Band 43, Heft 1

In the postwar era Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche has been held responsible for the reputation her brother acquired during the Third Reich as a prophet of National Socialism. In scholarly writing and popular accounts Forster-Nietzsche’s manipulation of her brother’s writings and letters, as well as her philologically unsound editorial practices, has led most observers to the hasty assumption that she intervened in his texts in order to fashion the image of Nietzsche as a German nationalist and anti-Semite. Recently Christian Niemeyer has renewed these attacks on Nietzsche’s sister, fearing that contemporary scholarship has forgotten the violations of her brother’s legacy. His philological accounts are flawed, however, and his arguments are contrived and unpersuasive. In fact, if we look closely at the evidence and Forster- Nietzsche’s editorial practices, we find that she consistently included letters and passages that demonstrated Nietzsche’s intense opposition to the anti-Semitism of his era and to conservative Wilhelmine politics. In Niemeyer’s article Forster-Nietzsche is once again unfairly blamed for Nietzsche’s favorable reception as a proto-Nazi. Zusammenfassung In der Nachkriegszeit machte man Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche fur den Ruf ihres Bruders als eines Propheten des Nationalsozialismus wahrend des Dritten Reichs verant wortlich. In wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten und in der breiten Offentlichkeit fuhrten Forster-Nietzsches Manipulationen der Schriften und Briefe ihres Bruders und ihre philologisch fragwurdigen Editionspraktiken die meisten Beobachter zu dem ubereilten Schluss, dass sie in Nietzsches Texte eingriff, um ihren Bruder als Nationalisten und Antisemiten darzustellen. Zuletzt hat Christian Niemeyer diese Vorwurfe gegen Nietzsches Schwester erneuert, in der Besorgnis, die Entstellungen des Erbes ihres Bruders seien in der gegenwartigen Forschung vergessen worden. Niemeyers philologische Methode ist jedoch nicht akzeptabel, und seine Argumente scheinen weit hergeholt und nicht uberzeugend. Schaut man sich die Texte und Forster- Nietzsches Editionspraktiken genauer an, findet man in der Tat, dass sie mit groser Regelmasigkeit Briefe und Passagen veroffentlichte, die gerade Nietzsches heftige Gegnerschaft gegen den Antisemitismus seiner Zeit und gegen die konservative Wilhelminische Politik bewiesen. In Niemeyers Aufsatz wird Forster-Nietzsche wieder einmal unfair die Schuld fur die bereitwillige Rezeption Nietzsches als Proto-Nazi gegeben.

In responding to Robert C. Holub’s criticism, I seek to establish both the context in which Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche’s activities must be seen and the context of my own critique of her. I raise the question whether, given the numerous cases in which Forster-Nietzsche’s falsifications have gone unnoticed (also by Holub), specific misperceptions stemming from early German editions of Nietzsche’s works and letters might not have found only partial or local entry in Nietzsche reception. After reiterating and elaborating on my position, I suggest that future objections to Nietzsche’s sister are more likely to increase than decrease and warn away from quixotic attempts at vindication.

The aim of this paper is to make a contribution to research into Nietzsche’s sources on Spinoza. Firstly, it presents some proposals concerning Adolf Schöll. Secondly, the paper develops the assumption that some mentions of Spinoza in 1884-1885 are based on the notebook M III 1 (1881). Thirdly, it discusses the hypotheses on the source of the expression “Inconsequenz Spinoza’s” in JGB 13, which have recently been presented by Andreas Rupschus and Werner Stegmaier (Trendelenburg) and by Andre as Urs Sommer (Guyau, Falckenberg). The paper presents some proposals concerning the notebook M III 1 and Afrikan Spir in order to give a contribution to the explanation of the expression

Richard Rorty does not only embrace many aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but claims to improve on it. Thus, he shares with Nietzsche the refutation of a moral philosophy based on pretended objectivity and ultimate justification. However, he holds such a position to be consistent with the insistence on his own particular perspective of a Eurocentric liberal. Rorty’s criticism targets Nietzsche’s demand for poeticised self-creation because of its potential for cruelty, which is supposed to undermine the social bedrock for further self-overcoming. Although his critique is poignant, it issues in a dichotomy between public and private that is open to the charge of falling back into the metaphysics he explicitly wants to avoid

Today, the reception of Nietzsche and his work in Korea looks back at a history of approximately 94 years. The Nietzsche reception in Korea may be divided into three consecutive phases: (1) the phase of initial reception and argument (1920s to the end of the 40s), in which over time its socio-philosophical introduction took place with, on the one hand, the confrontational argument between the philosophy of fascism and the philosophy of culture of the ‘Übermensch’ and, on the other hand, the productive discourse of neo-humanism in literary criticism and the birth of the ‘School of Life’ in poetry; (2) the phase of extension (1950s to late 70s), in which both the first two attempts to translate Nietzsche’s complete works took place and ‘vulgar Nietzscheanism’ made its appearance; and (3) the phase of systematical study (early 1980s to the present), in which there has been made a new and thorough attempt to translate the works of Nietzsche, culminating in the Nietzsche’s Works Critical Edition, and in which simultaneously the manifoldness and the maturity of the contemporary Korean research on Nietzsche becomes visible