Volume 104, Issue 3

Over the past twenty years, research on political extremism and terrorism has become one of the fastest growing sub-fields within criminology. This rapid growth is reminiscent of the early years of criminology itself, characterized by energy, imagination and creativity but at the same time a specialization struggling to collect and analyze valid data, apply appropriate research methods and develop coherent theoretical frameworks. In this paper, we take stock of these developments by considering a basket of micro- and macro-level risk factors that have been frequently linked to the decision to engage in violent extremism. Following a review of risk factors, we consider major definitional, theoretical, data and methodological challenges and also progress made. Prior criminological research on violent extremism has focused especially on micro-level characteristics and few studies to date have integrated micro and macro determinants to explain extremist outcomes. However, with the growing availability of data, including open-source databases, paired with the application of more sophisticated statistical methods, we expect to see more robust results in the years ahead.

The present study seeks to explain individual differences in self-reported politically motivated violence and vandalism, and participation within an extreme right-wing group. While violent extremism is highly debated, few criminological studies explicitly test factors that can trigger violent extremism. The present study addresses this gap by integrating two different frameworks: a perceived injustice and group threat-initiated model and an impulsivity-initiated model. We also investigate several intervening mechanisms. We draw on a sample of 705 adolescents and young adults living in Flanders, Belgium to test the strength of direct and intermediary effects of perceived injustice, perceptions of out-group threat from Jewish populations, ethnocentrism, feelings of superiority, moral support for right-wing extremism, and exposure to racist peers on politically motivated violence and vandalism. Results of structural equation models (SEM) indicate various direct and intermediary effects between both perceived injustice and violent extremism, and between impulsivity and violent extremism. Our model reveals the complex and intricate antecedents of violent extremism. Importantly, we find that feelings of injustice and unfair treatment are a major source of extremist violence, as they easily trigger often debated causes such as high in-group identification and ethnocentrism. Implications of these findings for preventing violent extremism are discussed, given the centrality of perceptions of injustice and threat.

In this study we sought to identify whether risk and protective factors for radicalization can be classed as ‘universal’ factors or whether they have heterogeneous cross-regional effects. Specifically, we sought to identify whether there were factors which displayed significantly different effects in European contexts compared to other democratic countries. We conduct a confirmatory meta-analysis based on a recent Campbell Collaboration systematic review and meta-analysis (Wolfowicz, Litmanovitz, Weisburd and Hasisi, 2021). Studies were classified as being from either EU or non-EU countries and moderator analysis was used to identify between-region heterogeneity. The analysis was possible for 23 factors pertaining to radical attitudes, 13 pertaining to radical intentions and 4 for radical behaviours. For radical attitudes, the estimates for European studies were significantly larger for Gender, Socio-economic status, and Parental involvement, whereas the estimates for Religiosity, Institutional trust, Integration, and Moral neutralizations were significantly smaller compared to other democratic countries in other regions. For radical intentions, the estimates for Self-esteem was significantly larger for European studies. For radical behaviours, the estimate for Unemployment was significantly larger for European studies than for democratic countries in other regions. Overall, most risk and protective factors for radicalization appear to have ‘universal’ effects across democratic countries, but there are some factors that may be more relevant for targeting by counter-radicalization in certain contexts. Although European counter-radicalization has often focused on factors such as integration and institutional trust, these factors have relatively small relationships with radicalization, and these relationships are even smaller in the European context compared to democratic countries in other regions. The findings suggest that mitigation strategies, and interventions providing employment opportunities in particular, may be well suited to the European context if the goal is to develop locally-oriented approaches to counter-radicalization.

This paper examines the link between attitudes, the acceptance of violence and the performance of extremist acts. It is tested, if different ideologies of extremism develop commonalities in their positions, attitudes and structures. Data from a school survey of more than 6,700 9th grade students from Germany serves as the empirical basis. The results show among other things that different extremist ideologies (right-wing, left-wing, Islamism) covary on the level of attitudes, acceptance of violence and extremist behavior. In a further step of analysis, the theoretically based paths of initially extremist attitudes, then an additional approval of violence and finally the commission of extremist acts was examined approximately in a person-oriented approach. Except for one path, the analyses of radicalization patterns confirm a model that commences on the cognitive level, followed by the acceptance of deviant means to reach ideological goals and finally leading to extremist acts.

Zusammenfassung Während in den vergangenen Jahren die Forschung zum politisch rechtsorientierten und religiös-islamistischen Extremismus zunahm, blieb eine ähnliche Entwicklung beim Linksextremismus aus. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht spezifische Risiko- und Schutzfaktoren des Linksextremismus. Die Daten stammen aus einer Onlinebefragung mit 144 potentiellen Linksextremen, die wir mittels eines Online-Fragebogens u. a. über einschlägige linksaffine und -extreme Gruppierungen rekrutierten. Wir konzentrierten uns in unserer Studie auf aggressives und gewalttätiges Verhalten (nicht nur auf Einstellungen). 51 % unserer Teilnehmer waren männlich, das Durchschnittsalter war M = 26.74 ( SD = 6.11). 92 Teilnehmer berichteten, politisch motivierte Gewalt gegen Personen und/oder Sachen begangen zu haben. Erhoben wurden theoretisch fundierte Einflussfaktoren der Person und des sozialen Umfelds. Eine hierarchische Regression konnte circa 50 % der Varianz der Gewalttätigkeit aufklären. Die Integration in ein gewaltbereites extremistisches Netzwerk hing deutlich mit der Durchführung extremistisch motivierter Gewalt zusammen. Eine persönliche kriminelle Vorgeschichte ging ebenfalls mit mehr politischer Gewalt einher. Wahrnehmungen von prozeduraler Gerechtigkeit und Legitimität konnten als Schutzfaktoren identifiziert werden. In einer explorativen Diskriminanzanalyse untersuchten wir Unterschiede zwischen Personen, die »nur« Gewalt gegen Sachen ausgeübt hatten, und jenen, die auch Gewalt gegen Personen berichteten. Gewaltorientierte extremistische Einstellungen waren der wichtigste Aspekt bei der Vorhersage der Gruppenzugehörigkeit. Die Ergebnisse werden theoretisch eingeordnet sowie Stärken und Schwächen der Studie diskutiert. Mehr empirische Untersuchungen zum Linksextremismus sind nötig, insbesondere solche mit einem längsschnittlichen Design.

Zusammenfassung Wie steht es um das Ausmaß islamistischer Einstellungen unter jungen Muslimen im deutschen Justizvollzug? Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es, Radikalisierungspotenziale und damit in Verbindung stehende mögliche religionsbezogene Einflussfaktoren sowie die Dauer der bisher verbüßten Haft anhand einer Stichprobe von 87 jungen muslimischen Inhaftierten explorativ zu untersuchen. Die Teilnehmer bearbeiteten hierfür einen Fragebogen, in dem wir Fragen zu religiösen Sozialisationserfahrungen und aktueller Religiosität stellten, sowie Zustimmung zu fundamentalistischen und religiös-militanten Aussagen erhoben. Wir untersuchten die Häufigkeitsverteilungen fundamentalistischer und militanter Einstellungen und verglichen die Skalenmittelwerte von Muslimen mit einer nicht-muslimischen Vergleichsgruppe ( n = 255). Anschließend berechneten wir Regressionsmodelle und modellierten Kausalketten, die die von uns untersuchten Konzepte durch Mediation miteinander verknüpften. Unsere Ergebnisse geben Hinweise auf eine erhöhte Vulnerabilität von muslimischen Gefangenen für Radikalisierung. Weiterhin geht aus unseren Ergebnissen hervor, dass Sozialisationseinflüsse zwar offenbar keinen unmittelbaren Einfluss haben, sich aber indirekt auf das Ausmaß militanter Einstellungen auswirken. Die bisher im Gefängnis verbrachte Zeit spielt eine untergeordnete Rolle. Wir diskutieren die Verallgemeinerbarkeit unserer Ergebnisse und mögliche Implikationen für den Strafvollzug.

Newsmedia have regularly reported about acts of terrorism that involved members of the same family, but also about instances where one sibling becomes a terrorist, whereas the other becomes a successful, law-abiding citizen. The question is, then, to what extent family circumstances and individual risk factors impact on pathways towards these shared or divergent outcomes. To date, studies on the family characteristics of terrorist suspects have been hampered by a lack of empirical data, small sample sizes and non-representative samples. Using register data on individuals suspected of a terrorist offense in the Netherlands and their family members, the present study examines the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the families, as well as criminal, employment and education careers of individual family members (parents and brothers/sisters). We compare these characteristics with those of two control groups: suspects of non-terrorist offenses and a matched sample from the population. We also compared the terrorist suspects with matched siblings who were not suspected of a terrorist offence. We will end with a discussion of both risk and protective factors that are present within these families and that can put members of the same family on different pathways.

Do radicalized Muslim prisoners differ from non-radicalized Muslim prisoners with regard to Kruglanski’s (2004) quest for significance (QFS), need for (cognitive) closure (NFC), and their frame alignment regarding ideological and religious issues? To answer this research question N = 26 male inmates from Bavarian prisons were interviewed. The radicalized prisoners or extremists ( n = 13) had been identified as Salafi or Jihadi adherents by the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bayerischer Verfassungsschutz) and therefore had a security note. The comparison group were non-radicalized Muslim inmates ( n = 13); the vast majority had a migration background. The audio files of the interviews were transcribed and Mayring’s (2010) qualitative content analysis was applied. The obtained interview material was analyzed twice (each time with a different focus) for psychological differences and characteristics between the two groups of Muslim prisoners. In the first analysis, the interviews were investigated with regard to conspiracy theories, dualistic conception of the world, political sensitivity, collective and individual victimization and religious rigidity. Extremists exhibited a stronger frame alignment with respect to general conspiracy theories, dualistic conception of the world, collective victimization, and political sensitivity. Results also substantiate the idea that extremists exhibit more rigid religious behaviors than non-extremist Muslim prisoners. Contrary to our expectations, the two groups did not differ in various biographical features, for example whether they grew up in a family that actively practiced their religion. In the second analysis, we found that although the overall pattern regarding QFS turned out as expected, the radicalized inmates did not achieve higher values than their non-radicalized counterparts. However, we obtained substantial differences for subcategories of QFS. The extremist prisoners reported more norm violations as a trigger for QFS and more opportunities for gaining significance than non-extremists. This was also true for non-legitimate as well as non-criminal opportunities to gain significance. There was a substantial difference between extremists and non-extremists regarding the overall NFC characteristics. Radicalized prisoners tend to avoid ambiguous situations or uncertainty, they prefer clear, structured processes and firm beliefs. The results suggest that it is possible to differentiate non-radicalized from radicalized Muslims as they showed less quest for significance, less need for closure, less political sensitivity and a less rigorous view on religion.

Radicalization and violent extremism in young people are growing problems in almost every society around the globe. This article starts by briefly summarizing the result of several comprehensive reviews on the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. Based on a new social-developmental model of radicalization, it then introduces the concept of developmental prevention and presents a review of prevention principles, approaches, and programs derived from a developmental perspective within four different fields of proximal radicalization processes. These include (1) identity problems; (2) prejudice and negative intergroup attitudes; (3) extremist narratives, beliefs, and ideologies; and (4) antisocial development. Overall, several approaches and programs reveal promising effect sizes for a developmentally founded prevention of radicalization. However, more sound evaluations are needed to further promote this field.

Improving our understanding of how disengagement and deradicalisation from terrorism and violent extremism occurs has critical real-world implications. A systematic review of the recent literature in this area was conducted in order to develop a more refined and empirically-derived model of the processes involved. After screening more than 83,000 documents, we found 29 research reports which met the minimum quality thresholds. Thematic analysis identified key factors associated with disengagement and deradicalisation processes. Assessing the interactions of these factors produced the Phoenix Model of Disengagement and Deradicalisation which is described in this paper. Also examined are some of the potential policy and practice implications of the Phoenix Model, as are avenues for future research in this area.