Volume 12, Issue 2 - Special Issue: Relational Equality and Migration

In this introductory essay to the special issue on relational equality and migration, I first introduce a familiar way of conceiving of the connection between equality and migration, one that focuses on distributive inequality. I then provide an overview of the state of the debate concerning relational equality and migration. I conclude by summarizing the contributions to this special issue.

This paper argues that recent debates on egalitarian objections to immigration restrictions overlook a crucial, powerful normative principle that underpins objections to inequalities: any inequalities between morally equal persons – whether in goods, resources, welfare but also in powers, statuses, rights, and freedoms – that arise from morally arbitrary factors are pro tanto unjust. This principle of moral arbitrariness is fundamental to both luck and relational egalitarianism yet is often missing from debates that apply such theories to migration ethics. The result of this omission is that certain arguments that purportedly reject luck egalitarian cases for open borders in fact fail since they fail to recognise the normative force of the principle of moral arbitrariness; yet, simultaneously, relational egalitarian cases for open borders are not fully successful since they fail to recognise that the principle of moral arbitrariness is required to distinguish immigration restrictions as unjust where other (relational) inequalities may not be. Hence, the overall argument of this paper is that the recognition of the principle of moral arbitrariness is essential for the success of both the luck and relational egalitarian cases, and thus a proper recognition of the full normative force and implications of this principle entails the egalitarian case for open borders indeed succeeds.

Recently, some political philosophers have started to argue that the history and continuation of colonial injustices means that former colonising states have no right to exclude members of former colonies or colonially inflected societies. However, less attention has been paid to the issue of how postcolonial migrants ought to be treated once admitted into former metropoles. In this paper I assess whether postcolonial migrants ought to be required to socially integrate once admitted. On the one hand, there seems to be a compelling argument in favour of this requirement, because of the relational equality promoting benefits of social integration. I show how postcolonial migrants are subject to relational inequality within former metropoles and draw attention to compelling empirical evidence that shows that facilitating close and frequent interactions between members of ‘outgroups’ and ‘ingroups’ is an effective means of promoting relational equality. However, I then argue that postcolonial migrants ought not to be required to socially integrate for two reasons. Firstly, such policies in fact risk reinforcing relational inequality, and secondly, they risk subjecting postcolonial migrants to unreasonable burdens. This does not mean that former colonising states ought to dispense with social integration policies altogether, but they ought to be more attuned to the preferences of postcolonial migrants. In contexts in which they oppose social integration policies, a more appropriately relational egalitarian act would be for former colonising states to keep open the possibility of future social integration, rather than to impose it.

Should states naturalize long-term irregular migrants residing in their territory? Scholars such as Carens and Rubio-Marín have defended their naturalization by drawing on a theory of social membership. However, some have argued that the social membership account falls short of requiring the granting of citizenship to irregular migrants. Others, such as Brock, Ochoa Espejo, and Hosein, have attempted to defend a right not to be deported. I argue that relational equality can provide a defense for granting irregular migrants citizenship rights – their complete naturalization – which avoids the limitations of both approaches: it provides a more solid grounding for granting citizenship to irregular migrants, and shows why a right to stay still leaves irregular migrants in a morally troubling position. Irregular migrants are subjected for long periods of time to the laws of the state they reside in without having any power or influence over them and face significant difficulties in leaving the country, which results in objectionable social inequality. I argue that such concerns about inequality of status override the right of the demos to determine its membership and concerns about irregular migrants’ original breaking of the law.

My focus is on how democratic states restrict, constrain and shape the movement of citizens and residents across their territory. My central claim is that a focus on equal relations between them, as relational egalitarians emphasize, can show where restrictions on movement are permissible or problematic. Over the course of the discussion, I offer many examples, as well as four cases in which I assess specific movement-related policies for whether they are violations of relational equality: exclusionary zoning, eminent domain, resettlement of isolated communities and no-fly lists. These analyses are neither extensive nor exhaustive, but I hope they are sufficient to demonstrate that relational egalitarians should be concerned with whether citizens and residents can move freely and to indicate how a relational egalitarian can evaluate movement-related policies as to whether they support or undermine the ability of citizens and residents to interact as social equals.

Methodological nationalism is a cognitive bias that construes states as the natural and necessary form of contemporary social organisation. This gives rise to a state-centred view which naturalises national communities, exaggerates the differences between citizens and migrants, and exceptionalises international migration. In this paper, I argue that methodological nationalism is not only empirically inaccurate, but also normatively problematic, because its assumptions prevent migration ethicists from properly theorising about discrimination. I begin by briefly presenting methodological nationalism and clarifying some misconceptions. I also identify some features that would make a policy discriminatory and show that many contemporary migration policies are discriminatory. Looking at three variants of methodological nationalism (naturalisation, territorialisation, and ignorance), I argue that methodological nationalism marginalises concerns about discrimination in migration ethics and prevents migration ethicists from developing accounts that would be able to counter xenophobic arguments. Last, I consider the implications of my argument for migration ethics.

Relational egalitarians have increasingly argued that immigration control facilitates social inequality. This ranges from Amy Reed-Sandoval’s account of the socially undocumented, to Désirée Lim’s criticisms of skill selection’s expressive disrespect, to Daniel Sharp’s claim that immigration control exercises power over would-be immigrants. I develop a novel extension of relational egalitarianism principles. Unlike other accounts, I argue that immigration control contributes to inegalitarian relationships that are not: (1) within the receiving state, (2) the result of discrimination, (3) simply the exercise of power-over, and (4) between the receiving state and would-be immigrants. I argue that immigration restrictions can, in the context of cultures of migration, create inegalitarian relationships in sending countries, harming both would-be immigrants and nonimmigrant populations. Cultures of migration respond to and help create changes in values. They lead to a dissatisfaction with local opportunities – including employment, consumption, and cultural practices. When borders are relaxed, these changes promote immigration. But when they are hardened, the changes persist while the dissatisfied are increasingly trapped in a society that they no longer find desirable. And nonimmigrants – who might still endorse local values and desire local opportunities – are left living amidst (often) more privileged compatriots who increasingly denigrate the lifestyles they endorse.

The prevailing belief, both within the immigration literature and in current political debate, is that the cornerstone of resolving immigration issues is the attainment of citizenship. In contrast, this article delves deeper into the plight of citizens with a perceived immigration background. We argue that formal equal citizenship does not alleviate the morally objectionable patterns of social inequality experienced by these citizens. To elaborate further, we insist that citizens with a perceived immigration background are often not treated equally by social institutions or by their fellow citizens. To address this concern, we argue that these citizens have a claim against being treated as strangers, aliens, and nonmembers of society, which is grounded in the public and equal advancement of the fundamental interest in ‘being at home’.

For some, cultured animal products ought to be celebrated for the potential they offer to replace factory farming. Others argue that, for the same reason, there is a duty to support their production and consumption. This paper argues that the ethical status of cultured animal products ought to be assessed not just in comparison with factory farming, but also in terms of its potential to bring about interspecies justice. The claim is made that the attitudes embodied within cultured animal products show a lack of proper respect for nonhuman animals and are at odds with those required by justice. Although cultured animal products have the potential to greatly reduce harms done to nonhuman animals, this paper argues that their adoption ought to nevertheless be regarded with some regret. Using a Rawlsian framework for assessing transitional steps towards justice, the paper shows that, whilst the adoption of cultured animal products may be permissible, the case for regarding it as a duty is much weaker. For cultured meats to be permissible, it must first be shown that alternatives that respect the value of nonhuman animals as ends-in-themselves do not exist.

A social insurance scheme against a short life seems impossible: ex ante (before lengths of life are known), it is hard to identify the persons who will be short-lived, and ex post (once lengths of life are known), it is often too late to compensate the short-lived. However, it is possible to insure persons against a short life by means of age-based statistical discrimination that favours the young in line with the Herod strategy: allocating the good things of life to all young adults improves the situation of the unidentified persons who will die prematurely and reduces the deprivation due to an early death. This article examines three challenges questioning the capacity of the Herod strategy to reduce wellbeing deprivation due to a premature death. First, the limited substitutability between the quantity and the quality of life years makes an efficient insurance scheme against a short life incomplete. Second, the state cannot know ex ante the conception of the good life of the short-lived and must offer baskets of universal means that would improve all kinds of short lives. Such baskets will, under endowment effects, affect the adopted views about the good life, against the ideal of a neutral state. Third, the bias towards the future makes persons spontaneously reallocate the good things of life to later ages, which would defeat insurance against a short life.

This paper examines the legitimacy of retrospective parental rights-claims through the lens of so-called ‘thwarted father’ cases: men who are unaware of their progeny’s existence until the window for establishing legal parentage (and associated rights) has passed. In some famous cases of thwarted fathers, courts have found that an injustice has been done which must be rectified by awarding retrospective parental rights and custody to those men, even when their genetic child has already lived for some extended period with their adoptive parents. In this paper, I critically examine Norvin Richards’ liberty-based defence of the parental rights of these fathers. He argues that the decision to overturn an adoption in a thwarted father case is justified if we agree that a man’s contribution of sperm was indeed the first act of a parenthood project that he should have had the liberty right to continue. Although Richards’ account might allow us to say that a thwarted father has been wronged, justice cannot demand that the situation be rectified through specific performance (as in cases when property is stolen and justice requires that it be returned).

Relational accounts of autonomy such as those advanced by Rebekah Johnston (2017. “Personal Autonomy, Social Identity, and Oppressive Social Contexts.” Hypatia 32 (2): 312–28) and particularly Marina Oshana (1998; “Personal Autonomy and Society.”  Journal of Social Philosophy  29 (1): 81–102. 2006; Personal Autonomy in Society . Aldershot: Ashgate; 2015. “Is Social-Relational Autonomy a Plausible Ideal?” In Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives , edited by M. Oshana. New York: Routledge) are often thought to be distinctively vulnerable to paternalist and perfectionist objections, as well as implying in a troublesome and/or implausible way that many of us are much less autonomous than is standardly thought. I argue that although constitutively relational accounts are indeed perfectionist, they are so in such a “thin” way that we should not be concerned by it; that they are not paternalist (and indeed are necessarily hostile to the sorts of power relations necessary for paternalism); and that the charge that relational accounts demand an unattractively high bar for autonomy is misdirected – we really do lack autonomy in perhaps surprising but plausible ways and for the account to imply this is a problem for the world rather than the theory.

According to a prominent account, the central normative commitments of socialism are a luck egalitarian principle of equality and a principle of community or solidarity. The model has a number of attractions. However, it appears to be vulnerable to a series of objections that have been pressed against luck egalitarian accounts of the concept of exploitation. In this paper I argue that, despite some overlooked flexibility, the exploitation objection represents a serious challenge to this model and provides a good reason to explore alternative accounts of socialism’s normative grounds.