth and Heidegger’s metaphysical account of Nietzsche’s position, this article examines how Nietzsche, in contrast to Heidegger’s ontological commitments, allows us to decide about truth on the grounds of perspectivism. While Nietzsche’s position thus seems compatible with that of Niklas Luhmann’s constructivism, Nietzsche still holds on to his truth as the truth of “an evangelist the like of which there has never been” (EH, Destiny 1).

All speech is a form of self-presentation, a performance on the stage of life, and since antiquity this has been accepted as much as lamented and rejected on moral grounds. Do we today, once again, live in times that justify this complaint? So-called ‘fake news’ are, first and foremost, simply ‘news,’ that is, information whose truth claims everyone needs to judge according to their own prejudices. Nietzsche’s skepticism about truth, at least since the early essay Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne , draws radical conclusions from this apparently nihilistic diagnosis of our cognitive abilities which never reach their goal, that is, truth. But Nietzsche does not despair about the fact that our thinking has no power over truth; rather, he transforms lying into a product of the creative intellect that seeks to serve life. As such, we have to rethink truth’s relationship to lying. Both, truth and lying, thus lose their respective meaning. Against the background of Kant’s famous distinction between opining, believing, and knowing as three different modes of holding-to-be-true, I argue that Nietzsche does indeed provide a both timely and constructive answer to the question how to think about ‘lying.’

This article addresses the role and meaning of prayer as well as the language of piety and praise in Nietzsche’s writings, notably in Zarathustra .<fnote> This essay was first presented as a talk in German at the 2017 Nietzsche colloquium in Sils Maria, the theme of which was “Zarathustra und Dionysos”. In preparing it for a publication in English, the argument has been reworked and expanded and references have been added, while partly preserving the tone and structure of the oral delivery. I am grateful to the instructive comments and suggestions of the anonymous reviewers for Nietzsche-Studien .</fnote> Nietzsche can be read as an uncompromising critic of religion but also as the initiator of a new form of faith, described by some scholars as a “Dionysian piety”. The analysis takes its lead from the way in which Z refers to his yes-saying as also saying “amen”, exploring how Nietzsche explicitly incorporates the language of religious discourse into his writing. Examining passages where he explicitly questions the adoption of confessional language and prayer, it criticizes as overly simplistic the view of his thinking as seeking a new piety. The discussion of the significance of prayer from a psychological, linguistic, and poetological perspective highlights the experience of “inspiration” as a key to the adoption of confessional language in Z. In an interpretation of the last part of this book, it shows how its concluding scenes coalesce precisely around the role and possibility of prayer and piety, and how a crisis in the narrative is triggered by the inability of Zarathustra’s visitors to properly understand his message in this regard. A concluding interpretation of the section “Before Sunrise” in the third part of the book shows how it gathers the philosophical stakes involved in Nietzsche’s understanding of prayer, piety, and confessional praise.

In this essay I explore what might be meant by the “nearest things” in Nietzsche’s philosophy. In the first part of the essay I contextualise Nietzsche’s concerns with “ the closest things of all ” in the “free spirit” period (1878–1882) and raise the question of how knowledge of them is possible. This idea is developed in the second part of the paper in relation to the claim that dominant (Platonic/Christian) habits of thought impede our understanding of the body. In the third section, I suggest that Nietzsche’s interest in Epicurean thinking in this period enables us to situate the nearest things within the political aesthetics of a transfigured physis . In the final section, I examine how Nietzsche’s 1881 notes on eternal return provide a less-well known locus for his philosophy of the nearest things, one which suggests that to “incorporate” eternal return we need to become “good neighbours” to what is close.

Nietzsche has repeatedly commented on his already published works, and thus continuously reinterpreted them, in order to shape their public reception and to foreground the communication of specific aspects of his works. As such, he followed a specific “work politics,” or Werkpolitik . The resulting retractions are not only revealing for the reconstruction of Nietzsche’s self-understanding, but also demonstrate both the development and the dynamic character of his thinking. In the present article, this is shown through a so-called “contrasting reading,” which contrasts a posthumous note about The Birth of Tragedy , the Attempt at a Self-Criticism from 1886, with the book itself and with the chapter in Ecce Homo that is dedicated to BT. Starting from a close reading of note Nachlass 1888, 17[3], which also takes into account the genesis of BT, I argue that Nietzsche’s self-commentaries combine his current philosophical reflections with work-political objectives. The subsequent comparison reconstructs the philosophical differences between the note and the texts mentioned above, thus demonstrating the dynamic character of Nietzsche’s philosophizing, which is often stated but seldom reconstructed on the basis of the actual texts.

This essay focuses on the genetic text of Nietzsche’s unpublished poem An Hafis. Frage eines Wassertrinkers in order to establish the development of this poem from preliminary versions to an authoritative version. Through such a detailed philological analysis of the text in Nietzsche’s notebooks, it becomes increasingly clear that the final version of An Hafis constitutes an intertextual answer to Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan (1819/1827), which itself was inspired by the late-medieval Persian poet Hafez. Developing from different, and open-ended, semantic configurations to a final version, Nietzsche’s An Hafis also allows us to reassess the editorial practices necessary to shed light on Nietzsche’s unpublished lyrical drafts.

Limited scholarly attention has been committed to the analysis of Nietzsche’s 1873 Time-Atom Theory, a fragment whose contentions strike both the seasoned and unseasoned reader of the Nachlass as especially speculative and grandiose. The principal objective of this essay is to critically review and extend the recent aspects of this limited commentary, focusing on the work of Gregory Whitlock, Robin Small and Keith Ansell-Pearson. I argue that an important and overlooked ambiguity is latent in Nietzsche’s framing of his argument, which impinges upon the scope and purpose of the fragment. I consider the question posed by Small as to the status of the time-points in the fragment which, I contend, Nietzsche does not hold to be empirical. Thirdly, I discuss a central point of debate between Whitlock, Small and Ansell-Pearson: the extent of the analogy between Roger Boscovich and Nietzsche. I submit in conclusion that the connections between the two have been over-emphasised in the context of the 1873 fragment, and that this relationship cannot yield a complete account of Nietzsche’s approach.

In this paper, I show that Nietzsche is a Kantian, and what being Kantian means. He accepts the idea that our perception is configured by concepts which unify and inform the world around us, and which result from a biological evolution of the human species. His Kantianism is thus biological and mainly influenced by Friedrich Albert Lange’s reading of Kant. But this Nietzschean conceptualism must be inscribed in his thought of the will to power, where the perceptive fixation of the world is the result of a degeneration caused by the biological, psychological and historical recovery of the will to power. Thus, I show that Nietzsche’s Kantianism is as biological as it is axiological.

The ‘French reading’ of Nietzsche crystallized almost 50 years ago at the 1972 conference at Cerisy-la-Salle, Nietzsche aujourd’hui .<fnote> An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, with the theme of ‘The Politics of Difference’, Newcastle University, 20–21 September 2018.</fnote> Nietzsche’s fortunes have since undergone some dramatic shifts in France, but there are signs that he is once again on the ascendency, in particular the 2016 edited collection Pourquoi nous sommes Nietzschéens (a direct riposte to the 1991 Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas Nietzschéens ). Taking a bearing from the French readings, I want to explore the question of what ‘Nietzsche today’ might mean for us today . At Cerisy in 1972, the meaning of Nietzsche was centred on the twin critiques of humanism and capitalism. While these issues persist, several articles in the 2016 collection indicate that they are now inflected through the vast contemporary significance of technology. One of the key debates here is Nietzsche’s significance for transhumanism. For Bernard Stiegler, transhumanism is the culmination of nihilism, understood as the reign of big data and the total quantification of the self. In this regard, he alludes to a ‘hypernihilism’ of the contemporary era, characterised by the quantifying effects of information technologies, which work in conjunction with capitalism to produce an ultimate ‘averaging’ force. I will argue that Stiegler gives an essential corrective to the largely critical engagements with neonihilism of the Nietzscheans of the previous generation, but that his emphasis on the value of negentropy risks reaffirming the logic of the transhumanism he critiques. Nietzscheanism today, I will argue, requires an appreciation of the dual tendencies of nihilism – identified here as neonihilism and hypernihilism – such that we must draw on contributions from both generations of French Nietzscheans in order to think and respond to the problems of our contemporary era.

Exception and authority are core themes of Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s works. These themes are used as points of comparison in more recent studies on the two authors which focus on structural parallels developing the figure of the single one resp. the lonely one and on concepts of power with regard to religious and philosophical authority. Methodological difficulties relevant to the popular comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in general concern the interpretation of the totality, teleology and style of each works.

The books discussed in this article examine Nietzsche’s philosophy of life in different ways. Nietzsche’s theory of art as well as his Dionysian philosophy play a special role, which emphasizes the possible continuity of these terms in Nietzsche’s works. An additional focus of attention are Nietzsche’s philosophy of the body as well as his relationship to the theory of evolution. Nietzsche’s position is distinguished from Darwinism by the former’s focus on an anti-essentialist critique of the concept of nature and of mind-body dualism. Finally, the possibilities of a phenomenological interpretation of Nietzsche are taken into consideration, which situates the concept of the life-world, or  Lebenswelt , in the context of Nietzsche’s own conception of life.

Two new volumes fundamentally revise our understanding of Nietzsche’s poetry in the broader context of his philosophical thought. Marked by a dialogic structure, and with an emphasis on what might be described as a poetics of selfhood, Nietzsche’s poetic texts raise the question what it means to write lyric poetry philosophically. Employing syntactical rules in order to reflect on the philosophical dimension of poetic language, Nietzsche’s poetic practice also informs the practices of his philosophical writing.

Four new publications provide an overview of the relationship between Nietzsche’s philosophical thought and his political commitments. Together they highlight the true complexity of Nietzsche’s politics, since some of his ideas can be adapted to anarchist and right-wing positions as much as, for instance, to Frankfurt School critical theory. At the same time, these contributions underscore the limitations of a strictly positivist, or philological approach, since any assessment of Nietzsche’s politics cannot be detached from the political faultlines of the present.