Band 11, Heft 2

This paper follows Noel’s 2010 attempt to introduce journalists and practitioners to findings from professional political science which are relevant to the interpretive challenge of American politics but with which they may not be familiar. It extends his work by focusing on comparative politics this time – the domestic politics of foreign countries – and it argues that American politics might be interpreted differently if it were analyzed through the lens of comparison.

The linkages between political elites and their ostensible rank and files are central concerns of democratic theory, and central considerations in the empirical analysis of democratic politics. Yet in a world of burgeoning surveys of public opinion generally, there remains a desperate shortage of ways to tap the opinion of national elites. This piece (re)introduces political scientists and practicing journalists to one device for adding elite opinions to their tool-kits, by way of the Insiders Polls that were created and sustained within National Journal , a magazine of political analysis. Examples are offered of major differences between partisan elites, of concerns where experience trumps partisanship in shaping elite opinion, of the use of these Polls in following both electoral campaigns and conflicts over public policy.

Political parties are not static organizations; they continually adapt to changes to the political, electoral, and legal environments. In this paper we argue that so-called 527 committees are another form of party adaptation. We investigate questions about their role in elections, using a dataset consisting of the personnel backgrounds of the largest 527s in the 2004 and 2006 election cycles. We examine the staffing of these groups and their ties to the formal party structures. We find that 527 organizations with stronger personnel links to formal party organizations have more connections to other 527s. The results suggest that 527s are not independent actors disrupting the party system, but rather well-placed participants in the party networks that helped parties adapt to a changing electoral context.

Does the relationship of political consultants to national political party committees influence whether US House candidates who use fundraising specialists appeal to national or local campaign donors? This question clarifies whether campaign fundraising is a means to represent the interests of donors across the nation or the local concerns of interests within congressional districts. Recent scholarship argues that donors give to non-local candidates in competitive races when prompted by party leaders and elites. Yet this causal mechanism may understate the calculus and ability of candidates to pursue local versus distant contributions. Using FEC data on party expenditures to fundraising consulting firms, candidate spending on fundraising firms, and candidate donor location in the 2010 House elections, I demonstrate that as candidates spend more on fundraising firms that are connected to national parties, they will raise more in out-of-district donations than if they hire those without party ties, who are more effective in attracting in-district contributions, while spending on fundraising consultants connected to national parties corresponds to a depreciation in local funds raised. The findings demonstrate the fundraising impact of political consultants within national party networks, as well as the limitations of national fundraising networks to direct local donors to congressional election campaigns.

The values divide between materialists and postmaterialists, first identified by Ronald Inglehart, continues to define the evolution of partisan loyalties in the United States. Contemporary analysis of voting behavior within the White working-class incorporates the debate between a revisionist school that identifies a contemporary electoral battleground inverted from that of the New Deal era and a traditionalist school that maintains the class alignment established during the New Deal largely remains in effect. The following case study investigating voting behavior in Pennsylvania at the precinct level allows the application of empirical data to identify trends in partisan identity. The study concludes that there is significant evidence that the class loyalties as determinants of partisan attachment established by the New Deal have been superseded by values-driven imperatives. Accordingly, traditionally Democratic, materialist blue-collar constituencies in southwestern Pennsylvania have moved towards the Republican Party, while the opposite has occurred in the traditionally Republican postmaterialist white-collar constituencies of southeastern Pennsylvania. Given the underlying demographics, the Democratic Party has been the net winner from this transfer of allegiances.

Intense partisanship and the permanent election mentality permeate Congress, such that bipartisanship is rare. Yet we contend that in overlooking intra-party compromises, observers both exaggerate the negative implications of partisan polarization and inflate the merits of inter-party cooperation. We show that in situations of unified government in this polarized era, meaningful compromises to enact major legislation may occur within heterogeneous parties instead of between polarized counterparts. Through an examination of health care reform in the 111th Congress, we demonstrate the significance of these intra-party compromises. While acknowledging that partisanship and the constant campaign cycle prevented bipartisan collaboration on health care reform and created a poisonous atmosphere, we nonetheless do not fuel the common anxiety over vitriolic partisanship – the same partisanship enhanced the importance of intra-party compromise for passing landmark legislation. Given that partisan tensions are not diminishing, our research also may provide food for thought for policy analysts. The article draws on material from one author’s informal, in-person conversations with over a dozen key actors in 2010 and 2011.

In the heated rhetoric of the 2010 elections, there were some accusations that the Tea Party movement was racist, and charges of Tea Party racism persisted through 2011 as President Obama attempted to deal with an intransigent Republican majority. This paper seeks to refute the charge of Tea Party racism. In particular, I treat the charge of racism as a research hypothesis (H R ): If racial animosity is a systematic motivation, then Republican freshmen elected to the House in 2010 with Tea Party endorsements should be significantly less supportive of the nation’s first Black president than are other conservative Republicans. The null hypothesis (H 0 ) is of course that Tea Party freshmen support for Obama is not different from that of other conservative Republicans. Controlling for the most obvious competing hypotheses (party, ideology, district partisanship) while comparing the results to analogous control groups, the analysis is able to reject the null hypothesis: ceteris paribus, Tea Party freshman support is significantly lower than should be expected, and this behavior is different from that of control groups. Although these results fail to provide evidence to refute charges of racism, it does not prove that President Obama’s race is the cause of lower Tea Party support. In the end, it suggests that more research is needed to look for causes other than race to explain Tea Party behavior.

Are independent leaners best compared to weak partisans, strong partisans, or to pure independents? Two recent surveys of leaners’ policy attitudes differ over whether they are more like weak partisans or strong partisans. Meanwhile, a separate survey of leaners’ interest in elections suggests that they are trending closer to pure independents. To resolve such differences, I argue for an issue-driven model of leaners that can encompass all of this variation. While some leaners are indistinguishable from strong partisans, other leaners are cross-pressured by their underlying policy preferences to look more independent from the party they say they are closer to. As one example of the latter, younger Republican leaners are more cross-pressured in terms of their economic ideology, and thus are more independent than are younger Democratic leaners.

From 2008 to 2012, national voter turnout fell by over 3 percentage points, to 58.2% of the eligible voting population. This decrease reversed the trend of increasing turnout across the previous three presidential elections. Using aggregate data from official records, this article reviews turnout across time and across the states. Taking advantage of recently released individual-level data, it also explores the level of turnout and change in turnout by race and age. Turnout among Blacks and Whites seems to be going in different directions, with Black turnout exceeding White turnout for perhaps the second election in a row. Youth turnout remains low and decreased substantially from its 2008 level. These findings suggest the need for additional attention from the research community. The article concludes with a call for a shift in focus from the next quick fix to longer-term solutions that will establish and maintain an attachment to voting among the citizenry.